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Abstract
The popularity of Twitter for information discovery, coupled with the automatic shorten-
ing of URLs to save space given the 280 character limit, provides cybercriminals with an
opportunity to obfuscate the URL of a malicious Web page within a tweet. Once the URL
is obfuscated, the cybercriminal can lure a user into clicking on it with enticing text and
images before carrying out a cyber attack using a malicious Web server. This is known
as a drive-by download and has been reported to account for 48% of web-based attacks.
In a drive-by download a user’s computer system is infected while interacting with the
malicious endpoint, often without them being made aware the attack has taken place. An
attacker can gain control of the system by exploiting unpatched system vulnerabilities,
and this form of attack currently represents one of the most common methods employed.
In order to counter drive-by download attacks on Twitter, this thesis contributes to the
existing literature on detecting malware on online social networks by shifting the focus
towards the effects of malware on user machines, and away from the malware signa-
ture and dynamic behaviour, which can be obfuscated. Initially we developed a drive-by
download detection model for Twitter that was successful in classifying URLs into ma-
licious and benign with an F-measure of 0.81 during training, and 0.71 while testing on
an unseen dataset. The model was then extended into a predictive model that was able to
predict whether the URL was pointing to a malicious Web page with 0.99 F-measure (us-
ing 10-fold cross-validation) and 0.833 F-measure (using an unseen test set) at 1 second
into the interaction with a URL. These provide a novel contribution with which it is pos-
sible to kill the connection to the server before an attack has completed - thus proactively
xblocking and preventing an attack, rather than reacting and repairing at a later date. This
thesis also contributes to the broader literature on malware propagation by uncovering
both social and content-based factors that aid in the propagation of a tweet containing a
link to a malicious Web server. This was achieved by gathering data from seven different
and diverse sporting events over a period of three years. The data were then analysed to
answer questions including: why are certain Tweets retweeted more than others? is viral-
ity partly driven by psychological arousal? and, is the act of retweeting affected by the
tweet content and the emotions it evokes? Experimental results showed a strong associa-
tion towards content-driven features, such as emotions and the choice of words associated
with emotions that were used to compose a tweet or create hashtags. Tweets that contain
malicious links were associated with negative emotions, particularly the emotion fear, for
their retweet likelihood (virality) and survival (longevity of propagation). Whereas, in
tweets that were classified as benign, it was positive sentiment and high arousal emotions
such as surprise that were associated with the size and survival of Web links.
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3Chapter 1
Introduction
”True Cyber security is preparing for what’s next, not what was last”— Neil Rerup
1.1 Introduction
In this digital era, it is estimated that 4.02 billion people actively use the Internet [37], and
each user, simply by virtue of being online, is vulnerable to a cyber attack. In 2018, 12
billion records [47] containing personal and confidential information fell victim to cyber
attacks, and it is estimated that this number will continue to rise, no matter what security
measures are taken. A report by Juniper Research Labs estimated that by 2023, 33 billion
records containing personal and confidential information would be stolen by cybercrimi-
nals [106], resulting in substantial financial losses to both individual and companies. On
an average, £3.03 millions were lost, due to data breaches by companies worldwide, and
it was observed that the average time taken to detect a data breach was 196 days [158].
Though cyber attacks can be carried out on the Internet in numerous ways, cybercrim-
inals have in the past largely preferred platforms that are widely used [55]. Thus, with
the growing popularity of online social networks (OSNs), attacks such as Phishing [137],
Distributed Denial of service [121], Cross-site scripting [86], Man in the middle, Trojan
attacks [153] and drive-by downloads [102] that deploy viruses, worms [184] are continu-
ally being modified so that they can be delivered through OSNs. The introduction of OSNs
as another medium through which an attack can be delivered has increased the complex-
4ity and the number of cyber attacks. The growing popularity of OSNs has also attracted
infamous cyber groups such as Lurk [74] and Patchwork [53] (or Dropping Elephant) and
others like them, which are dedicating time and effort to the design of OSN-specific at-
tacks.
Though OSNs have brought millions of users together and created a new venue where
users can interact online, they have also posed a serious threat to information security
[77]. They present a highly connected network of users who can communicate with each
other by sending direct messages or by sharing content by means of posts. This is because
the rate at which people react to topics on OSN can escalate very rapidly giving a very
short response time in which to counter an attack. For example, 6,000 tweets per second
is the average rate at which a tweet is posted on Twitter [145], a rate which can increase
to reach 143,199 tweets per second [205].
In the current digital environment, the Windows operating system is the most commonly
adopted [88] and, thus, most often targeted by cybercriminals [47]. This makes preserv-
ing the security and privacy of individuals’ and companies’ data a challenging task for
security analysts and forensics investigators. Even though substantial amounts are spent
on researching ways to fight cyber attacks and developing malware detection models, the
rate at which cyber attacks occur increases [106]. As technology changes so do the at-
tacking strategies of cyber criminals and, even though counter-measures are taken, such as
educating users [93, 171], installing anti-virus software [139], restricting user privileges
in security policy [143], deploying malware detection models based on static/dynamic
analysis [100, 210, 137, 135, 31, 125, 65, 103, 108, 114, 11, 116, 149, 22], the use of
anti-malware [169] and anti-exploitation tools [170], they continue to pose a threat to
cybersecurity. In order to counter cyber attacks, researchers have proposed a systematic
method in which data on security threats, threat actors, exploits, malware, vulnerabilities
and compromise indicators [182] are collected, assessed and applied. This is referred to
as ”Cyber Threat Intelligence” (CTI). The aim of CTI is to help security practitioners
to identify the indicators of a cyber attack by analysing the information about attacking
strategies and formalising counter-measures to respond in time.
5In this study, we looked at cyber threats arising from OSNs, focusing mainly on drive-by
download attacks on Twitter. Here a methodological approach in CTI was followed, con-
ducting behavioural analysis on malware by executing malicious code. The study then
developed a machine learning model to predict drive-by download attacks on Twitter and
used statistical models to uncover the social and content-based factors that exist as part of
a tweet containing a malicious links that help it to propagate. However, the model had to
surmount such challenges as (i) finding suitable sources to gather this intelligence from;
(ii) gathering data from multiple events so that the model generalises beyond a single
event; and (iii) sifting the collected data for information that would be useful for predict-
ing such attacks. These challenges were met by (i) gathering data around seven popular
events on Twitter; (ii) extracting URLs from Tweets and opening them in a honeypot to
identify the occurrence of a drive-by download attack; and (iii) revisiting the Web page
in a sandboxed environment to observe the machine’s behaviour and identify the requisite
set of features; (iv) using the information gathered to develop a model that was capable
of predicting a drive-by download attack; and (v) understanding malware propagation
behaviour by uncovering the social and content-based factors that aid this propagation.
1.2 Problem Definition
In 2018, Symantec reported in their Internet Threat Security technical report that an av-
erage of 953,800 Web-based attacks occurred every day [47], and that 1 in 10 unique
resource locators (URLs) points to a malicious Web server. Among the different types of
Web-based attacks, the present study focuses on drive-by download attacks, particularly
those that use OSNs as the delivery method. In a drive-by download attack, a user’s sys-
tem is infected with malware merely by visiting a compromised Web page. During this
visit, the malware executes a malicious java-script code and the vulnerability of the sys-
tem is exploited to infect the user’s system. This is referred to as a ”drive-by download”
because the user is directly linked to a malicious file which is downloaded without the
user’s consent. Such attacks are considered more dangerous than attacks where a user has
6Figure 1.1: Typical Sequence of events for a drive-by download attack
to click to download a compromised software, which infects the system when installed.
Microsoft also acknowledges these attacks as one of its top threats in their security and
intelligence report [140]. Also, in a survey conducted by SANS Institute to identify the
most frequent methods employed by cybercriminals to launch cyber attacks on organisa-
tions, it was shown that drive-by downloads accounted for 48% of attacks by exploiting
Web-based vulnerabilities [175].
Twitter is growing in popularity and the 280-character restriction imposed on a tweet auto-
matically shortens a URL and gives cybercriminals the opportunity to create an enticing
tweet and obscure the URL that points to a malicious Web server inside it. Figure 1.1
above outlines the typical sequence of events through which an attacker entices a user to
open a malicious Web page and admit a malware on his/her system. This gives the cyber
criminal access to the system and exposes his/her private and confidential information to
theft for monetary gain. In order to counter malware attacks, numerous detection models
have been proposed.
These were built using OSN characteristics [12, 183, 227, 126, 144, 43, 192, 30, 187,
19], by doing static [100, 210, 137, 135, 31, 125, 65] or dynamic code analysis [103,
108, 114, 11, 116, 149, 22]. Models built using OSN characteristics help identify those
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ready classified as malicious or by comparing URLs against publicly published blacklists
of malicious URLs. Even though OSN characteristics help identify accounts exhibiting
deviant behaviour, the OSNs features used change with time or can be masked by cyber-
criminals to avoid being detected [6]. To overcome this limitation, additional investigation
of the Web page’s code or machine behaviour while visiting the Web page was required
to classify the URL as malicious. Typically, a honeypot is set up to observe machine state
changes while visiting a Web page [161, 24] or static/dynamic analysis is conducted to
investigate a Web page’s code.
Models have been built using static code analysis by analysing the code of the malware
without actually running it. The aim of these models is to identify known malware sig-
natures based on characteristics such as function calls, headers, etc. extracted from the
malware code [232]. One of the major drawbacks to these models is that they are slow
and require a considerable amount of human interaction [52], making them unsuitable for
handling large volumes of data quickly.
In contrast to static analysis, models built using dynamic code analysis identify the code
by executing the malware while observing the changes made by the code. However, these
models require many resources and present only a limited viewing period in which to ob-
serve the malware, thus restricting their usefulness against the malware in the Polymorph
category [152]. Moreover, these models fail if the malware becomes familiar with the
execution conditions, such as in a sandboxed environment, because of the strategically
placed triggers in the code [123]. These make the malware behave benignly and thus es-
cape detection.
One of the common methods used by security practitioners to protect their network is
to deploy honeypots [180]. The aim is to lure the cybercriminal to a system away from
the network and allow a cyber attack to take place, to reveal the malicious nature of the
application downloaded or Web page visited. The detection is performed on the basis of
system activities observed post an attack rather than by dissecting a malware code. By
doing so they gain an advantage over static/dynamic analysis by focusing on the effects
8of the malware infecting the system than analysing the malware itself. The assumption
is that no matter how well hidden the code was, upon successful execution, its effect on
the user’s system would eventually reveal its malicious nature. Thus, detection based on
observing machine activities provides an alternative approach where malware code is not
analysed, overcoming the need to decrypt, reassemble code or identify triggers in it. Even
though detection through honeypot by observing changes in machine activity removes the
need to analyse malware, they require high maintenance and if they were not properly de-
ployed they could act as access points to the network [180]. Cybercriminals continue to
develop new ways to overcome Twitter’s policy and beat the detection models proposed
to counter them. There is a requirement to develop detection models by shifting the focus
from existing malware code/behaviour features to keep pace with cybercriminals.
To summarise, OSN characteristics were used to identify accounts posting malicious
URLs and malware detection models which focused on identifying malware from activi-
ties which had already taken place or from existing malware signatures. Most importantly,
the focus of the research so far has been on detecting malware based on its code or its
behaviour alone or alternatively by observing machine activities through a honeypot af-
ter an attack has taken place. To the best of our knowledge, no work conducted yet has
achieved early-stage prediction to identify malware before an attack, allowing security
practitioners to take appropriate countermeasures and stop the malware from infecting a
system. This predictive security feature, could potentially save millions of pounds that
are spent towards repairing a network post a malware attack is detected.
In order to launch a successful drive-by download attack via Twitter, a cybercriminal aims
to create a tweet containing a URL, tempting enough that a user clicks on the URL point-
ing to a malicious Web server, and that it gets retweeted to a larger number of users. The
more the tweet gets retweeted, the more it is exposed to a significant number of users,
thus, increasing the chances of infecting a larger number of people. Even with a high
processing capability of the detection models, there is a good chance that a large number
of users would have been exposed to malware by the action of a retweet, even if the user
that started spreading it was identified and removed. In order to carry out a successful
9drive-by download attack via Twitter, the cybercriminal has to ensure that the tweet is
’interesting’ enough to catch a user’s attention and also contains content that encourages
the user to share it within its network. This leads to questions such as: (i) why are cer-
tain post shared more than others? and (ii) is virality driven by physiological arousal?
Content-based features such as emotions have been used to understand the virality of
posts on online social networks [17, 211]. Particularly, content containing negative emo-
tions have a higher chance to be shared on OSN than positive emotions [17]. This tactic
of using negative emotions to convey a message to a larger audience has been seen in
advertisements as well [16]. In order to investigate if emotion were a contributing factor
behind propagation of malicious URLs, a novel study to link emotions and sentiments to
malware propagation was conducted. Once the factors are identified, they can be used in
developing strategies to stop the malware from spreading. Thus, in order to successfully
stop an attack both the source of infection (user and URL used to spread the malware)
and the factors aiding its propagation need to be identified.
In order to identify accounts posting malware on OSN, their characteristics need to be
observed. What is required is the anticipation of the attack and its probability through a
series of machine activities taking place, while identifying the factors that aid its propa-
gation. This raises the following research question:
Is it possible to construct a predictive model based on machine behaviour and social fea-
tures that will identify malicious URLs and their propagation behaviour on OSN?
1.3 Contribution
To answer this question, this thesis adopts the detection principle used in honeypots i.e.
observing machine state changes to detect malware, but shifts the focus away from fixed
and possibly missing features such as API calls, to dynamic behaviour based on the effects
of malware on user machines (e.g. CPU, RAM, network use) that are much more difficult
to obfuscate and will be present in every piece of malware. This led to the development of
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a novel detection model capable of classifying an URL into a malicious or benign category
with an F-measure of 0.81 during training and 0.71 while testing on an unseen dataset. It
then combines social features, that act as indicators to identify accounts exhibiting deviant
behaviour with system activities leading to a drive-by download attack to build a novel
predictive model capable of identifying a malicious URL on Twitter with 0.99 F-measure
(using 10-fold cross-validation) and 0.833 (using an unseen test set) at 1 second into the
interaction with the URL. Thus, giving the model the ability to identify a malicious URL
based on system activities leading to an attack, providing a basis from which to kill the
connection to the server before an attack has completed and proactively blocking and
preventing an attack, rather than reacting and repairing at a later date. Though identifying
malicious URLs on Twitter is important, it is equally important to understand the factors
that aid in its propagation in order to stop it from spreading. A malicious URL propagates
on Twitter by the action of retweets. The more interesting the tweet is, the higher the
chances are that it would be shared. In this thesis, the contents of the tweets were analysed
to understand why certain tweets were retweeted more than others. In doing so it conducts
the first study that links content based factors such as emotion and sentiment to malware
propagation.
The thesis is composed of several individual chapters, listed below. It should be noted
that the chapters in this thesis have been published as peer-reviewed papers:
Paper 1 Burnap, P., Javed, A., Rana, O.F. and Awan, M.S., 2015, August. Real-time classi-
fication of malicious URLs on Twitter using machine activity data. In Advances in
Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM), 2015 IEEE/ACM International
Conference on (pp. 970-977). IEEE.
Paper 2 Javed, A., Burnap, P. and Rana, O., 2019. Prediction of drive-by download attacks
on Twitter. Information Processing & Management, 56(3), pp.1133-1145.
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1.3.1 Contributions
C1 To propose a predictive model capable of identifying a malicious URL within sec-
onds, based on machine activities and social features, thus providing new capability
to kill the connection and curtail the sequence of malicious actions rather than de-
pending on detection and repair at significant cost and inconvenience.
C2 To understand propagation behaviour by uncovering the social and content features,
particularly emotions that influence the propagation of tweets containing malicious
URLs.
Contributions C1 is relevant to Papers 1 and 2;
1.4 Thesis Structure
The chapters of this thesis have the following content:
Chapter 2 This chapter surveys the work related to the detection and propagation of drive-by
download attacks on Twitter, with the aim of identifying the limitations and research
gaps in the current work. Open research questions, based on the research gaps, are
proposed in the course of the discussion. This chapter contributes to C1 and C2.
Chapter 3 The emergence of Twitter as one of the most popular OSNs for updates on current
affairs has in the past attracted cybercriminals, who exploit system vulnerabilities
to carry out cyber attacks. This chapter investigates cyber attacks on Twitter and
finds evidence of drive-by download attacks around popular sporting events. It
contributes to C1 and C2
Chapter 4 In this chapter, a novel detection model is proposed that classifies a URL as mali-
cious or benign based on the system’s activities leading to an attack. Thus shifts
the focus from deriving features from malware code/behaviour to observing the
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changes in the user system made by the malware. The associated chapter con-
tributes to C1.
Chapter 5 In this chapter we develop a world-first predictive model for drive-by download
attacks on Twitter. Further, we develop evidence that social features contribute to
the prediction of drive-by download attacks on Twitter and can adapt to changing
techniques of malware delivery. By developing a machine learning model using ma-
chine activity data and tweet metadata, the study moves beyond the post-execution
classification of such URLs as malicious ones, to predict whether a given URL will
be malicious or not. The associated chapter contributes to C1.
Chapter 6 This chapter investigates the propagation of malware through the action of a retweet.
We develop evidence that social and content-based factors that form part of a tweet
containing a malicious URL aid its propagation. This chapter contributes to C2.
Chapter 7 This chapter reflects on the contributions and highlights the future effect of the
thesis on the behaviour analysis of drive-by downloads on Twitter.
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Chapter 2
Background
A survey on work related to the detection and propagation of drive-by download attacks
on Twitter is conducted in this chapter, with the aim of identifying limitations and
research gaps in the current work. Open research questions, based on the research gaps,
are proposed and the scope of the thesis is defined in the course of the discussion.
2.1 Introduction
In January 2019, it was estimated that there were around 4.02 billion Internet users, of
whom 3.19 billion were active users on OSNs [37], defined as services or Web pages that
facilitate social interaction among online users as a means of exchanging information.
An OSN consists of active users whose connection to each other allows a relationship to
form. This relationship may be based on common interests, friendship or a search for
information. Over the years OSNs such as Facebook [66], Instagram [98], Tumblr [203],
Pinterest [156], Snapchat [186], YouTube [81], Whatsapp [97], Twitter [207], etc. have
grown considerably and engage around 80% of all Internet users [37]. Amongst the pop-
ular OSN platforms, we chose Twitter, a micro-blogging online social platform, for our
research, since it has around 335 million active users [118] and has become one of the
habitual places for getting updates on news of current affairs and entertainment. It also
makes 1% of its daily data publicly available for research. Its popularity, unfortunately,
continues to attract cyber attacks, such as distributed denial of service [121], cross-site
scripting [86], Trojan attacks [153] and drive-by downloads [102] which have become
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major threats to it.
This research is focused on drive-by download attacks on Twitter because they have
been acknowledged by Microsoft as one of its top threats in their security and intelligence
report [140]. Also, in a survey conducted by SANS Institute to identify the most frequent
methods employed by cybercriminals to launch cyber attacks on organisations, it was
shown that drive-by downloads accounted for 48% of attacks by exploiting Web-based
vulnerabilities [175].
Typically, in a drive-by download attack, a cybercriminal creates a client-side scripting
code that targets a Web browser’s vulnerability or a Web-browser’s plugin vulnerability.
The client-side code is either added to the code of the Web page or hosted on a server.
When a user visits any of these Web pages they are injected with the malicious code,
transferring the client side-script on the user’s machine, exploiting the browser’s vulnera-
bility and thus compromising the user’s machine. Once the machine is compromised, the
cybercriminal can steal confidential information such as files and passwords or can even
use secondary devices such as a camera or a microphone to spy on the user [20]. These
cyber attacks can also be used as an entry point to carry out more widespread attacks such
as Ransomware [36] – where a CryptoLocker attack that originated from a drive-by down-
load attack locked down a small city in Washington, USA for four days [122]. Twitter is
particularly susceptible to drive-by download attacks, due to the 280-character restriction
imposed on tweets [102]. This automatically shortens a unique resource locator (URL),
giving cybercriminals the opportunity to obfuscate a URL that points to a malicious Web
server.
Today, a company that has an online presence spends on average around £1.89 million
per year on security defence against malware and Web-based attacks [1]. Yet 48% of
Web-based attacks launched on companies were contributed to drive-by download at-
tacks [175] and 1 in every 13 Web-based requests made points towards malicious Web
servers [46]. Despite a security policy in place by Twitter and different malware detection
models proposed to counter malware on OSNs cybercriminals continue to develop new
ways to overcome them leading to a year by year increase in cyber attacks [106]. Also,
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it is estimated that by 2023, 33 billion records containing personal and confidential in-
formation would be stolen by cybercriminals [106]. Thus, there is a need to change the
counter-attacking strategies in order to better defend against malware attacks. This chap-
ter is divided into three sections on (i) definition of general terms used on Twitter, (ii)
discussion of work related to the detection of malicious content on OSNs, (iii) identifying
the underlying factors behind the propagation of malware.
The second section focusing on the detection of malware is further divided into three
subsections, namely, (i) detection based on OSN characteristics,(ii) detection based on
static and dynamic analysis (iii) detection based on Twitter’s policy. Through these we
look into the detection techniques based on content, using OSN user accounts, and URL
characteristics; study the detection techniques based on static and dynamic code analysis;
and finally, look at Twitter’s policy for detecting spam and malware. In the third section
we look at work to combat malware propagation on Twitter. In each section the typical
design choices, key findings and limitations are discussed, research gaps are identified
and research questions are presented.
2.1.1 Definition of Terms Used on Twitter
Tweet: Twitter allows users to share their opinions, make status updates, or discuss news
in posts, which it restricts to 280 characters, commonly known as tweets. This restriction
automatically applies a URL shortening service to facilitate the posting of a URL in a
tweet. This service acts as re-direction service that creates a short URL of 8 characters
from the original length of the URL.
Followers: the followers of a user’s account are defined by the set of users who choose
to receive a tweet when the user has posted it.
Friends: Unlike popular OSNs such as Facebook, relationships between users in Twitter
are not bidirectional. Twitter lets users receive tweets from a friend without revealing
their own tweets. Friends are a set of users that an account subscribes to, in order to
obtain access to status updates.
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Mentions: Twitter allows users to be addressed specifically by prefixing @ to their unique
screen name in the tweet, which is a way of identifying a user. If a user has a public
timeline, mentions appear in this timeline whether or not they are following the user that
initially posted the tweet. This allows users on Twitter to quickly identify tweets directed
at them (which are broadcast to the sender’s followers). A typical example of this would
be
TwitterUser1:”@Superman keep Doomsday away”,
where the user, Superman, will receive the tweet on her/his timeline, even though s/he is
not following the user.
Retweets: Retweets on Twitter are a form of attribution, where RT @username denotes
that the tweet text originally appeared on another user’s profile.
TwitterUser1:”RT @Batman: where did you park the #batmobile.”
is an example of a retweet, where RT signifies that a user has retweeted the original tweet.
Retweets are used to increase the volume of users who see a tweet.
Hashtags: Hashtags are created by users to give context to their post and make them
stand out from others, in order to reach a targeted audience, increase traffic to their post
and in turn increase traffic to their profile. Any word preceded by # on Twitter is termed
a hashtag; typical examples are #superman, #batman, etc. An example of a tweet using a
hashtag is
TwitterUser1:”#TGIF movies and popcorn”
One of the unique advantages that Twitter provides is that it highlights the most talked
about topics (using hashtags) by creating a list of trending topics.
1 Tweets examples given are not taken from any user’s account on Twitter, but are merely created as
examples for explanation purpose.
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2.2 Related Work for Detecting Malicious Content in On-
line Social Networks
In this section we look not only at work related to drive-by download attacks on Twit-
ter but also at work detecting malicious content more generally on OSNs. Any content
on Twitter that has malicious intent, and that may be used to harm a user’s computer
system, steal personal/confidential information or in any way disrupt a user’s activity is
categorised as malicious content. In addition to malicious content, spam circulating on
Twitter, which is considered a significant issue on OSN, is also considered. The rationale
in looking at spam detection is that it has revealed similar detection methods to those
combating malicious content. The remainder of this section is divided into three parts,
which deal with the detection of the malware problem from three different perspectives,
namely detection based on:
1. Social features.
2. Static and Dynamic behaviour.
3. Twitter’s own policy to counter malware.
2.2.1 Detecting Malicious Content Based on OSN Accounts and URL
Characteristics
Previous research has aimed to identify tweets that were classified as spam or contained
a URL pointing to a malicious Web server, based on a tweet’s meta-data. This was be-
cause it is possible to distinguish a ’normal’ user from a ’malicious’ user on the basis of
account characteristics extracted from the tweet’s meta-data, such as the number of fol-
lowers, number of people s/he follows, posting behaviour, etc. Evidence of this is seen in
earlier works, where tweet attributes were used as key features to detect accounts exhibit-
ing abnormal behaviour (e.g. posting spam or malicious URLs). For example, in order to
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identify the social features of accounts spreading spam, Benevenuto et al. [14] collected
1.8 billion tweets from 54 million Twitter accounts discussing three trending topics on
Twitter. They then manually annotated the dataset and identified 355 accounts that were
spreading spam and 7,852 accounts that were categorised as regular accounts. Accounts
that were labelled as spam were further analysed to identify patterns and features that
could be used to build spam detection models. They found around 23 tweet attributes that
could be used to flag an account or a tweet as spam. The resultant model was able to
detect accounts spreading spam with an accuracy of 70%. However, much time was taken
up by the manual annotation of data, making it difficult to add features from new accounts
identified as spam to the detection model and thus making the model restrictive.
Grier et al. [83] analysed account behaviour and included blacklists of URLs as one of the
features in the malware detection model. The model was built by capturing 200 million
tweets and investigating 125 million URLs. These authors used three well known sites
(Google Safebrowsing [80], URIBL [209], and Joewein [218]) that published blacklists
to identify malicious URLs. By means of account posting, these URLs were analysed
to identify features that could be used to detect malicious accounts. The authors also
evaluated the effectiveness of blacklists to curtail the propagation of malware on Twitter.
However, their work was limited to URLs already identified in blacklists and they had
little means of identifying the URLs that were evading detection because they were not
included in the list. Similarly, focusing only on the behaviour of Twitter users, Cao and
Caverlee [32] proposed a spam detection model based on tweet attributes and users’ post-
ing behaviour. The robustness of the spam detection model was based on the assumption
that it is difficult to manipulate a user’s posting behaviour. For their study, they investi-
gated the posting behaviour of Twitter users by collecting from a publicly accessible Bitly
API the URL clicking statistics for those URLs that were embedded in the posts marked
as spam. From the collected data a user’s behavioural features were extracted. Features
included frequency of posting, frequency of the link being clicked, and the post sharing
behaviour such as observing if the post was shared in a burst or gradually over time. A
model was then constructed using 7 million tweets that contained a URL. In terms of per-
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formance the model recorded a precision of 0.86 and a recall of 0.86. However, the model
relied on Bitly’s application programming interface (API) to provide statistics on users’
posting behaviour. The same statistics are generated by Twitter or other URL shorting
services but are not easily available; hence, they limit the model’s efficiency, depending
on Bitly’s API.
Building on the idea that the same information could be perceived differently by different
people, Shen et al [183] proposed a generalised spammer detection framework based on
multiple views of information. When these multiple views of the same information were
taken, the authors proposed that the information be incorporated from various perspec-
tives and not be limited to a single view (such as hashtags, URLs, etc.) as in previous
models. In order to build the proposed model information about a user was gathered
from three different perspectives – text, hashtag and URL. The analysis by these authors
showed that different information has the ability to characterise users differently. They
assigned different weightings to each view and then combined them to build the classifi-
cation model. The model was built using information gathered from 10,080 Twitter users’
accounts and the final model was able to classify tweets as spam with an F-measure of
0.879. Though the model showed different views of information could be used to detect
account that were showing deviant behaviour it was limited to identify account that were
spreading spam only.
Alghamdi et al [6] conducted experiments to identify the features that could be used
to build a reliable spam detection model. Experiments were conducted on 6,509 tweets
with a mix of spam and legitimate content, segregating them on the basis of publicly
available blacklists of URLs marked as spam. Features based on the tweet content and
user demographic information were used to show a close relationship between them and
the tweets that were classified as spam. The authors conducted content analysis to charac-
terise user behaviour by comparing the content of a tweet around a particular topic (based
on hashtags) with that of both legitimate and spam containing tweets using the Frequency
Pattern [2] and Term Frequency. By doing so, they were able to segregate user features
and behaviour into sets of distinct patterns. Then, using Cosine similarity, they compared
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similarities between the user’s profile description and the tweets posted. Experimental
results showed that spammers tend to show either lower similarity or high divergence be-
tween their profile description and their tweets.
Instead of observing an adversary’s behaviour, Lee et al [126] created a trap to attract
cybercriminals. Social features were captured from every cybercriminal that fell into the
trap to construct a spam detection model that was capable of identifying similar accounts
on OSN. In their approach these authors created a legitimate profile and attached a so-
cial bot on two online social platforms, Myspace and Twitter. The aim was to attract and
identify spammers to this profile. The account was classified as spam on the basis of in-
teractions - for example, through content in direct messages or friend requests that were
made. When an account was identified as spam, features such as the number of friends,
presence of URL in a post, age of the account, etc., were extracted and were used to
build a spam detection model. In order to validate the model, it was tested on two online
social platforms. For Twitter an F-measure of 0.992 was observed and for Myspace an
F-measure of 0.88 was observed. One of the key features of this model was that it could
adapt to a changing environment. This model was implemented by the manual validation
of its results and its design was based on the validation results. The model was rebuilt
to prevent future mistakes. In a similar approach, Stringhini et al created honey-profiles
on the top three OSNs (Twitter, Facebook and Myspace) and recorded the content and
interactions made to these profiles in order to identify tweet attributes that could be used
to detect accounts which spread spam [192]. Using these honey-profiles the authors were
able to identify accounts that spread spam by using the friend requests and messages that
they received. Behavioural analysis of these accounts led to the identification of impor-
tant online social account features that could be used to detect irregularities. Using these
features the authors built a machine learning model and tested it against unseen datasets.
They were successful in identifying around 15,857 accounts on Twitter that were spread-
ing spam. However, in both cases, the spam detection model performance depended on
the honey-profile. This meant that if the profile did not attract enough spammers it would
not be able to capture enough attributes from spam accounts and its performance would
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decline, thus limiting its efficiency.
Exploring the idea of using a blacklist - a list of suspended accounts that had been classi-
fied as spreading spam - Thomos et al. [199] analysed content and user account attributes
to highlight features that could be used in identifying other accounts spreading spam. The
dataset that they used for their analysis contained around 1.1 million suspended accounts
and around 1.2 billion posts from them. The aim of the experiment was to come up with a
competent blacklist that could be used to remove all accounts that were spreading spam.
One of the key findings of this research was uncovering emerging ”spam as a service”
APIs. These APIs were used by cybercriminals to evade detection, to decouple themselves
from the process of distributing spam, to save on resources by using APIs, and to launch
a very specialised spam attack on OSN. However, the experiment was limited to the data
that had already been detected by Twitter as spam and the blacklist that was generated
reflected only the accounts that had features similar to accounts published on Twitter’s
blacklist. The model failed to capture information about accounts that had been evading
Twitter’s spam detection filter and would always fail to detect these and similar accounts
on Twitter. Similarly, Yang et al [226] collected data from around 500,000 Twitter ac-
counts and applied a blacklist filter. URLs were extracted from the results and passed on to
a honeypot to identify those who were spreading malicious content. The honeypot results
were also validated by a manual check before using the URLs to construct a spam detec-
tion model. By studying the characteristics of the OSN accounts they identified ten new
detection features, including graph-based, neighbour based, timing-based and automation
based features, that were later used to build the model. The model in this research out-
performed previous spam detection models by 12%, giving an accuracy of 85%. These
authors collaborated with Zhang and Shin [228] to analyse the cybercriminals’ ecosystem
on Twitter, studying inner and outer social relationships. Inner relationships were defined
as accounts associated with cybercriminals which were interconnected, while the outer
relationships looked at accounts which supported accounts conducting malicious activi-
ties.
Similarly, a feature-based approach was employed by Cresci et al [50], who built a clas-
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sifier to detect fake accounts that cybercriminals had created to inflate the number of
followers. A baseline dataset was created by manually annotating the data and by us-
ing public lists of accounts that spread spam. This was followed by running numerous
experiments to identify the best spam/bot detection model to date for detecting accounts
spreading spam and accounts that are classified as bots. The most effective features were
identified by testing those used in previous studies to identify spam/bots. Based on the
features found most effective, a machine learning model was built to detect accounts that
were spreading spam or were classified as bots. The results showed that the proposed
model had an F-measure of 0.991. Shifting focus form social attributes Concone et al.
[44] developed a real-time malware discovery system, based on the contents of the post.
The proposed model was able to analyse the content of a tweet and generate alerts signi-
fying the presence of malware online. However, the system did not detect the malware but
only confirmed the presence of malware circulating on the online social network based
on social chatter on Twitter. Chen et al [38] used a Finite State Machine based spam tem-
plate, demonstrating that a cybercriminal can create 2,000 tweets from a single template.
They discovered that such users were using multiple accounts to post spam in a coordi-
nated manner chosen to avoid detection. This is called ”load balancing” - a technique
frequently used to prevent denial of service attacks – but in this case, tweets were posted
from multiple accounts to prevent detection.
So far, the research has been focused on studying OSN accounts and URL characteristics
to identify the tweets or accounts that exhibit deviant behaviour (posting spam or mali-
cious URLs). Table 2.1 gives a list of the most common features used to detect malicious
accounts, but are these features enough to identify accounts posting malicious URLs? It
is evident from models built using OSN characteristics, that it was necessary to include
them to identify deviant accounts but they may not be the only features that a detection
model should be composed of. The reason being, Twitter spammers quickly modify their
behaviour in order to evade existing spam detection techniques [227] and subsequently
OSN features that are required to detect them change with time [6]. Furthermore, this
problem is not specific to Twitter and other OSNs may have different user characteristics.
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Table 2.1: List of most frequent Meta features used in Previous Research
Sr. No. Features Most Frequently Used
1 Followers And Friends Ratio [192][12][183]
2 Age Of The Account [227] [126][144][43][183]
3 Number Of Tweets Posted By Account[144][43] [192][30][187]
4 Profile Has A Name [30]
5 Friends Count For An Account [43] [192][187][19]
6 A Default Image Set After 2 Months [187]
7 Account Part Of A Blacklist [83][30][50][199]
8 Account Has A Image [30]
9 The Word Bot In Bio Description[12]
10 Followers Count For An Account [12][43][3][183]
11 An Address Provided [43]
12 Based On Biography [30][187]
Thus, we propose features derived by conducting additional analysis are required to iden-
tify malware. We explore this question in Chapter 3.
While evidence exists in related work of OSN users exhibiting malicious behaviour, no
significant pattern has been observed to show how cybercriminals were using OSN to
spread malware or spam on a large scale. It was not clear if specific people were targeted
or whether popular events used to deliver a cyber attack. This leads us to our first research
question:
RQ1 Are popular events that attract millions of users on online social networks exploited
by cybercriminals carrying out drive-by download attacks?
2.2.2 Detecting Malicious Content by Analysing the Static or Dy-
namic Activity of a Web Page
There are two ways to analyse the activity of a Web page, one by static analysis and the
other by dynamic. Static analysis examines the code that loads the Web page, looking for
recognisable malicious codes and methods, whereas, dynamic analysis executes the code
by interacting with the Web page and observes the behaviour at the endpoint and the local
system, also looking for evidence of known malicious activity.
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Static Analysis
McGrath and Gupta analysed the anatomy of phishing URLs, studying the patterns of
characters and domain length in URLs to develop a filter that would detect phishing URLs
[137]. For their experiment they collected around 7,500 phishing URLs from Phishtank
[155] and MarkMonitor [136]. Their results showed that phishing URLs tend to be longer
than regular ones, they contain the name of the brand that they are targeting, and exploit
URL shortening services to evade being detected. Furthermore, they found that a phishing
website is live for only about 3 days before being detected. Their work gives an insight
into the techniques used by cybercriminals to carry out phishing attacks, and the features
identified were able to be used to build a malware detection model. A time trigger based
malicious code was constructed that behaves maliciously only if a certain condition is ful-
filled. But these attacks cannot be detected by lexical analysis of URLs only, and hence
they restrict the model’s detection capabilities. In a similar approach, an automated clas-
sification model was built, based on lexical and host-based features, to detect malicious
URLs using statistical models [135]. Experiments were conducted on around 20,000 ma-
licious URLs collected from Phishtank [155] and SpamScatter [8] to train and validate
the model in this study. The authors used lexical features such as the length of the URL,
types and number of delimiters in the URL, and so on. In terms of host-based features
they looked at IP address, WHOIS, the domain name and geographical properties. The
model reported an accuracy of 95-99%, however since the model was build on static anal-
ysis it failed against cyber attacks that were carried out once a trigger was set off.
Using a filter based approach, Canali et al [31] developed a filter called Prophiler that
used features derived from URLs and Web page code to determine the likelihood of a
drive-by download. The filter used a number of Hypertext Markup Language (HTML),
JavaScript, URL and host-based features to determine whether the URL was malicious or
not. A HoneyClient, WepaWet [49] was included in the design to further check the URLs
that had been classified as benign as a way of checking whether any malicious URL had
been missed. One of the key advantages of models built using static code analysis was
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that they tended to be fast because once they found a similarity to the malicious code on
the Web page they flagged the URL as malicious. The same was seen in Prophiler, which
had a classification time of 0.237 seconds per Web page. However one of the limitations
of this approach was that it failed to cope with complex behavioural attacks. For example,
if a URL has multiple redirects and the final landing page has malicious code, the filter
flags the URL as benign due to the features of the first URL and does not consider the
features of the landing page.
Similarly, Lin et al [131] proposed a lightweight malware detection filter based on the
lexical properties of the URL. The rationale for implementing the URL based filter was
to reduce the load on the more complex malware detection model. Their results showed
that a 75% load reduction was observed on a malware detection model, while 90% of the
URLs were retained. However, the filter considered only the URL characteristics. These
may change with time, letting the malware evade detection, and leading to the model be-
coming outdated.
Focusing only on the embedded JavaScript code in a Web page, Kapravelos et al [109]
compared similarities between various JavaScript programs to detect malicious Web pages.
The detection model was built using a drive-by download detection tool called ”oracle”,
that can access both malicious and benign Web pages. Once the database of malicious and
benign was populated, an abstract syntax tree of the Java code was computed to identify
malware with similar code signatures. Based on signature matching, a Web page was clas-
sified as either malicious or benign. For their experiment these authors collected around
6.4 million Web pages, out of which around 250 thousand were classified as malicious.
In addition, using abstract syntax trees they detected the Web pages that used JavaScript
injection, data-dependencies and multiple evasion techniques. However, their model was
ineffective towards server-side evasion and attacks that involved code fragmentation.
Looking at browser plugin specific attacks, Laskov and Sˇrndic [125] used static code
analysis to detect malware targeting a browser using JavaScript based on Portable Docu-
ment Format (PDF) exploits. The proposed model extracted embedded JavaScript from
the PDF file. The extracted JavaScript was then compared with a malicious JavaScript
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code to determine if the PDF was infected with malware or not. The model outperformed
WepaWet [49], a Web-based service to detect malware based on JSand, giving a true pos-
itive rate of 85%. However, the model was limited to detecting PDF-based exploits only.
Eshete and Venkatakrishnan [65] proposed a malware detection model that determined
whether a URL was pointing to a malicious Web server, by checking if the URL was
hosting an exploit kit. The detection required a machine learning model that used features
derived from the attacking and defending mechanisms of the exploit. The machine learn-
ing model was built using 2,629 malicious exploit kits. Of these, 1000 exploit kits were
used to train the model, and the remainder to test it. The model gave a true positive rate
of 99.9% for training and a rate of 99.4% was observed while testing the model. Even
though the model gave a high accuracy of 99.4%, features that were derived were depen-
dent on Web page’s code and its URL.
Shifting the focus to system calls made while executing malware, Naval et al [151] pro-
posed a malware detection model immune to system-call injection attack in which irrel-
evant and independent calls were inserted during the regular execution flow of malware
binaries, to avoid being detected. In order to counter these attacks, the proposed model
characterised program semantics using the property of asymptotic equipartition. This
property allows the model to extract information-rich call sequences that are then used to
construct semantically relevant paths. These paths describe the program behaviour and
are eventually used to detect malicious binaries. Even though the model gave an accuracy
of 95.42% on the sample dataset, it did not account for malicious binaries that were used
to carry out shadow attacks. In a shadow attack the system-call sequences are divided and
exported to discrete shadow processes. These processes individually appear to be benign
but jointly they carry out malicious attacks.
Focusing on the results of a search engine, Invernizzi and Comparetti [100] proposed a
malware detection filter based on search engine queries. The tool takes a known malicious
Web page as a starting point to generate numerous Web page search queries. The retrieved
Web pages are then compared with known malicious Web pages and honeyclients to de-
termine if the retrieved Web page is malicious or not. This filter successfully identified
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around 230,000 malicious URLs from only 2400 seeds. However, the performance of
their model was dependent on the results of the search engine. If the search engine did
not retrieve the malicious URL then the Web page could not be identified.
Applying deep learning models to detect malware, Thanbi et al [210] proposed a malware
detection model based on deep learning techniques. They collected a sample of around
110,000 malicious and benign URLs from different known resources such as Phishtank
[155], MalwareDomains, MalwareDomainList, etc. Subsequently, characters from each
URL were encoded and a unique ID was assigned. After the encoding of the characters,
the collected dataset was divided into two parts, for training and testing. These were later
used to build various deep learning models such as a recurrent neural network (RNN),
an identity-recurrent neural network (I-RNN), a long- and short-term memory (LSTM), a
convolution neural network (CNN), and a convolution neural network long and short term
Table 2.2: List of most frequent used for Static Analysis in Previous Research
Sr. No. Features used Static Analysis
1 URL Characteristics [100] [210] [137][135][31]
2 Domain Name[31]
3 JavaScript Code[31][109]
4 Malware Code(exploit kit)[65]
5 HTML[100][31]
6 CSS[31]
7 Browser extension [125]
memory (CNN-LSTM) to identify the best performing model.
Under static code analysis, malware detection models were primarily built using features
derived by conducting the lexical analysis of a URL and by analysing the embedded code
in a Web page. In the lexical analysis, features such as its length, the words used in
forming it, domain names, etc.[100, 210, 137, 135, 31] were derived to build detection
models. In analysing the embedded code of a Web page, features were derived by look-
ing at HTML, Cascading Style Sheets (CSS), JavaScript, Octet-Stream (e.g., long byte
pattern), command, plain text, compressed content (e.g., *. zip, *.gz, *.tar), eXtensible
Markup Language (XML), PDF, and Postscript content [31, 109, 151] to build malware
detection models. In addition to lexical analysis of the URL and embedded code analysis
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of a web page, exploit kits were also analysed to identify various malware signatures [65].
Table 2.2 gives a summary of the features used for static code analysis.
The fundamental principle behind models developed using static analysis are that mal-
ware code needed to be examined where the security practitioners were reversing the
malware code to get a deeper understanding of the malware [111] and which can be time
consuming [96] . This process requires much human interpretation and can be a slow
process [52]. Furthermore, these models fail against techniques like encryption and poly-
morphism that were often used by cybercriminals to obfuscate their code [150]. Thus,
models built using static analysis alone might not be sufficient enough to detect malware,
and alternative methods to malware detection need to be explored.
Dynamic Analysis
In the following section various malware detection models are presented and their limita-
tions are highlighted in order to identify the research gaps in earlier works. Unlike static
models, which focus on the code used in a Web page to identify known malware signa-
tures, dynamic analysis focuses on the run-time behaviour of the code. By observing this
behaviour, researchers have proposed them as malicious.
In order to analyse the run-time behaviour of a Web page, Cova et al [49] proposed a
malware detection model. This model was developed in two stages. In the first stage,
the redirecting of URLs, length of the dynamic code, number of dynamic executions and
similar features were used to detect anomalies. In the second part, a custom built browser
was used to open the URL and record the process of detecting malicious behaviour. This
is achieved by low interaction honeyclients, which imitate the action of a browser based
on the events that identify malware. However, one of the key limitations of models based
on browser emulators was that they provide limited access to a small number of internet
protocol and services [134]. Due to their inability to give the adversary full access to
system they cannot capture complex cyber attacks [134].
In a dynamic malware detection analysis, path exploration is a common technique. Here
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the malware code execution is forced to go down multiple possible conditional branches
which prevents the malware from hiding; hence it is easily detected. Building on this
technique of detecting malware by analysing the dynamic execution of a code, Moser et
al [149] proposed executing the code through multiple paths, and in certain instances even
forcing it to go down specific paths. The rationale of these authors was to detect malware
that hid their signature and revealed their malicious nature in the execution of the code
itself. For their experiment they executed the malware code in an emulator QEMU [13],
and recorded the system calls made during its execution. By tainting the inputs given
in the program, the system was able to track whenever input values were used to make
control decisions about the flow. The program could then be reanalysed using different in-
puts so as to lead to the exploration of alternative paths of execution. In their evaluation of
308 malware samples from 92 families, the authors found from at least one tainted input
source that 229 had acted conditionally, and 172 (55.8%) exhibited additional behaviour
under forced path exploration.
Moving from system calls to bit-level operations, Brumley et al [22] proposed a malware
detection model called MINESWEEPER that could handle more complicated formulae
and bit-level operations than the model proposed by Moser et al [149]. MINESWEEPER
could detect the existence of a trigger based malware, through which those conditions
were identified that trigger hidden behaviour, along with the input triggers (e.g., tim-
ing, network input, or keyboard input). MINESWEEPER could identify trigger based
malware by executing the code both symbolically and concretely. It provides inputs to
potential triggers and then executes the code symbolically whereas the part of the code
that did not require the trigger is executed concretely. It could determine the input values
that triggered the execution down each path, and could then force code execution using
different trigger inputs in order to let the code’s behaviour be observed. The authors tested
their model on four malware samples and identified many conditional branches based on
trigger inputs.
The technique of forcing the code to be executed through a chosen path is also seen in a
model proposed by Kim et al [114]. This model was designed to systematically explore
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possible execution paths in order to reveal malicious behaviours. The proposed model J-
Force forced path exploration by recording branch outcomes and mutating them into Doc-
ument Object Model (DOM) elements. When an execution is forced down a certain path,
it may crash due to the missing reference to DOM elements, which J-Force overcomes by
dynamically creating new DOM elements as and when required so that execution is not
interrupted. By doing so, the writers uncovered hidden codes behind the evasion checks
in Exploit Kit exploits, and discovered injection vulnerabilities in Chrome browser ex-
tensions. Using a path exploration technique, Kolbitsch et al [116] proposed a model,
called ROZZLE, that sought to identify Web malware by using multi-path JavaScript ex-
ploration. ROZZLE detects environmentally sensitive Web malware specifically targeting
browser configurations. Even though path-exploratory technique helps to identify mal-
ware that mask its identity and reveals its malicious nature through certain triggers or
inputs, this technique has certain limitations. It made the model fragile because forceful
execution of the code could compel the program to access part of a memory that might
be corrupt, with the result that the program crashes. Furthermore, a cybercriminal could
design a malware using anti-symbolic execution obfuscation [10] or anti-fuzzing [84]
techniques that could evade detection by models based on path exploration techniques.
Using the same principle of forceful execution of the code but moving away from path
exploring techniques, Kang et al [108] proposed a malware detection model that focused
on system state changes. Their model analyses changes that were made to the program
execution state, such as registry changes, memory changes, etc., in order to identify eva-
sion tactics used by cybercriminals. Once the root point of evasion is identified, dynamic
state changes are made to forcefully execute the program. The execution of the program
reveals its malicious nature and the program is classified as malicious. This model also
has the limitations that the models using path exploration strategies have - forcing the
code to be executed may point to corrupt memory and the program may crash. In a sim-
ilar approach Das et al [56] proposed hardware-enhanced architecture to detect malware
at runtime based on system call made during malware execution. The system call were
observed for eight different types of malware from a collective sample of 472 malware.
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Based on the system call recorded numerous machine learning model were build, among
which MLP overperformed other and have a true positve rate of 97.6% and an false posi-
tive rate of 1.2%. Similarly, a system call detection engine was created to detect malware
by intercepting all system calls made during execution of a program [96].
Jayasinghe et al used the dynamic behaviour of a Web page to detect a drive-by download
attack [103]. In order to detect malware, they first executed the embedded JavaScript of a
Web page and then created a log file log file was used to create supervised machine learn-
ing models. Using the technique of 10-fold cross validation they used three different ma-
chine learning algorithms and found that Support Vector Machine (SVM) outperformed
NaiveBayes and Decision tree, giving an F-Measure of 0.96. However the model is highly
dependent on the successful execution of the JavaScript code; thus, if the cybercriminal
adds event triggers, then in their JavaScript the malicious script may not be executed and
the malicious Web page will not be detected. Research has also been undertaken to build
a machine classifier that uses network activity to detect malware. In one approach Bartos
and Sofka looked at network traffic and URL characteristics to build the classifier from
data captured in the form of proxy logs generated by 80 international companies [11] to
detect malware. They evaluated their classifier by testing it on the companies’ network
and on real HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) network traffic with approximately 15
million samples, out of which around 43 thousand were detected as malicious. The model
gave a precision of 90% and around 67% of the malware that were detected were previ-
ously unseen variants. However, it failed to detect malware sent over Hypertext Transfer
Protocol Secure (HTTPS). This was because it used features extracted from URLs or flow
field which were not available over encrypted HTTPS traffic. It also failed against the
dynamic changing strategies of an attacker [11].
Adobe Flash animation has been widely used on Web pages to enrich the multimedia
content. However, numerous vulnerabilities have been discovered by means of which
it has been used as an entry point for Web-based attacks. Focusing on attacks specific
to Adobe Flash, Wressnegge et al [222] proposed an Adobe Flash specific malware de-
tection model called Gordon. The model was capable of analysing Flash animation at
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various levels, starting from the interpreter’s loading of the code to its execution. The
authors combined structural analysis of the code with path exploration techniques where
the code was forced to be executed along certain paths to maximise the coverage of the in-
dicative code regions. By doing so, they revealed the malicious nature of the code. When
they applied their model to 26,600 Flash samples that contained around 1900 malicious
samples, an accuracy of 95.5% was observed. However, the model was limited to Flash
based malware alone and it shares the limitations of the path exploration methods.
Zhang et al [128] developed Arrow, a malicious URL detection tool, which correlates
URL redirect chains to generate signatures of a drive by download attacks. It used a
honeyclient to detect a drive-by download attacks and generated a log file containing an
HTTP redirect request from malicious Websites. Arrow was specially designed to detect
drive-by download attack, while Warning Bird [127] was developed by Lee and Kim to
detect spam, drive-by downloads and phishing Web pages based on URL redirects. One
of the biggest issues that their model tackled was scalability but they showed that a URL
could be classified into malicious or benign in 28.06 (ms) by using 100 concurrent con-
nections for crawling. Overcoming the limitations of malware detection models based on
URL redirect, Cao et al [33] proposed a graph based malware detection model, which
was built using features selected by studying 100,000 messages from Sina Wiebo, one
of China’s biggest OSN websites. The writers built their detection model by analysing
the length of the re-directional chain, forward comment ratio, forward following ratio,
following-follower ratio, etc. These features were chosen because a malicious URL is
redirected many times before it lands on a malicious Web page. However, these models
relied on the URL redirect and on the assumption that cybercriminals share resources or
intermediary links, which may not hold true, since the cost of hosting resources constantly
goes down and such resources are taken down regularly by law enforcement.
The fundamental principle behind models built using dynamic analysis was that malware
was executed and its run-time behaviour was observed to determine if it was malicious or
not. Popular techniques such as URL redirection [127, 128, 49, 11] and path exploration
[116, 149, 22] have been used to build previous malware detection models. Table 2.3
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Table 2.3: List of most frequently used for Dynamic Analysis in Previous Research
Sr. No. Features Used Dynamic Analysis
1 URL Characteristics and Redirection[127, 128, 49, 11]
2 JavaScript Code[116, 149, 22]
3 Network Activity[11]
4 Proxy Logs[103]
5 Document Object Model [114]
6 Operation Code[103, 108]
highlights the most frequent features used in building them. However, these models have
limitations; for instance, the path exploration models are fragile, as they force the mal-
ware code to be executed on specific paths and models based on URL redirection, and rely
on the assumption that cybercriminals have domains in common. They do not account for
the changing environment and do not add features or a component that constantly updates
the model in line with the current situation.
To summarise, different techniques have been used to detect malware on OSNs, which
are collated in Table 2.4. Models built using OSN characteristics identified accounts
that were behaving abnormally. However, in order to be effective, these models needed
to be updated at regular intervals, as Twitter spammers quickly modify their behaviour
to evade existing spam detection techniques [227]. Though features derived from OSN
characteristics were useful in identifying deviant accounts, they cannot be solely relied
upon, and there was a need to have more features that were derived by observing malware
code/behaviour to detect malicious accounts. In order to do so, the models were built by
focusing on the malware itself, conducting either static or dynamic analysis. Detection
models built using static analysis analysed the malware code to get a deeper understanding
of the malware [111]. However, these models failed against techniques like encryption,
polymorphism, etc. that were used to hide the malicious code [150]. In order to overcome
the limitation of static code analysis, models were built using dynamic analysis, where the
code was executed in a sandboxed environment and post execution its behaviour was ob-
served in order to reveal its malicious nature. Typically, the code was forcefully executed
along a path by modifying various parameters of the code, to reveal the malicious nature
of the program. Even though the behaviour of a program is hard to modify, cybercriminals
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use techniques like anti-symbolic execution obfuscation [10] or anti-fuzzing [84], strate-
gically placing triggers in code, etc. to avoid detection. In both cases, the fundamental
principle was analysing the malware code, whether it was analysed without execution
(statically) or after execution (dynamically).
In order to shift the focus from malware code analysis to observing the effects of malware
on the user system, security practitioners have used honeypots to detect malware [180].
The fundamental principle behind a honeypot is that it mimics a user by providing com-
puting resources that could be scanned allowing it to interact with a cybercriminal. By
doing so it allows a cybercriminal to execute a cyber-attack successfully. By deploying
a honeypot a security practitioner can gather evidence from the log file that was created
to document the attacks, and also monitor system state changes - giving them an insight
into the vulnerabilities exploited and files targeted by the adversary. Honeypots can be
Figure 2.1: Taxonomy of Honeypot [4]
categorised based on the attack vector and the level of interactions [4]. The attack vec-
tors are further divided into client and server-side attacks, whereas the level of interaction
is divided into high and low level ( see figure 2.1 ). As the focus of this research was
drive-by download attacks that target client machines, only client-side honeypots will be
considered for discussion. In terms of interaction, a low interaction honeypot performed
static analysis on a Web page code, looking for evidence of malicious scripts [49, 109].
These were typical emulators but gave limited access to the adversary [134]. Thus, due to
Table 2.4: Summary of Existing work on malware detection on OSN
Year Author Method Forced Path Exploration State Changes Lexical Analysis of URL Java Script Code Trigger Based Social Features Blacklist Relationship based Plugin Based Network Traffic Exploit Kit System Calls
2007 Moser et al DC
2007 Idika,N and Mathur, A DC
2008 Brumley et al DC
2009 McGrath and Gupta SC
2009 Ma et al SC
2009 Kang et al DC
2010 Lee et al OSN-AC
2010 Stringhini OSN-AC
2010 Benevenuto et al OSN-AC
2010 Grier et al. OSN-AC
2010 Cova et al DC
2011 Thomas et al OSN-AC
2011 Yang et al OSN-AC
2011 Canali et al SC
2011 Laskov and Sˇrndic SC
2011 Zhang et al. DC
2012 Yang et al OSN-AC
2012 Invernizzi and Comparetti SC
2012 Kolbitsch et al DC
2013 Kapravelos et al SC
2013 Lin et al SC
2014 Eshete and Venkatakrishnan SC
2014 Jayasinghe et al DC
2015 Cheng Cao and James Caverlee OSN-AC
2015 Cresci et al OSN-AC
2015 Naval et al SC
2015 Das et al DC
2016 Chen et al OSN-AC
2016 Bartos and Sofka DC
2016 Wressnegge et al DC
2017 Shen et al OSN-AC
2017 Alghamdi et al OSN-AC
2017 Concone et al OSN-AC
2017 Kim et al DC
2018 Thambi et al SC
DC- Dynamic Code, SC- Static Code ,OSN-AC -OSN Account Characteristics
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their inability to give the adversary full access to the system they cannot capture complex
cyber attacks [134]. Whereas, high interaction honeypots use dynamic analysis of the
interaction behaviour between the Web page and the client system, looking for evidence
of malicious actions [214, 219]. Capture HPC [27], Threat analyser [200], and Winpooch
[15] are typical example of high interaction honeypots that are capable of detecting ma-
licious attacks. Where Capture HPC has been favoured over others in the detection of
drive-by download attacks [5, 160].
Honeypots gain an advantage over models built by analysing malware code because they
focus on the effect of the malware on the system. The assumption is that no matter how
well hidden the code is, upon successful execution, its effect on the user’s system would
eventually reveal its malicious nature. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of
the models presented so far has adopted the principle of a honeypot that observes the ef-
fects of malware on the system to detect malware on OSN. This leads us to the following
research questions.
RQ2 Is it possible to construct a model to detect drive-by download attacks that is easily
reproducible and is independent of the malware code signature, by using system-
based activity extracted from a honeypot?
RQ3 Which machine learning models are well suited for detecting drive-by download
attacks, based on machine activity?
2.2.3 Twitter Spam and Malware Detection Policy
On an average around 10 million Web attacks per month were reported in 2018 [195].
Twitter’s popularity continues to attract cybercriminals to carry out cyber attacks. Cyber
attacks on Twitter such as distributed denial of service [121], cross-site scripting [86],
Trojan attacks [153] and drive-by downloads [102] continue to be major threats. Since
Twitter is being used to propagate and carry out drive-by download attacks [102, 103],
it too has taken measures to identify tweets containing malicious URLs and users who
are spreading malware. However, for security reasons Twitter has safeguarded the details
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of the malware detection model and has published certain rules as part of its terms and
condition and policy [206] to detect fraudulent accounts or malicious content on Twitter.
These broad rules forbid a user from:
• Stealing or copying the profile bio of other users.
• Accessing searches on Twitter by means other than provided by Twitter.
• Using Twitter to send fraudulent or misleading information by modifying TCP/IP
headers or any part of a header message.
• Intentionally misleading people by adding fraudulent information, including a false
geo-location.
• Aggressively start following people.
• Posting either tweets or direct messages that contain only links.
• Posting of duplicate or similar content, replies or user mentions across multiple
accounts.
• Accounts that post multiple updates in order to manipulate a trending topic or to
divert the traffic to unrelated accounts, products or services.
• Aggressively adding users to a list.
• Sending bulk replies.
• To randomly or aggressively engage in tweeted replies that aim to divert the traffic
to an account, product or service.
• To use or promote third-party services or apps that claim to get you more followers,
retweets, or likes.
The above rules are among the terms and conditions set by Twitter and used to iden-
tify accounts that are spreading spam or malicious content. Though the details of Twit-
ter’s actual spam/malicious tweet detection model have not been made public for security
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reasons, it can be inferred from other defined rules that Twitter analyses content, posting
behaviour and user behaviour (the adding of friends/followers) to identify malicious users
[206]. Cybercriminals have found ways to evade detection and continue to use Twitter to
spread spam and carry out cyber attacks. Furthermore, due to its large active user base
Twitter is constantly probed for vulnerabilities [112], which if found are used to further
attacks leading to financial losses, thus limiting the efficiency of the detection model.
To curtail malicious attacks, research has focused on building malware detection models
based on analysing OSN characteristics, static code and dynamic code, or by observing
machine activities through a honeypot after an attack has taken place. Most importantly,
the focus of the research so far has been on detecting malware on OSNs. Honeypot
based detection gains an advantage over detection models based on code because they
give an insight into the techniques used and vulnerabilities exploited during a drive-by
download attack. However, a honeypot needs to execute the malware in a sandboxed
environment and observe it for a user-defined period, before making a classification de-
cision. This means the attack has already completed. If an alarm was raised before the
malicious activity was complete, the connection to the malicious server could potentially
be killed, and thus reduce the exposure of the network to additional risk. To the best of our
knowledge, no work conducted to date has achieved early-stage prediction to identify
malware before an attack is complete, allowing security practitioners to take appropriate
countermeasures and stop the malware from infecting a system. Limitations observed in
the work published to date include:
• Detection models are specific to one type of vulnerability (e.g. Adobe Flash, or
Adobe PDF plugin).
• Detection Models are dependent on malicious code signatures (static analysis) or
code behaviour (dynamic analysis) at run-time and these models fail against code
obfuscating techniques such as encryption, polymorphism, etc.
• Detection models proposed are incapable of detecting malware based on early-stage
interaction, meaning machine activities lead to an attack.
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These give rise to the following research questions :
RQ4 Is it possible to predict drive-by download attacks on Twitter by observing machine
activities?
RQ5 Do social features that have been shown to help with identifying abnormal accounts
(posting spam/malicious URL), contribute to the prediction of drive-by download
attacks on Twitter?
2.3 Related Work for Malware Propagation on Twitter
In the previous section we analysed the research developed to detect malware on OSN. No
matter how accurate the detection model was, the features used to detect it suggest there
is a good chance that a malware would evade detection because (i) Twitter spammers
quickly modify their behaviour to evade existing spam detection techniques [227], and
(ii) these models fail against techniques like anti-symbolic execution obfuscation [10],
anti-fuzzing [84], encryption [150], polymorphism [150], etc. that were used to hide the
malicious code or its behaviour. If undetected or not removed from the network, malware
in an online social platform which has millions of active users has potential to infect
thousands of users at great speed. In this section we review some techniques used to curb
malware propagation.
2.3.1 Curbing of Malware Propagation on Traditional Networks
Researchers have studied malware propagation using a range of different methods. Mal-
ware propagation models fall into two categories, namely, control theoretical models and
epidemiology models. The aim of control theoretical models is to detect and contain mal-
ware, whereas epidemiological models count the number of compromised hosts and eval-
uate the distribution of malware from these compromised hosts. While both are equally
important, propagation models based on epidemiological theory have been favoured over
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other models because they give us a sense of the damage that a malware can cause to a
network.
Zou et al proposed a model based on epidemiology to detect the propagation of worms
on the Internet [235]. The detection model favoured by these authors focused more on
identifying network trends than on looking at bursts in the network. The underlying as-
sumption for their model was that at the early infection stage a malware propagates rapidly
with exponential growth. They used the Kalman filter estimation model as one of the key
components to identify early trends and in order to identify outbreaks of malware in the
network. The filter was strategically placed to monitor the network and was activated
when a surge of illegitimate scan activities was encountered. If the infection rate esti-
mated by the model stabilised and oscillated slightly around a constant positive value, the
model flagged the presence of malware. The rationale was that non-malware noise will
not grow exponentially. The model did not consider a scenario where multiple malware
might spread at the same time, or a single malware used multiple vulnerabilities to prop-
agate itself.
Similarly, Yu et al proposed a two-layer malware propagation model for large networks
based on epidemiological principles [229]. Using the two-layer approach, these authors
used the upper layer to focus on a large scale network, while the lower layer focused on
the hosts of a given network. To validate their model they used Android based [105] mal-
ware and the Conficker worm [184], an Internet based Botnet. The researchers observed
that during the early stages malware follows exponential distribution, in late stages of
propagation they follow power law distribution with a short exponential tail and in their
final propagation they follow power law distribution. However, one of the limitations
observed was that they did not consider multiple malware propagating at the same time,
which in real life is a more likely scenario.
Ganesh et al combined epidemiology and graph theory to understand malware propa-
gation on networks [76]. They observed that if the spectral radius of the graph of the
network studied is higher than the ratio of cure to infection, then the average epidemic
lifetime is of order log n, where n is the number of nodes. However, if the same ratio is
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greater than the isoperimetric constant of the graph then the average epidemic lifetime is
represented by ena , where a is a positive constant. Liu et al combined an epidemic model
with transmission theory in order to observe malware propagation in wireless ad hoc net-
works [132]. For their experiments they used two different malware propagation schemes
in two different network modes. They studied features such as the mobility of nodes, the
number of nodes in the network and the transmission range for each node and formulated
mitigation strategies. The study gives an insight into the ways that malware propagates
on wireless ad hoc networks and describes the highlighted features that can be used to
observe malware propagation. Others that used epidemic models to understand malware
propagation in ad hoc wireless networks used techniques such as removing infected nodes
[234], applying an immunisation defence technique [213] or studying the topology of the
network [233] in order to identify propagation factors. The epidemic models were also
used to understand malware propagation using Bluetooth as the propagation medium,
where models were built using features derived from Bluetooth transmission protocols
[75, 34, 193, 224] emphasising short-range and short communication protocols.
A considerable amount of research has sought to understand malware propagation us-
ing epidemiological models in traditional networks [164, 154], including wireless and
Bluetooth. However, while building these epidemic models to understand malware prop-
agation, the assumption was that the malware is propagated using traditional local area
networks, ad hoc wireless networks or more recent Bluetooth technology. The types of
malware considered here are self replicating and do not require much human interaction.
However, malware on OSN, particularly drive-by downloads require human interactions
(visits to the Web page) for infection. The malware after infection can be self-replicating
when downloaded to the user machine and may use traditional networks such as wireless,
Bluetooth or local area network to further infect other users. However, in order to give
a more realistic view, features derived from OSN (the point where the attack originated)
must be incorporated into the propagation model to make it most effective.
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2.3.2 Curbing of Malware Propagation on Online Social Networks
Earlier research on malware propagation related to social networks focused on the com-
munication medium such as a mobile device [70], Bluetooth[41, 75, 34, 193, 224], wire-
less networks [132] or emails[220]. However, with the emergence of online social net-
works, new techniques have been developed to exploit the social relationship between
users in order to propagate malware. To counter such propagation, researchers wanting to
know more about it have incorporated techniques such as basing design on epidemiology
or on user relationships.
Fleizach et al [70] proposed a model to observe malware propagation in a mobile network,
where the model would create a social network topology using the contacts saved on the
user’s device to evaluate the speed and severity of random contact worms. Even with the
mobile network constraints and limited address books that the malware exploits, the ex-
perimental results in this study showed that aggressive malware are capable of launching
distributed denial of service attacks and of preventing users from using services such as
Voice over IP and multi-media services. Their propagation model gives an insight into
the speed of propagation and help to formulate defensive rules to contain the malware
infection. However, one of the key elements that was missing in the propagation model
was user behaviour that could influence malware propagation. Even though the social
networks created by using contact address books may share traits with OSN graphs, they
differ regarding the amount of data generated and the amount of time a user spends on the
network. These abundant data on a user’s behaviour open doors to understanding mal-
ware propagation using various techniques that incorporate social behaviour defined by
user relationships.
Having compared virus propagation through emails with the propagation of viruses us-
ing messages exchanged on Facebook, Fan et al went on to propose malware propaga-
tion models based on the application network of Facebook [67]. They investigated two
malware propagation strategies, one where the cybercriminal would develop applications
designed to carry out attacks or contain vulnerabilities for subsequent exploitation; and
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the other where a malware is distributed by means of direct messages to users. Their
experimental results regarding malicious application showed that even if the malicious
application is less popular on the OSN platform, it still has the potential to spread rapidly.
Cybercriminals exploit the trust relationships between users whereby the installation by a
user of a malicious application may installs the same malicious software in the comput-
ers, etc. of her/his friends who trust any application their friends install. The propagation
model based on malware that is spread through direct messages showed that the propaga-
tion is directly proportional to the amount of time that a user spends on OSN. Furthermore,
the chances of spreading increase since users are more likely to click on the messages and
hence on re-directional links that they receive, which are used to carry out attacks.
Experimenting with user relationships, Sun et al proposed a human behaviour model
based on game theory to describe the propagation of network worms on social networks
[194]. For their experiment the writers created an artificial network and looked at mal-
ware attacks that were carried out using direct messages. They created two malware
propagation models, one based on user behaviour, which is predicted in terms of whether
the user will succumb to opening a message containing malware, and the other, which
characterises the dynamics of network users in order to identify those who are most vul-
nerable to malware attacks. Even though the model captures user behaviour it is yet to be
tested on a real sample where unexpected obstacles may be met, or the change in malware
behaviour which may affect the propagation model and thus reduce its efficiency. Sanz-
griri et al successfully applied epidemiology theory to understand malware propagation
on Twitter and showed that even a low degree of connectivity and the probability of user
clicking links could cause wide malware dissemination [177]. Similarly, Giri et al. [107]
proposed a mathematical model based on epidemic theory to understand malware prop-
agation on Twitter. They conducted multiple simulations on NetLogo, and their results
showed that even with a small number of infected users with low connectivity, malware
on Twitter has the potential to infect a large number of users. One of the drawbacks of
this models is that it lacks scalability and accuracy due to the assumptions made. To over-
come the drawbacks of the epidemic models, Wang et al [216] presented a discrete-time
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absorbing Markov process to characterise virus propagation. The proposed model was
capable of evaluating virus lifetimes in large networks.
Yan et al [225] analysed user activity patterns and OSN structure to narrow down the char-
acteristics of malware propagation in OSNs. For their experiments they used real-world
locations based on OSN data and conducted analysis from the perspectives of user friend-
ship and activity. Furthermore, they conducted trace driven simulation to observe the
initial infection impact, user click probability, social structures and user activity patterns
on malware propagation. However, their research assumed that users were active only if
they were engaging in certain activities, such as location based check ins, photo updating
or posting. Furthermore, they assumed that each user has the same probability of click-
ing on a malicious URL, which may not be the case in real life, some necessarily being
more educated than others. Focusing on user behaviour on OSN, Wang et al proposed a
malware propagation model based on user behaviour, mainly looking at user mobility and
temporal message processing [215]. One of the key features that they introduced was user
mobility as one of the main factors to estimate malware propagation. They incorporated
the idea that a user can be mobile and hence the infection rate can change endlessly. In
many OSNs, a message recall function was introduced to tackle the malware propagation
problem. This feature allowed a user to delete any post that contains a malicious link so
that it is no longer accessible to other connected users. However, users were still in the
network that had been infected before the message was recalled and they might continue
to spread the malware to their connected users. In view of this message recall mechanism,
Chen et al proposed a model based on epidemic theory to measure the propagation of in-
fections in a message-recallable OSN [40].
2.3.3 Propagation of User Posts Based on Content
Gupta et al.’s [85] work gave an in-depth characterisation of factors that influence the
virality of malicious post or fake content on Twitter. For their analysis, they gathered data
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around the Boston Marathon bombing incident and found that 29% of content that became
viral after the incident was either rumours or was fake. They discovered that a large
number of malicious or dubious account were created after the event to propagate fake
news. Furthermore, they used statistical models to demonstrate that the overall impact
of users who propagate rumours could be used to estimate the growth of fake content.
Sentiment analysis is concerned with detecting positive, negative or neutral content in
written text, whereas emotion analysis is concerned with detecting discrete emotions (e.g.
anger, fear, joy, and so on). Current research has focused on the detection of spam [212]
or predicting malware based on machine activities [24, 102]. Wang et al. proposed a
spam detection model that uses sentiment as one of the features in detection on Twitter
[212]. They showed that by using only four features, one could achieve results that were
satisfactory compared to previous tools. Similarly, Hu et al. used a network topology
to detect spam showing that the performance of the model increased by the addition of
sentiment data [95]. Focusing on content only, Berger et al. studied emotions expressed
in a tweet to identify a relationship between retweeting and emotions [17]. They found
that content that evokes high arousal, such as positive emotion (awe) or negative emotion
(anger or anxiety) has a higher probability of propagation than ’deactivating emotions’
such as sadness. In a similar approach, Vosoughi et al used emotions to explain the
propagation of news on social media [211]. They found that news that was false and
reflected fear, disgust, and surprise was more likely to be retweeted than actual stories
that reflected anticipation, sadness, joy and trust. This leads us to the following research
questions:
RQ6 Do social features aid the propagation of posts containing malicious URLs?
RQ7 Do features derived from emotive content, such as fear or joy, help in the propaga-
tion of malware?
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2.4 Conclusion
The main contribution of the chapter is the survey of existing techniques and methods
used to detect malware on OSNs. Previous work was discussed and research gaps were
identified, leading to the development of seven research questions. These are summarised
within the remaining chapter descriptions below.
RQ 1 Chapter 3 contributes to addressing RQ1, where evidence of consistent use of Twit-
ter to deliver drive-by download attacks has been found, particularly around popular
events that attract millions of users. The evidence was gathered by opening captured
URLs in a sandboxed environment and based on system changes observed the URL
was classified as benign or malicious.
RQ 2, 3 Chapter 4 contributes towards RQ2 and RQ3, where a novel drive-by download
detection model is proposed. The model adopts the fundamental principle on which
honeypots are built by observing system activity, and uses this as input to machine
learning algorithms that use the effect of malware on a user’s system to classify
URLs as malicious or benign.
RQ 4, 5 Chapter 5 contributes towards RQ4, and RQ5, where a novel drive-by download
prediction model is proposed, which identifies malicious URLs within seconds of
the interaction starting based on machine activities. This provide a basis from which
to kill the connection to the server before an attack has completed and proactively
blocking and preventing an attack, rather than reacting and repairing at a later date.
RQ 6 and 7 In Chapter 6 we present the first study to link emotions and sentiment to
the propagation of tweets containing malicious URLs on Twitter. In earlier studies
it has been established that emotions could be transferred between people through
OSNs [89] and they can affect the posting behaviour of users [120]. On Twitter, a
drive-by download attack is propagated by the action of retweeting the tweet con-
taining the link to a malicious Web server. The higher the number of retweets, the
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larger the number of people exposed to it. Experimental results of the study showed
emotions, particularly negative emotions, were associated with retweet likelihood
(virality) and its survival.
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Chapter 3
Popular Events as a Medium to Deliver
Drive-by Downloads Attacks
Are popular events that attract millions of users on online social network being exploited
to carry out drive-by download attacks by cybercriminals? The emergence of Twitter as
one of the most popular OSNs for updates on current affairs has in the past attracted
cybercriminals, who exploit system vulnerabilities to carry out cyber attacks. This
chapter investigates cyber attacks on Twitter and finds evidence of drive-by download
attacks around popular sporting events.
3.1 Introduction
Over the years online social networking platforms have attracted billion of Internet users.
These numbers have grown tremendously from 0.97 billion recorded in 2010 to 3.19 bil-
lion users recorded in January 2019 [37]. Their popularity has tempted cybercriminals to
carry out cyber attacks on the computer systems of the network users. Numerous attacks
from social media are recorded every year (see Figure 3.1) compelling security experts to
teach people about the dangers related to OSN. By observing the trust exhibited between
a user and others in their online social network, security experts have suggested that a
user is more likely to fall for a malicious attack through an online social platform than
a malware attached through email [73]. Exploiting the trust between the users on online
social network platforms, cybercriminals have used various techniques to compromise
the confidentiality, integrity and availability of systems. Attackers have used techniques
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Figure 3.1: Time line of cyber attacks on Online Social Platform
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Table 3.1: Top ten cyber attacks carried out using online social networks
Ten worst social media attack
Sr. No. Target Type of Technique Time of Attack Description of Attack
1
10k US Government Employees Spearphished
with Malware-Laced Posts [28]
Targeted Phishing/Malware,
Fraudulent Accounts
Early 2017
Custom phishing messages via social media were sent
to targeted government employees Each
post contained a link laced with malware enabling
the attacker to access and control the victim’s device.
2
Fake Social Media Persona Sends
Malware to Employees Via Social Media
[48]
Trojan APP Jul-17
Attackers created an incredibly compelling fake
profile to connect with corporate employees.
Later they disseminated a Remote Access
Trojan (RAT), called PupyRAT, via these
social media honeypot accounts to hijack
the controls of victims’ devices.
3
3rd Party App Leads to Hundreds of
High-Profile Account Compromises [173] Account Takeover Mar-17
Vulnerability exploited in 3rd party app
called Twitter Counter enabling
the attacked to take over the users’ account.
4
HAMMERTOSS Malware Uses Social
Media for Command & Control
[99]
Malware/Data Ex-filtration Jul-15
Malware automatically searched
social networks for commands
posted by attacker profiles, allowing
cybercriminals to control the malware
via social media posts.
5
Financial Crime Runs Rampant on Social
Networks [45] Fraud & Scams Aug-16
Instagram was used by scammers to prey
on the followers of verified banks with
fraudulent financial services offerings,
including card cracking and money flipping
6
AP’s Social Accounts Hijacked, $136 Billion
Lost in Stock Market Value [69] Account Takeover Apr-13
Attackers compromised the account of the
Associated Press, posting fake breaking news
that bombs had gone off in the White House.
The Dow subsequently dropped 150 points
before rebounding; an economic value of $136 billion
7
LinkedIn Hacked, Exposing 117 Million
Credentials [72]
Data Breach,
Account Takeover May-16
The 2016 LinkedIn data dump
was the 7th largest in history
by sheer number of compromised credentials,
8
Enigma’s Slack and website hacked,
a half million in Ether coin stolen
[172]
Fraud & Scams,
Impersonation,
Account Takeover
Aug-17
The Slack community channel of
Enigma, a start-up exchange for
the cryptocurrency Ethereum,
was breached by attackers.
The attackers impersonated
the executives of the company and
instructed the community members
to send their Ethereum coin to a
specific coin wallet, stealing roughly
a half million worth of the cryptocurrency
9
Phishing Direct Message
Sent to Customers from
Compromised Brand Account [119]
Account Takeover,
Targeted Phishing
& Malware
Sep-11
Australian bank’s account was
taken over by cybercriminals that
requested users to give sensitive
financial details over direct messages.
10
Vevo Hacked Via Targeted LinkedIn
Phishing Attack, 3.12TB Ex-filtrated
[29]
Targeted Phishing
& Malware Sep-17
Streaming service Vevo suffered
a breach when one of its employees
was phished via LinkedIn. Hackers
were able to obtain and publicly
release 3.12TB worth of the
company’s sensitive internal data
such as Phishing, Trojan malware, taking over users’ accounts, exploiting vulnerabilities
in mobile applications and luring users to malicious websites.
Table 3.1 lists the ten most harmful cyber attacks that were carried out using OSNs. In
each attack, the cybercriminals have taken advantage of the large number of active online
users on the online social network being used. These attacks varied from stealing finan-
cial data [45] to targeting government employees in order to steal confidential information
[28]. Furthermore, techniques such as fake offers (for example, like-jacking, fake plugins
or app tricks and manual video sharing) are used to trick users into installing malware.
A fake offer is one where a user is lured to join a fake group or take part in a fake event
to earn gift cards. Like jacking tricks the user into redirecting other users to a malicious
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web-page whenever they like a page. Fake plugins and fake apps trick the user into in-
stalling malicious software, which will later be used to steal confidential information. In
addition to these, posts containing links to malicious web servers were manually shared
by creating the post interesting enough for the users to share it and enticing enough for
the users to click on it.
In order to expose a large number of users on OSNs, cybercriminals have either overtaken
an account that had a significantly large following, such as that of celebrities [221], ei-
ther through data breaches [72], or through the distributing malicious applications [48]
or through content sharing that contained links to malicious web servers. By using each
technique the adversary has aimed to maximise exposure, so as to infect a maximum num-
ber of people to malware. However, the drawback of these approaches has been that they
get detected quickly and thus get stopped, for example the tone of communication used
by cybercriminals lets the fans of the celebrities quickly recognise that the accounts have
been taken over and thus report the accounts [221].
Popular global events that attract and engage millions of people to one topic are an alter-
nate to accounts of famous people that have the potential to expose malware to a broader
audience. Thus giving cybercriminal an alternate medium to launch an attack that could
potentially expose millions of users to malware. By overtaking an account a cybercrim-
inal would quickly gain access to the number of people following the user and any post
shared from it would potentially be seen by all the followers of that account. Whereas,
if the cybercriminal was to spread the malware using popular events, they would have to
piggyback on the popularity of the event by creating a post (using event-specific hash-
tags) related to the event, enticing enough to attract attention by means of being shared
among users. Evidence of accounts of famous people being taken over to spread malware
have been found [221]. However, to the best of our knowledge, no association between
popular events that gather millions of users and drive-by download attacks has been seen.
In order to gather evidence of drive-by download attacks being carried out using popu-
lar events on Twitter, data from seven diverse popular global events were collected, from
which URLs were extracted and further analysed to detect malicious behaviour. Typically,
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there are two ways through which a drive-by download attack can be detected, (i) by the
construction of detection models based on malware code/behaviour, and (ii) by observ-
ing the effect of malware on user’s system by opening the web page inside a honeypot.
These are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. However, the models constructed by analysing
malware code/behaviour often fail against code/behaviour obfuscating techniques such as
anti-symbolic execution obfuscation [10], anti-fuzzing [84], encryption [150], and poly-
morphism [150]. To overcome these, the latter approach was chosen to detect drive-by
download attacks on Twitter. The underlying assumption is that no matter how well the
code was hidden, once executed it would infect the system and so would reveal its mali-
cious nature.
3.1.1 Contribution
While all OSN are vulnerable to drive-by download attacks, due to its 280 character re-
striction, Twitter is particularly susceptible to it. This chapter aims to further motivate the
development of cybersecurity methods to support safer OSNs by answering the following
research question
RQ1 Are popular events that attract millions of users on online social networks exploited
by cybercriminals carrying out drive-by download attacks?
The research carried out in this chapter contributes to the growing literature on coun-
tering malware on OSN as follows:
1. It demonstrates how Twitter is vulnerable to drive-by download attack.
2. It shows how malware (drive-by download attacks) can be detected.
3. It lays the groundwork for a predictive online malware detection system by identi-
fying key indicators from the characteristics of tweets or Twitter accounts.
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3.2 Experimental Setup
In order to gather evidence that popular events on Twitter were being used to deliver
drive-by download attacks, the experiment is divided into two main phases:
1. Data Collection and Annotation— In this phase tweets containing URLs were cap-
tured from Twitter around a global event using event specific hashtags.
2. Identification of Malicious URLs— In this phase, the captured URLs were con-
nected to via a honeypot to detect the presence of a drive-by download attack.
3.2.1 Data Collection
For phase one, a Python-based data collection script using Tweepy [166] was created. It
connected to Twitter using its programmatically available streaming API. For our experi-
mental purposes, we chose sporting events around which tweets were collected. Sporting
events were specifically favoured over any other trending events such as the American
presidential election, because they were reported to generate a large volume of Twitter
traffic. For example, the Copa America in 2015 alone recorded 14 billion impressions
[124] and the 2016 Rio Olympics was the top subject that year - more popular than the
United States of America (U.S.A) presidential election [118]. In 3 years, we collected
data from seven sporting events:
1. The Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football Associations (FIFA) World Cup of 2014
2. The American Football Superbowl 2015
3. The Cricket World Cup 2015
4. The Rugby World Cup 2015
5. The American Football Superbowl 2016
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6. The European Football Championships (EURO) 2016
7. The Olympics 2016
Table 3.2: Description of Tweets collected during sporting event
Sporting Event Year Location Hashtag Used Number ofTweets Captured
Malicious
Tweets
Identified
Number
of Unique
Tweets
Federation
Internationale de
Football Association
(FIFA) World Cup
2014 Brazil #FIFA2014 95,000 46,481 2,039
Circket World Cup 2015 Australia & New Zealand #CWC15 7,961 4,238 891
Rugby World Cup 2015 United Kingdom #RWC2015 127,393 3,836 627
SuperBowl 2015 2015 USA
#SB50,
#SuperBowlSunday
#superbowlXLIX
122,542 2,293 1,230
European Football
Championship 2016 France #Euro2016 3,154,605 21,559 975
Olympics 2016 Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) #Rio2016 6,111 3,359 525
SuperBowl 2016 USA
#SuperBowlSunday
#NFL 57,572 23,876 582
Tweets were captured for each event using event-related topics such as #FIFA2014, #su-
perbowlXLIX, #CWC15, #Euro2016, #Rio2016, #RWC2015, #NFL, #SB50, #SuperBowl-
Sunday. Figure 3.2 gives the distribution of tweets captured for each sporting event. The
Figure 3.2: Number of Tweet’s captured for each sporting event over a period of four year
minimum sample of 6,111 tweets was collected for the Olympics 2016 opening ceremony
and the maximum sample of 3.1 million tweets was captured for the European Football
Championships 2016. The rationale behind selecting diverse popular events was to gather
evidence of these events being used to deliver drive-by downloads, as well as the subse-
quent statistical findings, that would generalise beyond a single event.
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3.2.2 Identifying Malicious URLs
The second stage of the experiment required visiting the Web pages from the URLs that
were captured during the sporting events. A sandboxed environment in which websites
were visited in an isolated subnetwork was used to protect the connected networks. These
protective measures were taken because there was a possibility a drive-by download at-
tack may occur during the visitation of these websites in which case the system could act
as an entry point to infiltrate and compromise the connected network.
A honeypot was setup in a sandboxed environment to systematically and automatically
visit the websites. Two types of honeypots exist - a high interaction and a low interaction
client-side honeypot. Low interaction honeypots perform static analysis on a Web page
code, looking for evidence of malicious scripts [49, 109]. High interaction honeypots use
dynamic analysis of the interaction behaviour between the Web page and the client sys-
tem, looking for evidence of malicious actions [214, 219]. Also, these honeypots may act
as active defence systems that visit potentially malicious URLs and log the system state
during the interaction.
Since the aim of this chapter is to identify associations between popular events on Twit-
ter and cyber attacks, and build the foundations of an approach to predict malware be-
haviour, a low interaction honeypot based on static analysis was ruled out. First reason
being cybercriminals take measures, such as encrypting the malware code to avoid being
detected. Secondly, because the high interaction honeypot detection of malware is based
on behavioural analysis that fits with our novel approach to using machine activity in the
detection of malware i.e. overcoming dynamically changing feature limitations such as
code signatures and URLs/domain names of malicious sites. Three high interaction hon-
eypots, Capture HPC[27], Threat analyser [200], and Winpooch [15] were considered to
support the capture and observation of behaviour of a Web application and to flag sus-
picious activity. Transparency, portability and confidence in the report generated were
the three parameters used to evaluate the effectiveness of a honeypot. Transparency re-
veals the inner working of a honeypot, allowing the end-user to understand the working
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of the honeypot and interpret the outputs. Portability enables a honeypot to be used in
different environments and allows it to be configured as desired. Finally, there should be
a high level of confidence in the correctness of the report generated outlining application
behaviour. If an infected or malicious application manipulates the system using low-level
system calls, honeypots observing behaviour based on high-level function calls would not
be able to detect the malicious nature of such an application. Hence, a honeypot should
observe application behaviour in terms of state changes at the lowest possible level, so
there is high confidence that the report generated is correct.
Capture HPC, Winpooch and Threat Analyser were judged useful, based on transparency,
portability and confidence in the correctness of the system activity generated report while
observing application behaviour (see Table 3.3). Threat Analyser only provides portabil-
ity, meaning it can be easily used in a different environment. Winpooch that is designed
especially to prevent malware infection was not portable but transparent and observed ap-
plication behaviour at the lowest possible level resulting in high confidence in the report
generated detailing the application behaviour as correct. Capture HPC being open-source
and designed especially for Win32 operating system exhibited all the three features, be-
cause of which it was chosen for all our experiments.
Table 3.3: Comparison matrix between various High interaction Honeypots
Tools Used Confidencein Report Portability Transparency
Capture HPC
Winpooch X
Threat Analyser X X
3.3 Capture HPC
The capture HPC honeypot system is designed on a client-server model, where the server
provides instructions for the client to execute and, in return, the client executes the in-
struction and passes on the results to the server. Since the honeypot would be visiting a
malicious website, both the server and the client of the honeypot are set up in a sandboxed
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Figure 3.3: Experimental setup to detect drive-by download attacks
environment to prevent the entire network from being infected. Figure 3.3, highlights the
experimental setup used to detect a malicious URL, where URLs that were captured dur-
ing popular events were opened inside the honeypot. Keeping in mind that a drive-by
download attack could occur while visiting the Web page, a sandboxed environment was
created using VirtualBox, an open source hosted hypervisor for x86 computers, and in-
side this the Capture HPC server on the Debian operating system was configured. Two
capture HPC clients were configured, one running Win7 and other on WinXP. These op-
erating systems were chosen for their popularity: 48% of desktop personal computers in
the world still use Win 7 and even though Microsoft discontinued updating WinXP it is
still in use by 7% of all Desktop users [104].
Furthermore, each client machine was equipped with Java version 7, Flash player 12,
Shockwave player 12, Internet Explorer 8.0 and Firefox 29.01. Upon bootup, the Capture
server was initiated, which in turn invoked all the Capture clients via the VMWare Vix
library within the virtual environment. Figure 3.4 gives an overview of the interactions
between a Capture HPC server and a client. For the communication between client and
server to be successful, the Capture client established a socket communication channel be-
tween the server and the client in order to exchange various files and information. Once
a communication channel was established, the Capture server directed the Capture client
to visit a particular website. While visiting the website the system activities in terms
of changes to the file, registry and processes were captured and reported back. These
changes were analysed, and a URL was classified as malicious if the configuration rules
(the exclusion list for the file, process and registry, see 3.4) were violated.
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Figure 3.4: Overview of the Capture HPC system [91]
Figure 3.5: Capture client components [91]
Figure 3.5 gives an overview of the architecture of the capture client that is composed
of four subsystems :
1. Client/Server communication.
2. Visitor.
3. Analyser.
4. Event controller.
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3.3.1 Client/Server Communication
This is responsible for establishing a communication channel between the client and the
server. It has two components, transmitter and receiver, which are responsible for sending
XML-based messages. Once the client side receives the message, it passes it to the Event
Controller, who later decides which event to initiate.
3.3.2 Visitor
When the Capture server requests it via the event controller, the visitor subsystem is re-
sponsible for directing a Web browser to open a URL sent by the Capture server. It is also
responsible for initiating all the plugins required by the Web browser. One of the primary
responsibilities of the visitor is to keep the analyser informed of every activity it engages
in, from initiating the plugins to any errors that may occur during the visit to the website.
3.3.3 Event Controller
This is responsible for handling requests from the server and communication between the
sub-components of the visitor and the analyser. It decodes server requests and initiates
the visitor component and the analyser.
3.3.4 Analyser
The analyser is responsible for maintaining various monitoring subsystems, whereas a
monitoring system itself is responsible for monitoring and analysing the system activities.
The three monitoring systems that Capture HPC has are as follows:
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The File System Monitor
Once initiated, it records all the read or write events from all the current files mounted in
the operating systems. It records all the relevant information for the triggered event, such
as the process that triggered the event, the file and the directory name related to the event.
The Registry Monitor
Similarly once it is initiated, it starts to monitor the entire Windows registry. A Windows
registry holds all the critical information for an operating system, which may be anything
from the configuration of the operating system to the information about the programs
installed on this operating system. The registry monitors and records the time of the event
and the process by which the registry was accessed; it edits the path of the key and the
action performed on the key.
The Process Monitor
Like the other monitors it records activities - in this case it is concerned with process
activity. It captures all the processes that were either created or destroyed while the URL
was being accessed, but ignores the processes that are already running. Like other log files
generated by system monitors, this also records the file name that represents the process.
It also captures the parent process for the triggering process.
3.4 Exclusion List
The primary operation of Capture HPC is to observe system activities with regard to file,
process and registry. During the observation, an operating system is capable of generating
hundreds of machine state events. For instance, on an idle machine that had Windows XP
SP2 system, 530 registry entries and 60 file entries were observed in one minute [181].
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In order to differentiate the malicious events from the benign ones, Capture HPC relied
on rules that were defined while configuring the Capture HPC server. These rules were
configured in the server as three files called the exclusion list, namely, FileSystemMoni-
tor.exl, RegistryMonitor.exl and ProcessMonitor.exl.
Exclusion lists are simple text-based files that are easily amendable to add more rules that
aid in detecting malicious behaviour. Also, these files could easily be ported by merely
copying these files from one machine to another (see appendix for detailed exclusion list).
By default, no rules were defined in each exclusion list, giving the end-user the flexibility
to define and update their own malware detection rules. Without any rules Capture HPC
flags every activity as malicious, meaning by default everything that was observed for an
application aided in classifying the application as malicious. In order to avoid this, rules
were defined that instructed Capture to ignore those activities that are benign and flag
those that were malicious. The process of identifying those activities that were benign
is highlighted in Figure 3.6, where a website which is most probably a benign website is
chosen, it is then checked using HoneySpider 2 [197], a static analyser that determines
whether a website is malicious or not. The website is then counter checked by Virus Total
[201], an online website maintained by Google to check whether a website is malicious
or not. The results of both tools are combined, and only those websites that are benign
are then opened in a Capture client and the activities recorded while visiting them are
included in the exclusion list for the omission. Many benign websites are used to create a
comprehensive exclusion list.
For malicious rules, activities that were without any doubt malicious and should not oc-
cur while visiting a Web page were created in the exclusion list, such as the automatic
download of an executable file, execution of a batch file, modification in Win32 folder.
In addition to these, any activity that occurred and was not defined in the exclusion list
would result in classifying the URL as malicious. Also, activities recorded, against which
rules are not defined were reviewed to check if these were correctly mapped to malicious
activities. In order to do so, the log file that was generated was inspected to check if
another process triggered the activity or not. These were then checked using Windows
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Figure 3.6: Determining a website to be benign leading to formation of exclusion list.
internals book and the operating system help pages [141] to map the activities with re-
spective processes and files. With the help of these documents, it could be determined
whether the excepted function that generated the activity was behaving normally or not.
Finally, VirusTotal [201] was used and based on the results the URLs were either marked
as benign or malicious activities.
An exclusion list is a file that contains symbols indicating (i) the type of event, (ii) the
process name, and (iii) the file path of the event. Figure 3.7 shows the content of an ex-
clusion list, in which each row specifies a rule that was created for the honeypot to follow.
An omission rule has the prefix of a plus sign ‘+’, and an inclusion rule has a prefix of
Figure 3.7: Contents of file exclusion list [181]
‘-‘ sign. In Figure 3.7, line 2 specifies that the writing in the folder c:\win\ should be
omitted whereas any writing in the folder c:\win\sys\ should be flagged. This feature of
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Capture HPC gives the user a great deal of flexibility and provides transparency in classi-
fying an activity in a malicious or a benign category. The main exclusion rules in each list
are discussed in sections 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, to clarify this categorisation of the URL.
Each exclusion list is tailored to capture the activities for both the Capture client, namely,
the WinXP and Win 7 operating system.
3.4.1 File Exclusion List
This exclusion file contains lists of all the files, those which should be ignored and those
which should be highlighted as malicious. The main rules that are added to the file exclu-
sion list are as follows:
1. Capture files. The honeypot imitates the program that will monitor the system state
changes and any triggers raised by this program are to be ignored. The rule men-
tioned under this heading concerns the files that are accessed by the Capture client
to carry out its processes and are to be ignored. The rules define that any executable
(exe) file executed or accessed from the Capture directory in program files should
be ignored, and that the writing of the log file, which is further communicated to
the server, should be ignored as a malicious activity.
2. Prefetch Files. Each time a computer is turned on, Windows keeps track of the
way that it starts and which programs is generally opened first. Windows saves this
information as a number of small files in the prefetch folder. The next time the
computer is turned on, Windows refers to these files to accelerate the start process.
However, if the file is not a part of Windows but is from any other source it will
automatically raise an alarm and be flagged as malicious, but will ignore any writing
in the Windows prefetch and svchost folders.
3. New Technology File System (NTFS) Meta Data. To run efficiently, the NTFS
contains several files that define and organise the file system. Like any other operat-
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ing system, these files are structured in the same way as any other user file ($Volume
being the most peculiar) but are not of direct interest to file system clients. These
meta-files define files, back up critical data in the file system, buffer file system
changes, manage free space allocation, satisfy basic input/output system (BIOS)
expectations, track bad allocation units, and store security and disk space usage in-
formation. Because the Master File Table (MFT) stores information about itself,
NTFS reserves the first 16 records of the MFT for meta-data files (approximately
16 KB), which are used to describe the MFT. Meta-data files that begin with a dollar
sign ($) are described in the Metadata Files table and are stored in the Master File
Table. As access to these files is always a routine activity, an exception was created
in the list in order to ignore any access to these files. These files are as follows:
• $mft –contains one base file for each file and folder on the drive.
• $mftmirr- is the mirror image in case mft file fails.
• $logfile- contains information for recovery in case of any crashes.
• $volume- contains volume information.
• $directory- contains directory information.
• $AttrDef - contains list of attributes such as name, number and description.
• $boot- includes the BIOS parameter block (BPB) used to mount the volume
and additional bootstrap loader code used if the volume is boot table.
• $bitmap- contains information for free and unused cluster.
• $badclus- contains information about bad clusters.
• $quota- keep tracks of file quota.
• $upcase- is an uppercase table used to convert characters from lower to upper
case.
• $ReplaceAttribute2 and 1- to optimise the storage and input or output over-
head.
66
4. Performance- uses certain files such as Windows Management Instrumentation
(WMI) Performance Adaptor (wmiadap) and those in the system32 folder to en-
hance the performance of the operating system. Access to these files is benign and
should be ignored.
5. System Log Files- In Windows XP, an event is added to a log if it is of any signif-
icant occurrence in the system or in a program that requires users to be notified, or
is the subject of an entry. The system log contains events logged by the Windows
XP system components. Hence, writing system log files should be ignored
6. Windows update- activities responsible for Windows updates should be ignored,
because a Windows update sometimes starts in a way that could falsely be picked
up as a malicious activity. The exception list here is configured to ignore any write
activity on wuauclt, windowsupdate and softwaredistribution directories.
7. System events- In Windows XP, if an event is of any significant occurrence in
the system or in a program that requires users to be notified, or an entry has been
made which is of significance, it is added to a log. Any activity related to the event
should be ignored; however, exceptions to AppEvent, SysEvent and SecEvent, in the
exception list, have been made to prevent the false triggering of malicious activities.
8. Mapping – In this, we are mainly concerned with Web-Based Enterprise Manage-
ment (WBEM), which is a set of systems management technologies developed to
unify the management of the distributed computing environments. In this case, an
exception has been made to ignore all activities related to this from the wbem folder.
9. Cataloguing- A security catalogue is the part of Windows that handles digital sig-
natures for updates, system file protection and other functions. Hence any activity
related to this should be ignored. The main folders where this exception is to be
applied are Catroot, svchost, winevnt and lastalive.
10. System Restore- As the name suggests, System Restore is a feature in Microsoft
Windows that allows users to revert to a former state of their computer (including
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system files, installed applications, Windows Registry, and system settings).This
can be used to recover from system malfunctions or other problems. The exception
list contains rules to ignore all activities related to this event.
11. User Date-A user profile describes the desktop computing configuration for a spe-
cific user, including the user’s environment and preference settings. Consequently,
any activity in the UserClass folder should be handled in accordance with the rule
in the exception list.
12. Internet Explorer- Our Honeypot Capture client accesses each URL using Inter-
net Explorer (IE), so our exception list, based on system activities, has designed
exception rules for each subcategory, as detailed below.
• IE temporary files/ Internet Cache- Temporary Internet Files is the name of
a folder on Microsoft Windows, which holds browser caches. This folder
usually holds multimedia content and Web pages for quick access. Not only
do Web browsers have access to the directory to read or write, but also have
access to the Window Explorer and Windows Desktop Search. Our exception
list ignores any access to the files of this folder.
• History – Internet Explorer keeps track of all the websites that have been vis-
ited in the past, and our exception list ignores any access to this folder.
• IE cookies- In the cookie folder, we created an exception for the index.dat
file. This is a database file, which is a repository of information such as Web
URLs, search queries and recently opened files. Its purpose is to enable the
data used by the Internet to be quickly accessed.
• User Data-This folder also contains information which is used to improve
performance. Hence, the exception list contains rules to ignore access to this
data.
• Plugins (Flash players)- Plugins such as Flash will be accessed in visiting a
URL; hence, any such access is ignored.
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• Digital rights management (DRM) related- Internet Explorer accesses the
DRM folder to check the information on various digital rights and thus ac-
cess to this folder should not be flagged as malicious.
• Msg ActiveX- Internet Explorer may use this folder for content download from
the Internet. Our exception rule prevents the wrongful marking of any website
as malicious if this folder is accessed.
Just as Internet Explorer uses various folders to function efficiently, there are other browsers
such as Chrome and FireFox which also use similar folders to perform efficiently. Though
our honeypot client may open Internet Explorer by default, the Capture client’s exclusion
list has made provisions to ignore the files and folders that are accessed by other browsers.
For instance, as listed below, there are certain folders for which rules are designed for
Firefox.
1. To check Start-up cache.
2. Profile file access.
3. Web-apps.
4. Temporary files.
5. Firefox cache.
6. History.
7. Cookies.
8. Safe browsing malware (inbuilt feature).
9. Certificates.
10. Session data.
11. Firefox Preferences.
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12. URL classifiers.
In addition to these exceptions, there are rules which determine whether the activity
should be flagged as malicious or not. These are sub-categorised as follows:
1. Alerts about executable and scripts that are written on to disk; any scripts or files
such as
• Batch file ‘bat’
• Command file ‘cmd’
• Executable file ‘exe’
• Setup information file ‘inf’
• Windows installer file ‘msi’
• Windows installer path file ‘msp’
• Program information file ‘pif’
• Registry file ‘reg’
• Scitex Continuous Tone file ‘sct’
• Microsoft scrap file ‘shs’
• System Configuration Repository ‘scr’
• Windows Script Components ‘wsc’
• Windows script file ‘wsf’
• Windows script host ‘wsh’
2. Alerts about modifications to startup locations – any changes in the Windows start-
up folder, win.ini, or the Windows task folder, are flagged as malicious activity.
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3.4.2 Process Exclusion List
Once the Capture HPC client has booted up, the process exclusion list is loaded in the
client’s machine along with the file exclusion list. The process exclusion list contains a
list of the processes which should be ignored if they are started. Like the file exclusion
list, the process exclusion list has also been sub-divided into the categories listed below.
1. Capture script – Our process exclusion list should include the capture process that
is running in the background and it should not be flagged as malicious activity. The
processes that are checked are CaptureClient.exe, CaptureClient.bat and the files
which are executed in the capture folder.
2. Windows Update- At times, even if a Windows update is disabled while running,
the operating system calls up a process. Hence, our exclusion list will ignore the
running of wuauclt.exe and savedump.exe as processes.
3. Standard screen-saver- It is possible that the screen saver is started while the Cap-
ture client is being analysed. Therefore, the logon.scr process is included in the
exclusion list and is to be ignored.
4. Defragmenter- While the Capture client is running the operating system, the pro-
cess of defragmentation may start. Thus have included dfrgntfs.exe and defrag.exe
as items are to be ignored if picked up by our monitors.
5. 7za- the 7za process that would be running since it is used to unzip files for the
Capture client.
6. Mapping- This activity is carried out for the efficient management of distributed
computing environments, usually by invoking wmiadap.exe and wmiprvse.exe. There-
fore, our exclusion list includes instructions to ignore such processes.
7. VMWare tools- VMWare would be running so processes which belong to VMWare,
namely VMWareUser.exe should be ignored.
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8. Capture Client- For the Win 7 Capture client we have configured the exclusion list
of items to ignore:
• Svchost is a process that contains or hosts other services required by the oper-
ating system to carry out its process.
• Win 7 Task scheduler is a process in which we have made an exception to
allow googleupdate.exe to run.
• Win 7 built-in search process, which starts on bootup, namely, SearchProto-
colHost.exe, SearchFilterHost.exe and SearchIndexer.exe should be ignored.
• Windows login scripts namely userinit.exe and winlogon.exe should be ig-
nored.
• Critical system processes like csrss.exe should be ignored.
• Conhost which is responsible for fixing bugs from previous operating systems,
is started when the system is booted. Processes conhost.exe and mobsync.exe,
which are responsible for this activity, should be ignored.
9. Internet Explorer – processes running to support Internet Explorer, namely iex-
plore.exe, agentsvr.exe, msmsgs.exe, rundll32.exe and imapi.exe should be ignored.
10. Other Browsers - As with the file exclusion list, provisions have been made to
ignore processes which would run if any other browser such as Firefox was running
instead of Internet Explorer.
3.4.3 Registry Exclusion list
So far we have worked on the process and file exclusion list, but must also bear in mind
that a malicious website will also try to make changes in the registry. We have configured
an exclusion list to highlight malicious activity and also to ignore any registry entry which
could have resulted from routine operations while visiting a website. First, we look into
the registry keys which we would ignore as benign since they are accessed during regular
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operations by various processes running whenever a website is opened for evaluation.
Then we discuss the registry keys that are highlighted as malicious. As with process and
file exclusion lists we also divide our registry list into various categories and elaborate on
each point.
1. Capture Client- There will be a value set in the registry when the Capture client is
running. The keys that would be affected and have been configured to be ignored
are as follows:
• Whenever an application is started the program count value in the registry
is incremented to show the number of programs running. This value, as a be-
nign activity, should be ignored. The registry key is HKU\SessionInformation
\ProgramCount
• Microsoft uses a set of registry keys to maintain the dimensions, icons and
position of a folder using Explorer. This activity is part of a regular opera-
tion and is to be ignored. The key value set in registry is HKCU\Software
\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam
• Windows will update the information for all Windows installer products and
components that are installed for the user once logged on. Registry entry
to this would be considered as benign; the value in the registry accessed is
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer
\User Data\
• Windows sets a registry key to hold an entropy value, which is the randomness
collected by the operating system. This is further required for cryptography
purposes and the registry key that is set is HKLM\software \Microsoft\
Cryptography\RNG\Seed
• Changes made by Capture Client from path C:\Program Files\Capture
\CaptureClient.exe
• System configuration information, such as drivers, is updated by setting the
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value to a registry key that should again be ignored. The value that is updated
is HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\
2. Internet Explorer - Every URL will be accessed using Internet Explorer. While
the browser is running registry values for that program will be set as part of the
regular operation and these should be ignored. They are as follows. Similar to
the Capture Client process we also allow fields such as SessionInformation, Shell-
noRoam, Internet Setting (how the browser should connect to the Internet ), group
policy, System certificates, interface list and driver setting. Registry editing was al-
lowed through only those processes which were permitted in the process list, such
as svchost, wmiadap, wmiprvse and lsass.
3. De-fragmentation- Registry modification, if defragmentation process is started,
should be ignored, subsequently any changes in the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft
\Dfrg should be ignored.
4. Windows Update - A registry entry is created when windows update is taking
place, hence any setting up of value for HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services
\EventlogV Application\ESE NT \should be ignored.
5. Capture Client - While running a Capture Client process in a Win 7 environment
provisions were made to ignore all modifications made by legitimate applications.
The list of keys that have been ignored while this application is running is as fol-
lows:
• Internet Explorer- To ignore any registry updates made by Explorer such as
home group owner setting, driver information, and so on.
• Search Indexer-Any update made by process searchindexer.exe, which is re-
sponsible for indexing of your files, should be ignored.
• Local service Authentication server (lsass.exe) Changes made in this process
from Windows system32 folder should be ignored.
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• Task scheduler – modification to the key HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft
\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\Handshake\should be ignored as it
points to task scheduler being loaded.
• Svchost- contains a number of individual services that perform a range of func-
tions such as win defender services and can have multiple instances hence
should be ignored. See appendix for complete list.
• System setting – registry being updated for printers, fax, etc should be ignored.
6. Additional rules have been added which are specific to Internet Explorer 6 Sp2
and Internet Explorer 8 as well.A few are mentioned below:
• Registry entry- for layout and notifications such as those mentioned below are
to be ignored.
– HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main\Window Placement
– HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Main\Fullscreen
– HKCU\Software\Microsoft\
Internet Explorer\Main\NotificationDownloadComplete
– HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\TypedURLs
• Plugins- Registry being updated due to plugin’s in the Internet Explorer such
as media player, multi-media player, and so on.
The list of rules to be ignored also included rules that would capture malicious activity
if any is observed while the Capture Client is running. Any modification in the registry,
which would affect the Windows start or boot up sequence was highlighted and flagged
as malicious activity. For this, it is necessary to look at registry keys mentioned below.
These rules are as follows:
1. Run and RunOnce keys from registry – these keys cause the program to run once
the user has logged into the system. Any addition and changes to this key should
be flagged as malicious [142].
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2. Userinit- specifies the program that should start once the user logs into the system;
hence any modification to this key should be recorded [140].
3. BootExecute- specifies the application, services and command executed during startup
of the operating system [140].
4. ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad- This is similar to the Run Key; The only difference
is that instead of pointing to the file itself, this points to the class id’s (CLSID)
InProcSever, which contains information about the DLL file that are to be used.
Capture HPC iterates through the list, visiting each URL, and keeping the connection
open for five minutes, logging machine activity on the client machine and identifying
whether the URL is malicious or benign via reference to its exclusion list. The 5 minute
interval is currently a heuristic to ensure that a large number of sites can be visited – it
makes the significant assumption that any malicious activity will be triggered within the
first 5 minutes of the visit.
3.5 Results and Discussion
Table 3.4: Total Tweets Captured
Event Number of Tweets
Fifa2014 95,000
Cricket World Cup 2015 7,961
European Football Championship 2016 3,154,605
Rugby World Cup 2015 127,393
SuperBowl 2015 122,542
Olympics 2016 6,111
SuperBowl 2016 57,572
We collected 3,571,184 tweets containing URLs across seven sporting events to gather
evidence of malware presence around popular events. The total number of captured tweets
for each event is given in Table 3.4. The captured tweets were pre-processed by removing
the tweets containing the same URL, that is retweets or the same tweet posted again.
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From these individual tweets, URLs were stripped and were passed on to the Capture
HPC honeypot. Due to the Web-page visitation time allocated (5 minutes), Capture HPC
was limited to process only 500 URL per day, a limitation that does not allow the entire
dataset to be checked for malicious behaviour in a short period of time. A random sample
of 500 unique URLs from the collected tweets for each event were selected and passed
to Capture HPC for the next two weeks. The results shown in Table 3.5 show that the
maximum number of tweets containing a malicious URL were found during the FIFA
2014 football event, which generated around 672 million tweets [59] during the one-
month period and the least number of tweets (525 - see Table3.5) containing malicious
URLs were found during the Olympic 2016 opening ceremony. In terms of percentage,
the highest percentage of tweets (19.26%) that were reported as malicious were in FIFA
2014 and lowest being reported for Superbowl 2016 (8.31%). Events related to football
(FIFA 2014 and EURO 2016) were used the most to deliver drive-by download attacks
(see Table3.5). Whereas, a substantial drop in number in malicious URLs identified were
seen for Superbowl.
The URLs were classified as malicious based on the system changes they made during the
Table 3.5: Number of Malicious URL Captured
Event Number ofUnique Tweets
Percentage of
Malicious Tweets
FIFA 2014 2,039 19.26
SuperBowl 2015 1,230 17.57
Cricket World Cup 2015 891 11.19
Rugby World Cup 2015 627 08.96
SuperBowl 2016 582 08.31
European Football Championship 2016 975 13.93
Olympics 2016 525 10.12
visit. These changes included modifying files in Window’s System 32 folder or modifying
the Internet Explorer file or modifying the dynamic link library files. They were also
labelled as malicious due to the processes started as a result of the execution of malicious
executable files from the Internet.
Twitter allows each user to follow other users, which allows them to see what others
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Figure 3.8: Number of Unique Tweets captured containing Malicious URLs
Table 3.6: Ratio of Followers by Following for accounts posting malicious URLs
Event Followers by Friend Ratio greater than
>10,000 10,000-1,000 1,000-100 100-10 10-1 0-1 Only Followers
Fifa2014 0.002% 0.039% 0.706% 10.434% 81.044% 7.855% 0.022%
Cricket World Cup 2015 2.360% 19.821% 27.230% 35.087% 15.432% 0.118%
European Football Championship 2016 0.028% 0.148% 2.129% 6.355% 77.494% 13.660% 0.232%
Rugby World Cup 2015 0.052% 3.128% 38.921% 34.176% 22.993% 0.704%
SuperBowl 2015 0.000% 2.268% 24.858% 43.611% 29.132% 0.131%
Olympics 2016 0.060% 1.250% 18.339% 40.161% 27.538% 12.474% 0.268%
SuperBowl 2016 0.000% 0.046% 0.846% 43.140% 55.901% 0.071%
are posting. Users who are Following someone on Twitter will be subscribing to (someone
else’s) tweets as a follower and their updates will appear in the follower’s Home timeline;
that person will also be able to send Direct Messages, these are also referred as Friends of
a user. Followers, in contrast, are people who receive others’ Tweets. If people follow a
user, they will show up in the followers’ list, and they will see users’ Tweets in their Home
timeline. Also, whenever they log in to Twitter, they can start a private conversation by
sending a direct message. The following and friends characteristics on the accounts of
users who posted tweets containing malicious URL were investigated. The aim was to
observe and identify patterns emerging out of OSN accounts that have been used to post
malicious URLs.
In order to successfully deliver a drive-by download attack, a cybercriminal needs to have
a potential list of users. On Twitter, this is represented by the number of followers a
cyber criminal’s account have who will view the malicious post. One of the challenges
the cybercriminal faces is to increase the number of followers. One way to increase the
number of followers is to constantly follow users, with the hope that they will reciprocate
the gesture by following them back. Evidence of this reciprocal relationship has been
observed among users on Twitter [94] .
In order to identify similar behaviour between accounts posting malicious content, seven
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categories were created. Each category represented the ratio between the followers and
friends. The ratio was calculated by dividing the number of Followers by Friends an
account had. The higher the ratio was, the more likely it was that the account will post
spam [192]. We found 0.12% accounts (121 accounts in total) across seven events posting
malicious tweets that were following people but had no followers themselves. At the other
extreme, seven accounts were identified (see table 3.6) that had a ratio higher than 10,000.
Accounts that had a follower by following ratio between 10,000 and 10 posted 12.8% of
the malicious URLs. We also found an average 65% of the malicious tweets were posted
by accounts having a ratio between 1 and 10 across all events. The result showed that
accounts that were used to post malicious content were following more people than they
were being followed by others, a tactic used to gain followers. By increasing the number
of followers a cybercriminal could increase the number of users exposed to malware, and
using the reciprocal technique it is possible s/he could increase the number of followers
by following people. Thus these features are frequently used in constructing spam [192,
12, 183] or malware [127] detection models. An interesting observation was that there
were malicious accounts that exhibited ratios between 0 and 1, a ratio that was usually
associated with normal accounts [192].
Table 3.7: Age of User Account Including Those Re-Tweeting Malicious URL
Event
Percentage of User Account Posting Malicious URLs
including Re-Tweets based on their age
<1 month 1-3 month 3-6 month >6 month
European Football Championship 2016 5.4% 6.0% 5.9% 82.7%
Olympics 2016 2.7% 3.6% 6.0% 87.7%
SuperBowl 2015 3.0% 1.5% 3.4% 92.2%
Cricket World Cup 2015 12.1% 5.1% 5.5% 77.2%
Rugby World Cup 2015 5.1% 3.8% 6.1% 85.1%
SuperBowl 2016 51.1% 3.3% 1.3% 44.3%
Fifa 2014 4.2% 4.6% 5.6% 85.6%
Total Percentage 15.3% 4.5% 4.7% 75.6%
In addition to OSN characteristics such as friends and followers, age of an account
has been used to detect those accounts that were posting spam [227, 126, 144, 43, 183].
An investigation was conducted with an aim to observe the effect of account age posting
malicious content across all the seven events. In order to do that, the age for each account
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that posted malicious tweets was calculated as the number of days between the day that
the malicious tweet was posted and the day that the account was created. The results
showed 21% of the accounts across all events had been created 6 months or more before
the event. 15% of the accounts were created under one month before the sporting event.
Interestingly for Superbowl 2016, 51% of the accounts that were posting malicious tweets
were created one month before the event (see table 3.7). These results showed a significant
association between accounts posting malicious content and their age and should therefore
be included in a malware detection/prediction model.
3.6 Conclusion
In the beginning of the chapter a question was posed ”Are popular events that attract
millions of users on online social network being exploited to carry out drive-by download
attacks by cybercriminals?” In answer to this, we can say that there is substantial evidence
to show that there is an association between popular events on Twitter and drive-by down-
load attacks. The evidence was gathered by collected 3,571,184 tweets from seven diverse
sporting events in three years. From these, we randomly selected a sample of 48,991
unique tweets that were passed on to the high interaction honeypot, Capture HPC. Of
the URLs processed through Capture HPC, 6,879 (individual tweets) and around 105,642
(tweets including retweets) were established to be malicious through an automated analy-
sis of each URL. This process involved a virtual machine interacting with an endpoint of
the URL for a fixed period, using an exclusion list of known malicious activity to detect
malicious behaviour.
In this process, results showed that popular sporting events on Twitter have continually
been used by cybercriminals to carry out drive-by download attacks. A maximum of
19.26% accounts during FIFA 2014 were identified as posting malicious URLs and a
minimum of 8.31% for Superbowl 2016. Even though the number of accounts posting
malicious URLs have gone down from 19.26% (FIFA) in 2014 to 10.12% (Olympics) in
2016, there were still a significant number of accounts that were detected as malicious.
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This is likely due to the popularity of an event attracting millions of users generating
thousands of tweets per second. For example on average 6,000 tweets [18] are tweeted
every second and a record of 143,199 tweets were tweeted during a popular event (airing
of Castle in the Sky in Japan) [205]. With so many tweets being generated a user acts
quickly to investigate the tweet. In addition to this a 280 character restriction imposed by
Twitter gives cybercriminals the opportunity to obfuscate a malicious URL in an exciting
tweet. Furthermore, with less reaction time and obfuscated URLs, an interesting tweet
acts as a click bait to lure users to visit the Web-page so that upon visitation the malicious
code is executed on their systems.
The tweets identified as malicious were investigated through the characteristics of Twitter
accounts to identify any patterns exhibited by accounts posting malicious tweets. Results
showed that accounts that had a higher number of follower and followee ratio indicated
that malicious account were following more people than they were followed by. The trend
whereby accounts that were following a large number of people with fewer people fol-
lowing them back was seen across all seven sporting events, this is consistent with other
areas where a user by means of reciprocal relationship had aimed to gain followers by
following many users on Twitter [94] .
By using a honeypot, Capture HPC, evidence of popular events being used to spread
drive-by download attacks was gathered. Accounts that were posting malicious URLs
were identified by opening the URLs inside the honeypot and observing changes made
during visitation. However, there were limitations to his approach, Capture HPC only ob-
serves changes made in terms of file, process and registry, it required high maintenance,
and if not properly deployed it could act as access points to the network [180]. Detection
models have been proposed based on malware code/behaviour, but these may fail against
code/behaviour obfuscating techniques such as anti-symbolic execution obfuscation [10],
anti-fuzzing [84], encryption [150], polymorphism [150]. This brings us to the question,
is it possible to construct a novel detection model to detect drive-by download attacks on
Twitter, that overcomes these challenges?
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Chapter 4
Classification of Drive-by Downloads on
Twitter
Popular events that attract millions of users on OSNs are being used to deliver cyber
attacks. Existing literature documents the development of detection models by analysing
malware code and by comparing with online resources such as blacklists. However,
these models fail against code obfuscating techniques such as encryption and
polymorphism. In this chapter, a novel detection model is proposed that classifies a URL
into malicious/benign based on system activities, thus shifting the focus from analysing
malware code to observing changes to a user’s system by the malware. The proposed
model was successful in classifying URLs into malicious and benign with a F-measure of
0.81 during training and 0.71 while testing on an unseen dataset.
4.1 Introduction
Online social networks have emerged as powerful tools for disseminating information.
Among these, Twitter, a micro-blogging website that allows its users to express them-
selves in 280 characters, has emerged as a go-to source for current affairs, entertainment
news and getting information about global events in real time. For example, Twitter has
been used to study public reaction to events such as natural disasters [174], political elec-
tions [202] and terrorist attacks [25]. The growing popularity of Twitter and events that
attract millions of active users has tempted cybercriminals to conduct attacks [231]. Also,
evidence of popular events being used to carry out drive-by downloads has been found as
discussed in Chapter 3. This evidence was gathered using a high interaction honeypot,
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Capture HPC, in which an attack was recorded if any unauthorised changes were made
during the visitation of a URL. Even though Twitter has a policy to curb malicious content
and successful models have been proposed by researchers, there is an 8% chance a Web
request made on the Internet will point to a malicious Web-server [46].
Cyber criminals continue to develop new ways to overcome Twitter’s policy and beat the
detection models proposed to counter them. There is a requirement to develop detection
models by shifting the focus from existing malware code/behaviour features to keep pace
with cybercriminals. One such approach would be to focus on the effect of malware on
user systems, by observing machine activities leading to an attack. After all, malware will
reveal itself eventually to harm a system even if it is using different evading techniques
such as polymorphism, encryption, triggers, etc. to hide the malicious code. In this chap-
ter we propose a malware detection model that classifies a URL into malicious/benign
based on machine activities, thus shifting the focus from malware code/behaviour to sys-
tem behaviour during malware execution.
4.2 Background
Figure 4.1: Malicious Content Detection on OSN
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Figure 4.1 gives an overview of malware detection models for OSNs, in which re-
search on detecting malicious content on OSN was conducted with three primary objec-
tives, (i) Detecting malware on OSN, (ii) Detecting accounts that are spreading malicious
content and (iii) Detecting Spam. Models that were developed to achieve these objectives
relied on features that were derived from OSN account characteristics [12, 183, 227, 126,
144, 43, 192, 30, 187, 19], by performing static code analysis [100, 210, 137, 135, 31,
125, 65] or dynamic analysis [103, 108, 114, 11, 116, 149, 22] of the code embedded in
a Web page. Subsequently, these features were used to either create a filter or a machine
learning model to detect malicious content on OSN. Models that used only OSN char-
acteristics could not be relied upon as Twitter spammers quickly modify their behaviour
in order to evade existing spam detection techniques [227] and subsequently OSN fea-
tures that are required to detect them change with time [6]. This led to the development
of models based on static and dynamic analysis, where the models focused on malware
code/behaviour to detect malicious URLs on OSNs. However, these models failed against
code/behaviour obfuscating techniques such as anti-symbolic execution obfuscation [10],
anti-fuzzing [84], encryption [150], polymorphism [150] (see chapter 2 for detailed dis-
cussion of these models). Alternatively, security practitioners have deployed high inter-
action honeypots, particularly Capture HPC [161], to detect a drive-by download attack
by observing changes made on the client’s machine in terms of file, process, and registry
to identify the URL as malicious or benign by referring to its exclusion list (see chapter 3
for details on Capture HPC and exclusion lists). However, there were limitations to this
approach. A high interaction honeypot observes changes only to file, process and reg-
istry [180]. Thus in this chapter we propose a novel drive-by download detection model,
that shifts the focus of detection from analysing malware code/behaviour through specific
(discrete) file, process and registry activity to observing effect of malware to client’s ma-
chine using (continuous) machine activity. To the best of our knowledge this is the first
study where a detection model was built based on actual machine activity to detect drive-
by download attacks on Twitter.
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4.2.1 Contribution
The main contributions of this chapter are to develop evidence to answers to two research
questions posed in Chapter 2 namely;
RQ2 Is it possible to construct a model to detect drive-by download attacks that is easily
reproducible and is independent of the malware code signature, by using system-
based activity extracted from a honeypot?
RQ3 Which machine learning models are well suited for detecting drive-by download
attacks, based on machine activity?
Here we aim to develop a novel machine learning-based method that will be able to
detect a drive-by download attack on the basis of system-level recorded machine activi-
ties. The underlying assumption here is that behaviour changes to the system are more
difficult to manipulate than the hiding of the malicious code. The main contributions of
this chapter are:
1. We developed a novel machine learning model based on system behaviour collected
while visiting the websites that can distinguish between malicious and benign URLs
within five minutes of the URL being clicked. Thus, shifting the focus to the anal-
ysis of system behaviour rather than analysis of code. This overcomes limitations
of models built based on malware code, such as encryption, polymorphism, anti-
symbolic execution obfuscation [10] or anti-fuzzing [84].
2. We examine and interpret the learned model and trace the relationship between ma-
chine activity and malicious behaviour exhibited by drive-by-downloads on Twitter.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 4.2: (a) Identifying malicious URLs which can carry out drive-by download at-
tacks on Twitter (b) Revisiting malicious and benign URLs in a sandboxed environment
to record system behaviour and build a classifier using the Weka toolkit (c) Testing the
classifier on unseen data from a different sporting event
4.3 A Drive-by Download Attack Classifier
4.3.1 Data Annotation and Pre-processing
Figure 4.2 outlines the experimental setup that was used to build and validate the drive-
by download classification model. The detection model was constructed in three stages,
namely: (i) using a honeypot to annotate URLs into malicious/benign (ii) revisiting the
URLs and observing behavioural changes made for the purposes of developing a machine
learning model, (iii) validating the detection model.
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The aim of the experimental setup is to build a machine classifier that can distinguish be-
tween malicious and benign URLs on the basis of the machine activities recorded over a
period of five minutes. The 5-minute interval is currently a heuristic to ensure that a large
number of sites can be visited – it makes the significant assumption that any malicious
activity will be triggered within the first 5 minutes of the visit.
This was achieved by training machine classification models, from both generative and
discriminative categories (see section 4.3.3 on building the model) using machine activity
logs generated while interacting with URLs extracted from Twitter data that had been col-
lected during two popular sporting events – Superbowl 2015 and the Cricket World Cup
2015. TThe experimental setup was divided into three parts. In the first part (see Figure
4.2a) URLs were classified into malicious or benign by Capture HPC (a detailed discus-
sion on how classification is performed can be found in Chapter 3). The result of the first
stage is an annotated list of URLs, where if a URL is classified as malicious it signifies
a drive-by download attack occurred during its visitation, and a benign label signifies no
attack. However, Capture HPC only observes changes made to the system by observing
changes made to files, registry and process. We have introduced the novel concept of
observing machine activity. Thus, in the second phase, an activity log was created at 30
second interval capturing all the relevant activities while interacting with known mali-
cious and benign URLs (see section 4.3.3 for detail). Next, a range of machine learning
models were developed as part of the investigation based on cutting edge approaches in
literature. Two popular generative (NaiveBayes[179, 117, 68, 208, 110] and Baynet[110,
208, 176, 223]) and discriminative (Decision Tree[117, 68, 110, 176, 208] and Multi-
Layer Perceptron[68, 178, 51]) classifiers were chosen to build the detection models (see
section 4.3.3). The best performing method was then chosen for the detection model. In
the final phase the classifier was tested on unseen data (data from a completely different
sporting event) and the performance of the classifier was evaluated (see section 4.3.4).
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4.3.2 Malicious URL Identification
For the study data was collected from Twitter via its programmatically accessible stream-
ing API using Tweepy [166] and a total of 122,542 Tweets were collected for the Super
Bowl final while 7,961 Tweets that contained a URL including retweets were captured
for the cricket World Cup using event-specific hashtags (#CWC15, #RWC2015, #SB50,
#SuperBowlSunday, #superbowlXLIXend). Figure 4.2a shows how a high interaction
honeypot was set up to analyse the activity of all the URLs collected from the Twitter
stream and to determine whether to annotate each of one them as either malicious or be-
nign. For this purpose we used Capture HPC, a client-side honeypot[160] system, that
interacted with each URL for period of 5 minutes. At the end of the interaction period
Capture HPC determines if any system-level operations have occurred including file, pro-
cess and registry changes made to the system. Based on these changes it classifies the
URL as malicious or benign (for details regarding the configuration of Capture HPC, see
Chapter 3)
The tasks that are summarised in Figure 4.2a are as follows:
1. Connect to the Twitter Streaming API and send the search term to collect on (#su-
perbowlXLIX), specifying that only posts containing URLs should be returned.
This returns Tweets as they are posted. Write and send the details of the Tweets to
a database.
2. Expand the shortened URLs and remove duplicates.
3. For every 500 (new) URLs, upload a text file using a (clean) Capture HPC virtual
machine.
4. Capture HPC iterates through the list, visiting each URL, and keeping the connec-
tion open for 5 minutes and at the same time, observes changes made on the client
machine in terms of file, process, and registry to identify the URL as malicious or
benign by referring to its exclusion list.
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4.3.3 Building a Machine Classifier
From the collection of annotated Tweets made in the previous phase 2,000 Tweets were
sampled containing unique URLs. The training data consisted of samples of machine
activity at regular intervals of 30 seconds throughout the Super Bowl data collection pe-
riod. The training set contained 1,000 URLs identified by Capture HPC as malicious, and
1,000 as benign. The unseen dataset used as the test set was collected around the time of
the cricket World Cup; it consisted of 891 malicious URLs and 1,100 benign (sampling
80% from the day of the final and 10% from each of the semi-finals).
Feature Selection and Preprocessing
To identify features that were predictive of malicious behaviour machine log data was
collected while revisiting the malicious and benign URLs in a sandboxed environment.
The details of the metrics that we measured are as follows:
1. CPU usage (number).
2. Connection established/listening (yes/no).
3. Port Number (yes for port 80/no for other port).
4. Remote IP (established or not).
5. Network Interface (type e.g. Wifi, Eth0).
6. Bytes Sent (number).
7. Bytes received (number).
8. Packets Sent (number).
9. Packets Received (number).
10. Time since interaction started.
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From the log file created only ten attributes from the recorded machine activities were
considered to build the machines learning models. The attributes were categorised into
two broad categories, one presenting the load on the machine, such as the CPU usage
during the visitation of the website and other presenting network data. In the log file gen-
erated to build machine learning models, the value for CPU was represented as a numeric
value representing CPU usage during visitation. While for attributes represented network
statistics had to undergo a pre-processing stage before they could be written in the log
file. In the pre-processing stage, attributes such as connection, ports, network interface,
and remote IP were transformed into nominal value. Where for connection and remote
IP a value one represented a presence of remote IP and connection established and zero
represent an absence. Whereas for ports a binary value 1 represented the use of port 80
and 0 represented the usage of any other port other than 80. The rationale for focusing on
port 80 was because it is the most commonly used for the internet communication proto-
col, Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). It is the port from which a computer sends and
receives Web client-based communication and messages from a Web server and is used to
send and receive HTML pages or data. For the network interface attribute, each number
presented the network interface that was used while visiting the website. Once the data
was transformed log file representing each attribute and their respective values at every
30-second interval were generated for both dataset.
In total a 5.5 million observations were recorded from interacting with 2,000 Tweets
(1,000 malicious and 1000 benign). Each observation represented a feature vector con-
taining metrics which indicated whether the URL was annotated by Capture HPC as ma-
licious or not.
Classifier Model Selection
The data contained logs of machine activity, which occurred even when the system was
idle, so it was likely that any log would contain a great deal of ’noise’ as well as malicious
behaviour. Table 4.1 presents a comparison between the training and testing datasets with
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respect to the mean and standard deviation of recorded machine activity. It illustrates the
high variance in the mean recorded values of CPU usage, bytes/packets and sent/received
used between the two datasets, which suggested that it would be challenging to identify
similar measurements between datasets for prediction purposes. The standard deviation
in both datasets was very similar, which suggested that the variance is common to both
datasets, while the deviation is high, suggesting a great deal of ’noise’ in the data.
In addition to the ‘noise’ in the data – although the training and testing datasets contain
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for train and test datasets at T=60 for numeric attributes
Attribute Mean Std. DevTrain Test Train Test
Cpu 1.255354 6.26 2.144828 2.31
Connection 0.86 0.88 0.34 0.32
Portnumber 0 0.37 0.01 0.19
Remoteip 0.86 0.88 0.34 0.32
Network 4 4 2 2
Bytessent 1.01E+08 3.59E+08 2.06E+08 9.50E+08
Bytesrecd 2.87E+08 3.12E+08 8.47E+08 8.90E+08
Packetssent 470821.5 2442275 1472258 6659166
Packetsrecd 539358 2849133 1843365 7742467
a well-balanced number of malicious and benign activity logs – the behaviours in both
logs are largely benign, creating a large skew in log activity towards the benign type. The
noise and skewness may have an impact on the effectiveness of a discriminative classi-
fier in identifying the decision boundaries in the space of inputs (i.e. the inputs may not
be linearly separable, which could cause problems in using a perceptron-type classifier)
even after great many iterations (for instance, if a multilayer perceptron were used that
had been developed using multiple layers of logistic regression).
It could be argued that for more complex relationships, such as multiple sequential activi-
ties leading to a malicious machine exploit, a generative model would more appropriately
generate a full probabilistic model for all the variables (possible behaviours), giving a
training dataset of machine logs. For example, a Bayesian approach could effectively
capture the dependencies between variables over time [190]. Or a Naive approach to
Bayesian modelling might be more suitable in that it assumes that there are no dependen-
cies, but that the probabilistic value of individual variables will be enough to determine
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the likely behaviour [115]. The first phase of data modelling was therefore to conduct
a number of baseline experiments to determine which of the two models would predict
more accurately. We used the Weka toolkit to compare the predictive accuracy of:
1. Generative models that consider conditional dependencies in the dataset (BayesNet)
or assume conditional independence (Naive Bayes).
2. Discriminative models that aim to maximise information gain (the J48 Decision
Tree) and build multiple models to map input to output via a number of connected
nodes, even if the feature space is hard to linearly separate (Multi-layer Perceptron)
While developing each machine learning model using Weka toolkit, default configuration
for each algorithm had been selected. The default setting for each are listed below
1. NaiveBayes- Batch Size=100, number of Decimal place =2
2. BayesNet-Batch size=100, Estimator Algorithm= Simple Estimator and Search Al-
gorithm= K2-P 1-S Bayes
3. J48- Batch Size=100, confidence factor=0.25, min number of Obj=2, number of
folds=3, unpruned=False.
4. MLP- Batch size=100, Decay=False, Hidden layers= (number of attributes+ classes)/2,
Learning rate=0.3, Momentum=0.2, Training time =500, Validation threshold =20,Nor-
malise Attribute=True, Normalise Numeric class=true.
4.3.4 Classifier Training and Testing Results
The results are presented using standard classification metrics, Precision (a measure of
false positives), Recall (a measure of false negatives) and F-measure (a harmonised mean
of P and R). We define these as follows:
Precision =
TruePositive
TruePositive+ FalsePositive
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Table 4.2: Bayesnet Result
BayesNet Precision Recall F-Measure
Time Train Test Train Test Train Test
0 0.83 0.67 0.83 0.67 0.83 0.67
30 0.87 0.66 0.86 0.66 0.85 0.66
60 0.87 0.67 0.86 0.66 0.86 0.66
90 0.87 0.68 0.86 0.67 0.86 0.66
120 0.86 0.70 0.86 0.69 0.85 0.69
150 0.86 0.70 0.85 0.68 0.85 0.67
180 0.86 0.68 0.85 0.67 0.85 0.66
210 0.85 0.69 0.85 0.68 0.85 0.67
240 0.85 0.69 0.84 0.68 0.84 0.68
270 0.85 0.69 0.85 0.68 0.85 0.67
,
Recall =
TruePositive
TruePositive+ FalseNegative
F −Measure = 2. P recision.Recall
Precision+Recall
The tables of results for two classifiers belonging to each type of model (generative and
discriminative) is presented below. Each table presents the results while training and
testing the model using machine activity logs split into incremental time windows (0-270
seconds) with aggregated log results. Note that t=0 is not actually 0 seconds but 5 seconds
after the connection is opened. The classifiers that were used are BayesNet (BN), Naive
Bayes (NB), J48 Decision Tree (DT) and Multi Layer Perceptron (MLP). It can be seen
from the training performance data , that was performed using ten fold cross validation
technique, (see Tables 4.2-4.5) that each model exhibits optimal performance between
t=30 and t=60, with very little improvement after this time.
The low error rates at t=60 in models that consider conditional dependencies in the train-
ing phase suggest three things:
1. The features we are using to build the models are predictive of malicious behaviour.
2. Malicious activity probably occurs within the first 60 seconds of the interaction.
3. There are conditional dependencies between the measured variables. This is a log-
ical result as we would expect certain machine activities to have some conditional
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dependencies, for example, CPU usage and Bytes sent/received.
Table 4.3: Naive Bayes Results
Naı¨ve Precision Recall F-Measure
Time Train Test Train Test Train Test
0 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.45 0.42 0.40
30 0.59 0.51 0.62 0.50 0.57 0.49
60 0.59 0.52 0.62 0.51 0.57 0.51
90 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.55 0.57 0.50
120 0.58 0.62 0.61 0.57 0.56 0.54
150 0.57 0.64 0.61 0.57 0.55 0.54
180 0.58 0.63 0.60 0.56 0.54 0.52
210 0.58 0.64 0.60 0.58 0.54 0.54
240 0.53 0.63 0.55 0.53 0.47 0.53
270 0.58 0.63 0.56 0.59 0.55 0.56
Table 4.4: J48 Results
J48 Precision Recall F-Measure
Time Train Test Train Test Train Test
0 0.83 0.69 0.83 0.65 0.83 0.65
30 0.87 0.66 0.86 0.67 0.85 0.66
60 0.87 0.66 0.86 0.66 0.86 0.65
90 0.87 0.69 0.86 0.69 0.86 0.69
120 0.86 0.68 0.86 0.68 0.85 0.68
150 0.86 0.67 0.86 0.67 0.85 0.67
180 0.86 0.68 0.86 0.68 0.85 0.68
210 0.86 0.68 0.85 0.68 0.85 0.68
240 0.85 0.69 0.85 0.69 0.85 0.69
270 0.85 0.70 0.85 0.70 0.85 0.69
Table 4.5: MLP Results
MLP Precision Recall F-Measure
Time Train Test Train Test Train Test
0 0.72 0.69 0.72 0.68 0.72 0.67
30 0.83 0.70 0.82 0.68 0.81 0.68
60 0.79 0.70 0.79 0.68 0.77 0.67
90 0.81 0.63 0.80 0.58 0.79 0.56
120 0.80 0.74 0.80 0.71 0.79 0.71
150 0.81 0.717 0.80 0.687 0.80 0.679
180 0.81 0.738 0.81 0.703 0.80 0.694
210 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.69 0.74 0.68
240 0.76 0.69 0.76 0.69 0.76 0.69
270 0.80 0.72 0.79 0.70 0.79 0.70
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Figure 4.3: Classifier performance over time for test dataset
With reference to Figure 4.3, a chart of the correctly classified instances over time
for the test dataset, the first point to note is that the model that does not consider de-
pendencies between input variables (the NB model) performs much worse than the other
models. This model improves over time, but takes until t=270 to reach peak performance,
while the other models begin to plateau or decline in performance around t=120 (see Fig-
ure 4.3). The second point is that the discriminative models outperform the generative
models, suggesting that there are distinct malicious activities that are linearly separable
from benign behaviour. This means that over time and, most importantly, across different
events, it is possible to monitor and measure specific machine behaviours that can be in-
dicative of malicious activity when the URLs are clicked. Strong claims cannot be made
about this, given that our optimal F-Measure performance was only 0.71 at time t=120
using the MLP model (see Table 4.5). However, it is encouraging to see that the MLP
model exhibited a precision performance of 0.740, only slightly above its optimum level,
at time t=30. This demonstrates the model’s ability to reduce false positives fairly early
on in the interaction.
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Model Analysis
Table 4.7 presents the weightings assigned to each attribute used as a predictive feature
in the MLP model. These results were extracted from the best performing iteration of
the MLP model during the training phase (t=60) to examine how the model represents a
learned weighting between features. The model produced 8 hidden nodes and the weight-
ing given to each node for each class (malicious or benign) is shown in Table 4.6, with
4 of the 8 nodes having values above the threshold value, and nodes 3, 5 and 7 having
high weightage towards a particular class. Node 1 stands out as the most discriminative
positive weighted node for malicious URLs. If we look further into this (see Table 4.7)
we can identify that the Bytes Sent variable has the highest weighting. If we compare
Node 3, which is more heavily weighted towards the benign class, we can see that Bytes
Sent/Received have similar weighting but that the Packets Sent/Received are negatively
weighted in Node 3 and positively weighted in Node 8. This is an interesting finding,
because Web endpoints will almost always send data to the machine visiting them. This
model demonstrates that there are measurable ‘norms’ for the inflow of packets from
Web pages and that there are measurable deviations from this that can predict malicious
behaviour, as is happening in Nodes 3 and 8.
Table 4.6: Node by Weight Class
Inputs Weights (Benign) Weights (Malicious)
Threshold 1.99 -1.99
Node1 -11.31 11.31
Node2 2.45 -2.45
Node3 13.79 -13.79
Node4 -8.90 8.9
Node5 10.55 -10.55
Node6 -9.34 9.34
Node7 24.65 -24.65
Node8 -2.61 2.61
CPU has weightings higher than the threshold for the node in Nodes 1 which suggests
that this is also a predictive feature.
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Table 4.7: MLP Analysis
Attribute Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node 4 Node 5 Node 6 Node 7 Node 8
Threshold 51.75 -7.47 44.34 59.95 -2.14 11.62 0.36 2.48
CPU 1.36 -86.36 -0.04 0.02 -0.39 0.20 -1.60 -60.51
Connection 0.14 -2.39 -0.01 0.08 0.04 -0.08 0.00 -0.03
port number -56.20 12.19 -45.24 -60.90 2.16 -11.84 -0.28 -19.34
remoteIP 0.12 -2.37 0.02 0.16 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.01
Network Interface=1 -31.12 19.79 -8.82 -1.79 1.93 -11.74 1.92 -1.36
Network Interface=2 -26.56 -9.39 -44.23 -59.96 2.17 -12.26 -0.44 6.58
Network Interface=3 -26.23 -9.81 -43.65 -59.15 2.09 -12.21 -0.43 5.87
Network Interface=4 -30.85 19.94 -8.19 -0.81 1.82 -11.30 2.06 -1.27
Network Interface=5 -87.26 1.32 -63.24 -116.64 -1.23 13.03 -6.52 -27.81
Network Interface=6 -31.01 24.48 -8.26 -0.82 1.83 -11.82 2.06 -1.02
Network Interface=7 -25.73 -9.20 -45.22 -60.65 1.86 -12.09 -0.57 6.45
Bytes Sent 484.93 9.01 484.23 593.43 50.37 14.02 22.54 62.36
Bytes received -62.91 1.21 -59.96 -12.24 140.94 91.83 -3.19 -10.23
Packets Sent -51.65 3.36 -49.40 -48.90 18.52 18.72 -2.20 8.15
Packets received -51.51 5.55 -48.18 -49.28 10.78 15.26 -0.91 5.15
Figure 4.4: Correctly classified instances with sampled training data
Sampled Learning
Finally, we investigated how much training data was required to train the MLP model.
Storing Twitter data around ongoing real-world events is not straightforward, given that
events can last several weeks. If the system is deployed it could run on a daily basis to
monitor malware and retrain learned models. Fewer data means less storage space and
less computational time required to extract model features and run models. In addition,
interacting with URLs is a time-intensive process. It may be asked whether the training
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set is missing a significant proportion of malicious activity, since not all URLs can be vis-
ited in real time with the relatively low level of computer resources available to academic
researchers. Malicious endpoints are also frequently taken down and are no longer acces-
sible. Thus, demonstrating that a small training sample achieves a similar performance as
a full sample would, to some extent, alleviate the disadvantage of missing data, in that it
would demonstrate that most of the explanatory features are present in smaller samples.
To test this theory, we retained the full test dataset and sampled (using no replacement)
from the training data at 1%, 10%, 25% and increments of 25% up to 100. Figure 4.4
illustrates the percentage of correctly classified instances with a 100% sample, down to
1% and shows that a sample of 10%, 25% and 50% yields a performance of 60%, which
is 10% lower than the optimal performance of 70%.
4.3.5 Experiment Summary and Key Findings
Data were collected from Twitter, using event-specific hashtags to sample the Tweets
posted at the time of two real-world sporting events. Having found evidence of drive-
by download attack during other sporting events (see Chapter 3) we sought to develop
a machine classifier that could classify a URL as malicious or benign within 5 minutes
with classification being performed at every 30 second interval. We used machine activ-
ity log data for this purpose, such as CPU usage, network traffic and network connection
statistics to discriminate between malicious and benign URLs. We aimed to explicate the
relationship between machine activity and the malicious URLs posted to Twitter. Finally,
given the large volumes of Tweets surrounding events and potential issues with sampling
from all malicious sites due to their short lifespan and the time intensiveness of interacting
with all of them, we aimed to understand the impact on classification performance when
using much smaller samples.
We built a number of machine classifiers and identified that a Bayesian model, a Decision
Tree and a Multi Layer Perceptron approach all worked extremely well during training,
achieving over 0.70 in the F-Measure, up to 0.86 for the DT and 0.81 MLP. Of these,
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the discriminative models performed better than the generative models in testing, and the
MLP model performed best overall with an F-Measure of up to 0.71 using previously
unseen data (logs created during the cricket World Cup 2015). The Bayesian approach
performed best in the early stages of the interaction, achieving an F-measure of 0.66
when the model had the least information available. The high training scores suggest that
the features used are indeed predictive of malicious behaviour for a single event. The
drop in performance on a new event suggested that the attack vectors were slightly dif-
ferent across events, but with a reasonably high degree of F-measure some independence
between predictive features and events could be claimed. Upon inspecting the decision-
making process within the MLP model, evidence was identified to suggest that the key
predictive machine activity metric was network activity – particularly packets sent and
received. CPU use and process IDs also had a clearly raised and correlated weighting in
the model, as did the bytes sent from the network when correlating with new connections
to remote endpoints, suggesting that data ex-filtration exercises could be distinguished
from general data transfer.
On data sampling, a learning curve produced using a range of samples from the training
dataset, while still being tested on the full testing dataset, revealed only a drop (10%, 25%,
50% of sample = 60% and 100% of sample yields a performance of 70%) in classifica-
tion performance below that of the full training sample. This suggested that machine log
data can be predictive of malicious system behaviour even with small samples, alleviating
some concerns over the appropriate sampling mechanisms, the lack of a complete log of
all Twitter URL activity, and the requirement for large amounts of data storage.
4.4 Conclusion
As Online Social Networks (OSNs) become a crucial source of information publication
and propagation following global events, an environment has been created that is particu-
larly vulnerable to cyber attacks via the injection of shortened URLs that take the user to
a malicious server launching a ’drive-by download’ attack on the local machine. In this
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chapter, we have sought to combat the problem by building on a body of work that has
developed methods to identify malicious URLs in OSNs. Existing work has developed
methods to provide evidence that OSN accounts or URLs may be malicious, which is
helpful; but given the frequency and volume at which new accounts emerge, the only way
to determine that actual malicious behaviour is occurring is to observe it. The existing
literature encourages users to classify URLs by means of all the data generated through
observing malware code/behaviour. This provides a post-hoc result, without actually ob-
serving the malicious activity; it makes a decision on the basis of previously seen malware
signature. However, these approaches relied on obsolete or published blacklist of users
no longer in the network, and on statically or dynamically analysing the malware code
that can easily evade detection by using encryption or polymorphism.
The proposed classification model presented as a result of our experiment observes ma-
chine activities during visitation of a Web page instead of statically/dynamically analysing
malware code. It was trained by using data collected over popular sporting events from
Twitter for its training and testing. None of the methods published before the present
study allowed us to observe malicious activity and classify an URL as malicious. The
main focus of our research was therefore to develop a method capable of identifying a
URL as malicious or benign on the basis of the machine activity metrics generated, which
were logged during interaction with a URL endpoint. The model gave a F-measure 0.81
for MLP during training the model and a F-Measure of 0.71 during testing the model on
unseen dataset. As the detection model was built by observing system activities at every
30 second interval, it created a series of time bounded events that showed different system
state changes, from its benign state (when the URL is clicked), to attacking state (when
the vulnerability is exploited) and to infection state (when the system is infected). This
bring us to the next question, can we use these system state changes to predict an attack
based on initial machine activities thus proactively blocking and preventing an attack,
rather than reacting and repairing at a later date ?
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Chapter 5
Prediction of drive-by Downloads on
Twitter
Current work on malware detection models on Twitter have used static/dynamic
techniques and analysed OSN account characteristics to detect malware, where, the
focus has been on detection. In this chapter we answer research questions like: is it
possible to predict a drive-by download attack on Twitter?; and do social features
contribute to the prediction of drive-by download attack on Twitter? A machine learning
model using machine activity data and tweet metadata was built to move beyond
post-execution classification of such URLs as malicious, to predict if a URL will be
malicious with 0.99 F-measure (using 10-fold cross-validation) and 0.833 (using an
unseen test set) at 1 second into the interaction with the URL. Thus providing a basis
from which to kill the connection to the server before an attack has completed and
proactively blocking and preventing an attack, rather than reacting and repairing at a
later date.
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 an association between drive-by download attacks and popular events that
attract millions of user on Twitter was identified. The evidence was gathered by analysing
tweets posted during popular sporting events. Sporting events were particularly chosen
due to high volume of users they attract. For example, the England versus Iceland foot-
ball match at the European Football Championships (Euro 2016) was one of the most
tweeted about events of 2016 - attracting 2.1 million users[167]. The more popular OSNs
become, the more attractive a platform they become for cybercriminals to conduct their
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attacks [231]. Current research has broadly investigated the problem of detecting these
drive-by download attacks on Twitter from a number of perspectives including: (i) char-
acteristics of OSN user accounts (e.g. posting behaviours [32] and social network links
[226]); (ii) characteristics of URLs (e.g. lexical features [135] and endpoint activity [127,
128]); and (iii) analysing the code of a Web page in a static or dynamic manner to study
its intended or actual behaviour when interacting with the underlying system on which
the OSN user is accessing the Web page [167]. However, the models developed focused
on malware code and failed against code obfuscating techniques such as encryption, poly-
morphism etc.
In Chapter 4, a novel malware detection model was proposed focusing on system be-
haviour rather than malware code signatures, recording system-level machine activity for
five minutes to capture behavioural interactions with Web servers [23]. This was used
to build a machine classifier that was able to distinguish between malicious and benign
URLs with an F-measure of 0.71 when the model was tested on an unseen dataset. The
main contribution in previous chapter was to build a machine classifier to classify a URL
at the end of a 5 minute interaction.
In this chapter we extend the work by adding more behavioural features to improve clas-
sifier performance on unseen data across different events, and reducing the classification
period to 10 seconds to predict a drive-by download attack based on early-stage machine
activities observed before the attack is complete. The choice of adding more features, was
taken to increase the diversity of data and incorporate features that may change over time
to test adaptability as cyber criminals change attack behaviour over time. In addition to
increasing the number of features, observation time was also reduced to a maximum 10
seconds and snapshots of machine activity were taken at each second, instead of every 10
seconds - meaning the predictive model could make a second by second prediction ( at
1,2,3,4...10 seconds) to identify and remove malicious URLs from the network as early
as possible. This not only reduces the amount of time the user’s system is exposed to the
malicious URL, but also increases the URL processing capacity of the model. As a result
of the work in this chapter, a single deployment of the predictive model is now capable
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of daily processing a minimum of 15,000 (with full 10 second observation time) and a
maximum of 150,000 (with predicting at 1 second) URLs compared to 500 URLs (with 5
minutes observation time) for Capture HPC.
Features are derived by capturing machine activity metrics (e.g. CPU use, RAM use,
Network I/O etc) as per Chapter 4, and we now introduce tweet attributes. Through the
developments in this chapter, the prediction model is able to predict whether the URL is
pointing to a malicious Web page with 0.99 F-measure (using 10-fold cross-validation)
and 0.833 F-measure (using an unseen test set) at 1 second into the interaction with a
URL. This provides a novel contribution with which it is possible to kill the connection
to the server before an attack has completed - thus proactively blocking and preventing
an attack, rather than reacting and repairing at a later date. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study to proactively predict a drive-by download attack by classifying a
URL during interaction, rather than requiring the malicious payload to complete before
classification.
5.2 Background
Twitter has been used to carry out a broad range of cyber attacks. For instance, in 2015
the US Pentagon’s email servers were targeted by Russian hackers using Twitter [165].
Cybercriminals have targeted popular people who have a large number of followers to
propagate malware or spam by hacking their accounts, for instance, Twitter’s CFO An-
thony Noto [18] and former Apple Macintosh evangelist Guy Kawasaki [138]. In a survey
conducted by SANS Institute to identify the most frequent methods employed by cyber-
criminals to launch cyber attacks on organisations, it was shown that drive-by downloads
accounted for 48% of attacks by exploiting Web-based vulnerabilities [175]. Such cyber
attacks could also be used as an entry point to carry out more wide-spreading attacks
such as Ransomware - for instance, a CryptoLocker attack that originated from a drive-by
download attack locked down a small city in Washington, USA for four days [122].
Current work related to the topic of detecting malicious content in Online Social Networks
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is divided in two parts, in the first detection models are built using static and dynamic anal-
ysis. For static analysis OSN user account, URL characteristics, and malware code were
analysed to detect malware on OSN. Whereas, in dynamic analysis the behaviour of the
malware or its effect on client machine was observed by executing it.Table 5.1 provides a
summary of related work and the methods used at a high level for comparison.
To date the focus has been on detecting malware on OSNs by using either static or
Table 5.1: Malware or Spam detection techniques used
Techniques used to detect Spam/Malware on Twitter
Methods Used
by Researchers Tweet Attributes
Blacklist
cross check
Lexical analysis
of URL
HoneyPot or
Honey profiles
Machine Behaviour
(Network, File,Process,
Memory,CPU etc)
User Behaviour
on Twitter
OSN Account
Characteristics[129] [32] [146] [39]
[192] [14] [83] [228] [226][50]
URL characteristics[127][128][135]
Detect By analysing
Static Code[137][31] [109]
Detect By analysing
Dynamic Code[49][114][103][222]
[11][25][33]
(network only)
Our Model
dynamic techniques. However, considering 335 million active users [118] post at an av-
erage rate of 6,000 tweets per second [145], with the highest retweet count of 4.1 million
recorded for a single tweet [130], a drive-by download attack has the potential to expose
malware to millions of users before a malware detection model detects it. For example, a
cyber attack that exploited a vulnerability in TweetDeck [204], a social media dashboard
for managing Twitter accounts, infected 84,700 Twitter accounts in a matter of hours and
it even infected the BBC News account exposing the malware to its 10.1 million follow-
ers [79]. In such a volatile environment, we need to adopt a proactive strategy to defend
against malware attacks, such as anticipating a cyber attack and subsequently devising a
means to counter it.
Thus, in this chapter we focus on prediction, proposing a novel model that can classify
a URL into malicious or benign at every second based on the combination of URL and
OSN account attributes and also dynamic machine behaviour - activity observed when the
URL is clicked, and the Web page is being loaded. The aim is to predict that behaviour
observed in the early stages of loading a Web page is likely to lead to malicious activity at
a later stage - providing new capability for a user to block the completion of the malicious
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actions rather than depend on detection and repair at a significant cost and inconvenience.
5.2.1 Contribution
In this chapter we aim to develop a novel machine learning-based method that will be able
to predict a drive-by download attack at every one second interval, on the basis of system-
level recorded machine activities and URL/OSN account attributes. The contributions of
this chapter develops evidence to provide answers to two research questions that were
identified in Chapter 2:
RQ4 Is it possible to predict drive-by download attacks on Twitter by observing machine
activities?
RQ5 Do social features that have been shown to help with identifying abnormal accounts
(posting spam/malicious URL), contribute to the prediction of drive-by download
attacks on Twitter?
The contributions can be summarised as:
1. A novel predictive machine learning model based on OSN account attributes and
system behaviour observed while visiting websites, which can predict a drive-by
download attack at every second, with maximum prediction time of 10 seconds.
Research question 4 will be answered in Section 5.3 and 5.4 where the architecture of the
predictive model is introduced and data is collected from Twitter around sporting events
to train and test the model. Research question 5 will be answered in section 5.4.2.
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5.3 Experimental Setup
5.3.1 Data Collection and Annotation
Based on the evidence gathered regarding popular events being used to deliver drive-by
download attacks in Chapter 3, two popular sporting events were chosen for training and
validating the model. Behind the decision to select two events was the desire to determine
whether our classification model would generalise beyond a single event and be applica-
ble for use on URLs posted around other events. However, data collected so far could
not be re-used to construct the predictive model proposed in this Chapter because of the
reduction in observation time and an increase in number of features required to build the
predictive model. Data collected so far recorded only 8 Tweet attributes and log files that
were generated for building detection model were generated at 30 second intervals, much
less granular than the proposed 1 second intervals we now aimed to study. Furthermore,
it was not possible to use the older URLs to recreate the log files at shorter intervals since
most of the URLs that were identified as malicious had been taken down.
The European Football Championships (#Euro2016) and the Olympics (#Rio2016) in
2016 were identified for training and testing the predictive model. Both events generated
some of the largest volumes of Tweets in 2016 [118], because of which were considered
appropriate for the experiment. Tweets containing a URL and hashtags relating to these
events were captured via the Twitter streaming API, similar to ones described in Chapter
3. For Euro 2016 we captured Tweets from the period of 10 June to 14 July 2016 using the
hashtag #Euro2016. We harvested 3,154,605 Tweets that contained a URL. During the
opening ceremony that marked the opening of the Olympics in 2016 (the peak of public
interest), we captured 148,881 Tweets that contained a URL using the hashtag #Rio2016.
From the captured Tweets we randomly created a sample of 7,500 unique Tweets to iden-
tify 975 malicious URLs for the European Football Championships dataset; in addition,
around 5,000 Tweets were randomly chosen. Using a high interaction client side honey-
pot, we gathered 525 unique malicious Tweets for the Olympics 2016 dataset. As in our
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previous experiments, Capture HPC was used as the high interaction honeypot, with an
updated exclusion list.
The process of updating each exclusion list was conducted every 14 days to reflect the
most recent actions that had been observed in drive-by download attacks. These exclu-
sion lists were created by formalising rules when visiting malicious or benign Web pages.
A URL is classified as malicious if during a visit to a website a system performs a cer-
tain activity or activities that violate the rules (see Chapter 3 for details of the exclusion
list). As in previous experiments, Capture HPC gives us a label that we can use for su-
pervised learning and a set of activity logs that we can use to train a system to recognise
the ’early warning signals’ that are present before the exclusion list flag is raised. How-
ever, the reliance on Capture HPC to provide us with a labelled data set for training our
model is a limitation of our predictive model, in that, if the URL behaviour varies beyond
what has been previously flagged as malicious, it will not create a malicious label for the
URL. However, there are millions of flagged malicious URLs made available every day
online for continuously updating Capture HPC’s exclusion lists, so this limitation can be
mitigated through regular updates.
5.3.2 Architecture of the Predictive Model
Even though the malware detection model that was proposed in Chapter 4 addressed lim-
itations observed in previous detection models (discussed in Chapter 2), such as the focus
on malware code signatures. However, due to the observation time of 5 minutes limited
the processing capability of the model to 500 URLs per day. This is a limitation to scaling
the model without multiple parallel models. When the observation time was reduced to
10 seconds, we saw a drop in performance - the F-measure improved with time in the de-
tection model for both training and testing sample. This poses the question, is it possible
to make the predictive model by reducing the observation time without compromising on
its performance?
The architecture of the predictive model is laid out in Figure 5.1, where the predictive
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Figure 5.1: Architecture of Predictive Model
model has three main components (see Figure 5.1): feature extraction, persistent storage
and machine learning.
Feature Extraction
The main function of feature extraction is to create a timeline of measurable observations
on the client system on the basis of machine activity and Tweet attributes from the time
a URL is opened to the point at which a drive-by download is carried out, or the system
becomes idle. The feature extractor opens each URL that is passed to it in a sandbox
environment and starts creating snapshots of machine activity at time intervals ’t’ for a
period of ’p’. For our experiment, t=1 second and the observation period is defined as
p=10 seconds. The first snapshot is generated when a URL is ’clicked’ at t=1 second,
and then subsequently at intervals of t. Each snapshot is written to a database for the
sake of persistence, since the sandbox environment is wiped clean after each URL has
been visited. Each database insert includes (i) metadata of the Tweet containing the URL
and (ii) machine activity. Building on existing literature, features such as number of
friends, followers, favourite count, retweet count, verification of user, etc that have proven
effective in detecting malware on OSN were extracted from a tweets meta data. These
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features were extracted from two perspectives, first from the user that is posting the tweet
and the other on the person that was retweeting or sharing the tweet to a larger audience.
1. Details pertaining to person tweeting
• User name.
• Screen name.
• Number of followers.
• Number of Friends (people following back the user).
• Favourite count.
• Geographical location in terms of latitude and longitude of the place where
the tweet originated.
• Verification of user.
• Default Language set for user.
• Time zone.
• Location by name.
2. Details about the account.
• Age of the account - calculated from the day of the event.
3. Details about people retweeting a tweet.
• Retweet favourite tweet count.
• Retweet retweet count.
• Retweet user followers count.
• Retweet user favourites count.
• Retweet user friends count.
• Retweet user location.
• Retweet user timezone.
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• Retweet user name.
• Retweet user screen name.
• Retweet user verified.
For machine activity, we log the metrics including file, process, CPU usage, network
activity and memory changes. The number of observational parameters originally used to
detect a malware while visiting a Web page were increased from 10 to 54 to enrich the
training data for better performance and to observe system changes from a social content
and machine activity perspective. Also, by including a more diverse set of features, it
is possible the model will be able to observe and identify relationships among different
features, even if in future the cyber criminal start using different attacking strategies. A
complete list of features are mentioned below.
1. Activities related to File changes
• File created.
• Files modified.
• Files deleted.
• Files moved.
• Source Path of the file.
2. Activities related to Process changes
• Process Name.
• Process executable path.
• Process status.
• Process created by user.
• Process creation time.
3. Activities related to Central Processing Unit
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• CPU usage in percentage.
• User CPU time -Amount of time the processor worked on a specific program.
• System CPU time- Amount of time the processor worked on operating sys-
tem’s functions connected to a specific program.
4. Activities related to Network changes
• Port Number
• Bytes sent out.
• Bytes received.
• Packets sent.
• Packets received.
• Error in sending messages.
• Error in receiving.
• Packets drop while receiving.
• Packets drop while sending.
5. Activities related to memory changes.
• Virtual memory total.
• Virtual memory available.
• Virtual memory percentage.
• Virtual memory used.
• Virtual memory free.
• Swap memory total available.
• Swap memory used.
• Swap memory free.
• Swap memory percentage.
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• Swap memory swap-in.
• Swap memory swap-out.
• Disk memory total available.
• Disk memory used.
• Disk memory free.
• Disk memory percent.
• Disk input output counter read count.
• Disk input output counter write count.
• Disk input output counter read bytes.
• Disk input output counter write bytes.
• Disk input output counter read times.
• Disk input output counter write times.
Generating Input File for Machine Learning Models
A log file containing both social information extracted from a tweet and machine activ-
ities recorded during visitation of a Web page was created for each URL classified as
malicious and benign. A program was created to read the data from all logfiles’ (contain-
ing both social attribute and machine activities for each URL), to combine them together
to generate an arff file that was later used to build the machine learning models. While
reading from the log file containing information regarding social attributes, data for those
attributes that contained string/identifier values, such as location, default language, user
verified, geographical location, etc. were transformed into nominal values for the logfile
created as input to the Weka toolkit. A numeric nominal value was mapped to the default
language of the user and data recorded for this field was transformed in the following way.
1. English-1
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2. Chinese-2
3. Hindi-3
4. Spanish-4
5. For any other categories-5
Where nominal value to top four languages spoken in the world [198] were given a num-
ber between 1 and 4 and for any other language a value 5 was assigned. For the location,
eleven categories were created to represent countries that have the biggest number of
twitter users. The nominal values assigned to these were:-
1. USA-1
2. Japan-2
3. United Kingdom -3
4. Saudi Arabia-4
5. Turkey-5
6. Brazil-6
7. India-7
8. Mexico-8
9. Indonesia-9
10. Spain-10
11. Other-11
The geographical location in terms of latitude and longitude was transformed into a nomi-
nal attribute that contained a value ’1’ for coordinates present and ’0’ representing absence
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of coordinates. For the user and the retweet user’s time zone, a value ’1’ meant the pres-
ence of a time zone value and value ’0’ represented absence of a value in this field. Simi-
larly, for verification of the user’s and the retweet user’s account, nominal attributes con-
taining binary values were created. Where, ’1’ meant that the user’s/retweeter’s account
had been verified by Twitter and ’0’ meant the account was not verified. Attributes like
the user’s/retweet user’s username was transformed into nominal values and these could
have 4 possible value (1,2,3,4). Where a value ’1’ was assigned if the user’s/re-tweeter’s
username had previously (from data collected in previous events) been used to post only
malicious tweets. A value ’2’ was assigned if it was previously seen posting only benign
URLs. A value ’3’ was assigned if it was used to post both malicious and benign dataset.
A value ’4’ was assigned if the username was not found in the previously stored database.
Similar transformation technique was used to the user’s/re-tweeter’s screen-name and the
attribute could have four possible values (1,2,3,4). Furthermore, attributes representing
fields such as the number of friends, followers, retweet count, favourite count were not
transformed, and the actual numerical value that was captured was set. For example, if an
account that posted the tweet had 40 followers, then the attribute representing the number
of followers would contain the value 40. Age of the account was calculated using the date
when the account was created and the date when the event took place. It represented the
age of the account and contained a numeric value representing the number of days that
have passed since the account was created.
A similar transformation was done on attributes that contained string values or identifier
information while reading data from the log file containing machine activities and writ-
ing it into an ’Arff’ file. For attributes explaining file changes, an attribute file type was
created that had four nominal values (created, modified, deleted, moved) representing the
action done on a file. The attributes relating to the path, such as the source path of the
file and the executable process path were categorised as nominal and could have three
possible value (1,2,3). Value ’1’ was set if the process started from System32 folder, ’2’
was set if it was executed from Program Files folder and for everything else a value ’3’
was set. A total of 32 process names that occurred in 99% of the dataset (training and
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testing) were identified, and a numeric nominal value was given to each process name
(see table 5.2). Furthermore, a nominal value of 33 was given to all process names that
Table 5.2: Nominal value for Process Name
Process Name Nominal Value
Svchost 1
Csrss 2
Iexplore 3
Searchprotocolhost 4
Audiodg 5
Cmd 6
Conhost 7
Dwm 8
Explorer 9
Lsass 10
Lsm 11
Python 12
Searchindexer 13
Services 14
Smss 15
Spoolsv 16
System 17
System Idle Process 18
Taskhost 19
Wininit 20
Winlogon 21
Wmpnetwk 22
Searchfilterhost 23
Wmiprvse 24
Dllhost 25
Userinit 26
Taskeng 27
Sppsvc 28
Wmpnscfg 29
Rundll32 30
Mobsync 31
Wsqmcons 32
OtherProcess 33
were not in the list of 32 identified process names. Process status was set as nominal, with
’1’ representing process running and ’0’ for any other value set to this field.
Similarly, an attribute representing the user that started the process was created that could
have two values (0,1). Where a value ’1’ represented the process started by the system and
116
0 represented that the user had started it. The attribute process creates time stores the dif-
ference between the time at which the process was started and the machine started. For a
port number, a nominal value was created where a value ’1’ is assigned if the port number
has value 80 else ’0’ was assigned. Furthermore, attributes such as CPU usage, User CPU
time, System CPU time, Bytes sent out, Bytes received, Error in sending messages, Error
in receiving, Packets drop while receiving, Packets drop while sending, Virtual mem-
ory total, Virtual memory available, Virtual memory percentage, Virtual memory used,
Virtual memory free, Swap memory total available, Swap memory used, Swap memory
free, Swap memory percentage, Swap memory swap-in, Swap memory swap-out, Disk
memory total available, Disk memory used, Disk memory free, Disk memory percent,
Disk input-output counter read times, Disk input-output counter write times were kept
as numeric fields, and they represented the actual values that were captured. Table 5.3
presents a comparison between the training and testing datasets with respect to the mean
and standard deviation of recorded numerical value of both attributes representing ma-
chine activities and social features.
While recording machine activity we defined peak activities as the maximum number of
activities observed while visiting the website in the given 10-second window, and irregu-
lar activities as a set of activities that occur when a machine is infected. These irregular
activities are activities not observed while visiting a website as defined in the exclusion
list (see Chapter 3 for the creation of an exclusion list and rules used to define malicious
and benign behaviour). We also used attributes derived from metadata on the Tweet, in-
cluding username, user screen name, user id, follower count, friends count and age of
account. This produced a set of attributes every second for a period of ’p’.
Persistence Storage
This component is responsible for storing information captured in the snapshots each
second. Each snapshot contains information about tweet attributes that were extracted
from the tweet meta data and machine activities that were observed during visitation of
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics for train and test datasets at T=10
Statistics for train and test datasets at T=10
Attributes Train Test
Social Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
User Followers Count 47332.94 377276.25 21074.805 134614.78
User Friends Count 1905.27 7415.42 1874.259 12691.045
Age of the Account 1393.62 845.97 1569.297 898.162
Retweet Favourite Tweet 16.35 122.42 59.592 295.427
Retweet Count 30.45 538.31 31.982 134.885
Retweet User Followers Count 210673.32 1275254.77 434220.734 2575403.175
Retweet User Favourites Count 1263.86 6176.86 1967.987 8401.988
Retweet User Friends Count 2536.99 25326.51 7726.806 59492.778
Machine
CPU Time User 0.134 0.184 0.119 0.167
CPU Time System 1.177 4.066 1.142 3.785
Memory Percent 0.249 0.196 0.225 0.179
CPU 71.25 29.319 94.935 9.702
Bytes Sent 51044.89 14405.899 39970.356 4903.951
Bytes Received 273618.84 350108.233 206786.318 133748.574
Packets Sent 147.78 164.66 86.361 38.861
Process Create Time 2.4 1.2 2.3 1.1
Packets Received 325.05 296.65 249.33 118.675
Virtual Memory Available 3636543218 39928656.57 3682304035 28862771.89
Virtual Memory Percent 20.23 0.875 19.224 0.632
Virtual Memory Used 922198286.3 39928565.57 876437469.4 28862771.89
Virtual Memory Free 3636543218 39928656.57 3682304035 28862771.89
Swap Memory Used 946574660.1 40582773.59 900921630.9 28601859.81
Swap Memory Free 8169003708 40582773.59 8214656737 28601859.81
Swap Memory Percentage 10.384 0.447 9.884 0.315
Disk Memory Used 26911543580 2708262348 30369623824 1815692572
Disk Memory Free 6723624676 2708262348 3265544432 1815692572
Disk Memory Percent 80.01 8.053 90.291 5.398
Disk IO Counter Read Count 5377.316 648.72 5082.231 430.637
Disk IO Counter Write Count 528.373 142.885 447.443 122.634
Disk IO Counter Read Bytes 218401106.3 34698593.93 210012597.6 24258661.5
Disk IO Counter Write Bytes 15711208.5 1747620.21 14883931.16 1461488.181
Disk IO Counter Read Times 5816878.119 4772238.097 5216764.111 2370010.96
Disk IO Counter Write Times 40668.949 45238.507 37052.043 35896.811
a Web page. Also, during the training phase we knew whether a URL was malicious or
benign on the basis of the results from Capture HPC (see Chapter 3 for the configuration of
Capture). This label is inserted into the database with each snapshot. Once the observation
time is complete, the sandbox environment is reset to a malware-free state so that each
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new URL can be opened in a known malware-free configuration with a consistent baseline
and new information can be stored.
Machine Learning
The third component is the machine learning phase. For the predictive model four dif-
ferent machine algorithms were trained to determine the best method of class prediction
using these data. As in previous experiment the Weka toolkit was used to compare the
predictive accuracy of (i) generative models that consider conditional dependencies in
the dataset (BayesNet) or assume conditional independence (Naive Bayes), and (ii) dis-
criminative models that aim to maximise information gain (the J48 Decision Tree) and
build multiple models to map input to output via a number of connected nodes, even if
the feature space is hard to linearly separate (Multi-layer Perceptron). To test the models,
we used the feature extractor and the learned machine learning model from the training
phase. Tweets from the testing dataset (in the first instance using 10-fold cross validation,
and later using a holdout testing dataset) were passed into the feature extractor, which
opened the URL in the sandbox environment and created the machine activity and Tweet
meta-data snapshots at every timed point. Each snapshot was passed on to the learned
model which classified the snapshot as malicious or benign. If the result was benign, the
process continued to the next snapshot. The first time the outcome was malicious, the
process stopped and the URL was classified as malicious, killing the connection to the
Web page.
5.3.3 Relationship between features attributes and its class
To understand which attributes were contributing to the classification, we did the Pear-
son’s correlation analysis (see table 5.4) to identify those attributes that were contributing
the most. Six attributes had the Pearson’s correlation coefficient higher than 0.10. Five of
those were related machine activities, where process create time (time difference between
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Table 5.4: Feature Selection of Attributes using Pearson’s R Correlation between at-
tributes and its class (Malicious)
Sr No Pearson’s CorrelationCoefficient Attribute Name Sr No
Pearson’s Correlation
Coefficient Attribute Name
1 0.35960 Process Create Time 31 0.01495 User Time Zone
2 0.26686 Disk Memory Used 32 0.01435 Retweet User Verified
3 0.26686 Disk Memory Free 33 0.01222 Disk I/O Counter Read Times
4 0.26682 Disk Memory Percent 34 0.01056 Retweet User Favourites Count
5 0.20133 Disk I/O Counter Write Bytes 35 0.01007 Disk I/O Counter Read Count
6 0.11725 User Verified 36 0.00997 Disk I/O Counter Write Times
7 0.08071 Bytes Received 37 0.00984 Retweet User ID
8 0.07416 Packets Received 38 0.00821 CPU
9 0.06412 User Friends Count 39 0.00744 Retweet User Friends Count
10 0.05818 Packets Sent 40 0.00696 User Language
11 0.05411 User-name 41 0.00438 User Coordinates
12 0.04440 Retweet User Name 42 0.00349 Process Using Network Yes/No
13 0.03877 Virtual Memory Percent 43 0.00212 Action Done on File
14 0.03806 Virtual Memory Used 44 0.00184 Process Status
15 0.03806 Virtual Memory Available 45 0.00180 Retweet Favourite Tweet Count
16 0.03806 Virtual Memory Free 46 0.00145 CPU Time User
17 0.03529 User Screen Name 47 0.00135 Source Path
18 0.03325 Retweet Count 48 0.00114 Process Name
19 0.03038 Disk I/o Counter Read Bytes 49 0.00089 Connection Establish Listen
20 0.03010 Disk I/O Counter Write Count 50 0.00089 Remote IP
21 0.02942 User Followers Count 51 0.00080 Process Username
22 0.02464 Swap Memory Used 52 0.00067 CPU Time System
23 0.02464 Swap Memory Free 53 0.00064 Process Path
24 0.02408 Swap Memory Percentage 54 0.00057 Memory Percent
25 0.02368 Bytes Sent 55 0.00028 Command Line Statement
26 0.02234 Retweet User Screen Name 56 0.00028 Process Executable Path
27 0.02233 User location 57 0.00024 Retweet User Followers Count
28 0.01596 Age of account 58 0.00009 Port Number
29 0.01571 Retweet User Location 59 0.00000 Swap Memory Swap In
30 0.01554 Retweet User Timezone 60 0.00000 Disk Memory Total
the process created and time the machine was booted) contributed the most to the mali-
cious classification. The other attributes corresponding to machine activities were related
to disk memory (used, free and percentage) and disk I/O counter writes signifying a dis-
tinction between malicious and benign activities while visiting a website. One rationale
could be that during visiting of malicious web-servers, malicious files were downloaded
into the client’s system, which was eventually executed to carry out malicious activities
such as stealing confidential information. One of the attributes that had correlation greater
than 0.10 was user verified, a feature that has been used in previous studies to identify
malicious users on Twitter [162]. Four features had the Pearson’s correlation coefficient
greater than 0.05 but less than 0.10, out of which three represented machine activities
and one represented social attribute of the account that posted the tweet. Features such
as bytes received, and packet send/received were contributing to the classification of the
URL and have also been used as indicators to identify malicious URLs in previous studies
[24]. Whereas, the number of friends an account has, was statistically significant and was
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contributing towards the classification of malicious URLs that were posted on Twitter.
This attribute has also been used in earlier studied to identify both accounts that were
posting spam and malicious URLs [192, 12, 183].
Furthermore, among the social attributes that had a correlation coefficient greater than 0,
age of the account and number of followers a user account had, have also been previously
used [192, 12, 183, 227, 126, 144, 43, 183] to detect accounts posting spam/malicious
URLs. Out of the 58 features that had Pearson’s correlation coefficient greater than 0,
there were in total of 36 attributes related to machine activities and 22 attributes represent-
ing social features of an account. This showed a combination of attributes representing
both machine activities and social features were used in the classification of the URL into
malicious and benign.
5.4 Results
(a) F-Measure of Naive Bayes over
time during training phase
(b) F-Measure of BayesNet over time
during training phase
(c) F-Measure of J48 over time during
training phase
(d) F-Measure of MLP over time dur-
ing training phase
Figure 5.2: F-Measure of all machine learning algorithms over time during the training
phase
121
Table 5.5: Training Model On Euro 2016 log file using NaiveBays Algorithm
Euro 2016 Train Model -NaiveBays
Time Precision Recall F-Measure
1 0.815 0.984 0.891
2 0.815 0.985 0.891
3 0.842 0.829 0.825
4 0.832 0.823 0.821
5 0.851 0.837 0.835
6 0.863 0.850 0.848
7 0.853 0.840 0.837
8 0.860 0.850 0.849
9 0.871 0.864 0.862
10 0.883 0.878 0.878
Table 5.6: Training Model On Euro 2016 log file using BayesNet Algorithm
Euro 2016 Train Model-BayesNet
Time Precision Recall F-Measure
1 0.997 0.987 0.992
2 0.995 0.995 0.995
3 0.994 0.994 0.994
4 0.993 0.993 0.993
5 0.994 0.994 0.994
6 0.994 0.994 0.994
7 0.992 0.992 0.992
8 0.995 0.995 0.995
9 0.994 0.994 0.994
10 0.994 0.994 0.994
Table 5.7: Training Model On Euro 2016 log file using J48 Algorithm
Euro 2016 Train Model -J48
Time Precision Recall F-Measure
1 0.990 0.986 0.986
2 0.978 0.977 0.977
3 0.990 0.990 0.990
4 0.994 0.994 0.994
5 0.996 0.996 0.996
6 0.995 0.995 0.995
7 0.996 0.996 0.996
8 0.997 0.997 0.997
9 0.997 0.997 0.997
10 0.998 0.998 0.998
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Table 5.8: Training Model On Euro 2016 log file using MLP Algorithm
Euro 2016 Train Model -MLP
Time Precision Recall F-Measure
1 0.988 0.975 0.978
2 0.987 0.987 0.987
3 0.993 0.993 0.993
4 0.994 0.994 0.994
5 0.994 0.994 0.994
6 0.995 0.995 0.995
7 0.998 0.998 0.998
8 0.996 0.996 0.996
9 0.995 0.995 0.995
10 0.998 0.998 0.998
Figure 5.3: Machine activity over time
5.4.1 Training and Testing the Predictive Model
To determine which models provide the best predictive power – not just overall classifica-
tion accuracy on all data – each model was trained and tested using data from sequential,
cumulative time intervals. That is, at each time interval t from t = 1 to t = p where p
is the total number of time intervals (in this case p = 10), each model was trained and
tested using data from t=1-to-p where p = p + 1. Each interval was evaluated with a ten
fold cross validation using the Weka toolkit. The results were calculated using standard
classification metrics: Precision, Recall and F-Measure. We also included a False positive
rate as one of the metrics used in testing our unseen dataset.
FalsePositiveRate =
FalsePositive
FalsePositive+ TrueNegative
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The results for each classifier are presented in Figure 5.2 and Tables 5.5-5.8. In each sub-
figure, the machine learning model is trained and tested on the metrics derived using the
Euro 2016 data-set. In each table, time represents the time in seconds elapsed from the
time the URL was clicked, and the starting point is defined as t = 1. For example Time=2
means that 1 second had elapsed since the URL was ’clicked’ (URL clicked at t = 1).
Models built using the Naive Bayes and J48 algorithms (see Figures 5.2a and 5.2c) ex-
hibit similar behaviour – they both have a dip in accuracy from the starting point and
then the accuracy steadily rises. One explanation for this may be that in the open-
ing seconds the system is inactive (see Figure 5.3), leaving the algorithm struggling to
differentiate between benign and malicious activity. We define system activities as the
range of activities that ensue in a visit to a Web page. These include process running,
read/write operations on a file or registry entry, CPU usage, etc. The F-measure of the
J48 machine learning model follows the trend of machine activity and continues to rise as
more activity is recorded. When we compare the generative probabilistic models (Naive
Bayes and BayesNet), we find that BayesNet outperforms NaiveBayes, suggesting inter-
dependencies between the attributes. This is logical because when malicious network
activity occurs it is likely that, for instance, CPU and RAM use will also spike, owing to
the additional resource required for the activity. Looking at the results of the MLP model
(see Figure 5.2d) we see the model is able to better balance the utility of the machine
activity and Tweet meta-data features, and to control for the lack of machine activity at
the start of the interaction. The F-measure rises smoothly from 1 second, suggesting it is
making better use of the Twitter metadata to improve accuracy in the early stages of its
activity.
In terms of the highest F-measure achieved, the J48 and MLP models perform best with
0.998 at 10 seconds. At 3 seconds the results are almost identical. The key difference
between models is a slight improvement in MLP at 2 seconds, but this is countered by
the speed at which the J48 returns a result. The MLP result takes longer than a second to
return, whereas the J48 takes milliseconds. Thus, in practical applications, the J48 model
is the most likely to be favoured.
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5.4.2 Impact of Online Social Network Platform Attributes
Much research has been done in the past on the basis of Tweet attributes to detect ma-
licious/spam Tweets propagating on Twitter [192, 14, 83, 228, 226, 50]. Thus in the
previous section we included Tweet metadata as part of the feature set for prediction.
However, these features are quite idiosyncratic and not consistent across different OSNs.
For instance, if we wanted to predict a drive-by download via other OSNs such as Face-
book, Tumblr or Instagram, we would get a slightly different set of user characteristics
from the metadata available. Hence, we aimed to determine the impact of removing these
features, using machine activity data alone to determine the applicability of our method
across different OSNs. To conduct this experiment we selected the model from the previ-
ous experiment that performed best – the J48 algorithm that displayed apparent correlation
with machine activity. We retrained the model using the machine activity but no Tweet
metadata. Table 5.9 and Figure 5.4 show the performance of this model over time.
Table 5.9: Training Model On Euro 2016 log file using J48 Algorithm without Tweet
metadata
Euro 2016 Train Model -J48
(Without Tweet metadata)
Time Precision Recall F-Measure
1 0.89 0.863 0.858
2 0.945 0.94 0.939
3 0.909 0.9 0.901
4 0.92 0.904 0.905
5 0.928 0.916 0.915
6 0.914 0.899 0.897
7 0.915 0.899 0.897
8 0.929 0.918 0.918
9 0.941 0.933 0.933
10 0.952 0.947 0.947
Figure 5.4 shows the F-measure metrics for the J48 model when trained with and with-
out Tweet metadata. When we compare the results of the two J48 models we observe that
the model built solely on machine activity data fluctuates over time. The model F-measure
drops by around 13% at t=1 second. This suggests that Twitter’s idiosyncratic attributes,
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Figure 5.4: Train J48 Model without OSN metadata
such as number of followers, significantly contribute to the accurate classification of mali-
cious URLs, but that the model is still highly accurate when using machine activity alone,
making it likely that the approach will be able to detect drive-by downloads on other
OSNs. Without the OSN metadata, the model seems able to cope with the low rate of ac-
tivity at the start of the interaction, which is interesting, because this is the opposite of the
situation when metadata were being used to train the model. The key finding here is that
including the OSN metadata improves the prediction of the classifier by 12.98%. Thus
our future aim will be to retain the characteristics of the user account wherever possible
when they come from OSNs outside of Twitter. Nevertheless, our model still provides a
high predictive performance even without these idiosyncratic data, providing promising
results for the application of machine activity models for predicting malicious behaviour
in URLs on multiple OSN platforms.
Table 5.10: Test Model On Olympics 2016 Dataset
Test Olympic- Vote Algorithm
(NaiveBayes and J48)
Interaction
Time(Sec) FP Rate Precision Recall F-Measure
1 0.149 0.836 0.723 0.730
2 0.152 0.861 0.834 0.833
3 0.147 0.867 0.846 0.845
4 0.160 0.856 0.834 0.832
5 0.157 0.881 0.859 0.856
6 0.164 0.884 0.866 0.862
7 0.202 0.860 0.837 0.831
8 0.195 0.855 0.837 0.832
9 0.192 0.854 0.837 0.833
10 0.185 0.855 0.837 0.833
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Figure 5.5: Testing on Olympics Data using model built earlier
5.4.3 Testing Using Unseen Data from Olympics 2016
In the previous two experiments we validated our predictive models using a single dataset
from Euro 2016 and obtained promising results. One possible limitation of this experi-
ment comes from the variance in cyber attack methods over time. For instance, in a second
unrelated event we may see a new collection of individuals spreading malicious URLs,
and indeed the URLs themselves exhibiting different behavioural profiles. We therefore
now introduce an unseen dataset from the Olympics 2016. This dataset has played no part
in training the model and is thus completely unseen, to some extent testing the generality
of the approach .
Given that J48, MLP and Naive Bayes (NB) models performed best on the Euro 2016
data, we combined them using a Vote meta-classifier. The Vote algorithm allows two or
more machine learning algorithms to be combined in such a way that the label likelihood
from each model is used to provide the classification label for each test instance. In our
case we used the average probability as the decision point. Through experimentation we
narrowed the field down to two combinations of methods that produced the best classi-
fication performance: J48 & NaiveBayes and NaiveBayes & MLP. Figure 5.5 shows the
F-measure for both. The rationale for choosing two classifiers through the vote algorithm
was that we wanted the final classifier to have a mix of generative and discriminative ma-
chine learning properties. The combination of J48 with NaiveBayes reaches an F-measure
of 0.85 after just two seconds into the interaction with a Web page. Note again that t=1 is
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the time when the test machine launches the URL so there is a lag of 1 second, meaning
that t=3 is actually 2 seconds after the URL was clicked. The combination of NaiveBayes
and MLP reaches a maximum F-measure of 0.75. Thus a significant performance differ-
ence results from combining the Naive Bayes and J48 models.
This is somewhat counterintuitive considering that in the previous experiments the MLP
and J48 algorithms were almost indistinguishable at 3 seconds, and that J48 is a rule-
based model. We would expect a rule-based model to overfit a single event (i.e. the CPU,
RAM and network traffic would have a large variance between events as demonstrated by
[25]). This was not the case, and in fact this combination produced a model that is capable
of detecting malicious URLs in an unseen dataset with 0.83 F-measure and a 15.2% False
Positive rate only 2 seconds into the interaction. We next rebuilt the Vote model with and
without Tweet metadata. Figure 5.6 shows the result of the classifier when we tested this
model on the Olympics 2016 (unseen) dataset. We see a significant increase (on average
an increase of 24% was observed) in the F-measure of the classifier when Tweet attributes
were added to machine data. This suggests that even though Tweet attributes are similar
across events they are not alike enough to accurately classify a URL on their own, and
we still require machine data to improve our classification across events. Note also that
the results of the same models based on Tweet metadata alone using the Olympics 2016
dataset gave an F-measure of only 0.16 (full results not shown, for brevity). We can see
that while the attack vectors as measured by system activity are changing between events
(hence the drop in performance when we remove the Twitter metadata), the combination
of the network characteristics of the individuals posting malicious URLs, and machine
activity recorded while interacting with URLs remains fairly stable, showing a drop in
F-measure from 0.977 to 0.833 at 2 seconds between events (see Table 5.10). Our model
may therefore not be limited to a single case, but could be applied to multiple events that
attract large numbers of users on Twitter, where they would maintain reasonably low error
rates when predicting malicious URLs just 2 seconds into the interaction.
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Figure 5.6: Comparison of Results on Unseen Data with and without tweet metadata
5.4.4 Adaptive Nature of the Predictive Model
To make our predictive model adaptive, a feed-forward architecture was implemented (see
Figure 5.1). The rationale was to ensure that new techniques employed by cybercriminals
to carry out a drive-by download attack, as captured in the form of machine activity, would
be continually captured and considered while training the model. In order to check the
effectiveness of the feed-forward architecture in achieving this, we conducted a further
experiment. We trained the model on the Euro 2016 dataset with varying sample sizes,
and tested using 10-fold cross validation. We then tested the model on an unseen dataset
(Olympics 2016), with the hypothesis that increasing the size of a dataset would capture
new machine behaviour that would increase the diversity of features seen by the model
and improve the overall F-measure of the predictive model. We used a range of sample
sizes for model training - 1%, 5%, 10%, 25%, 50% and 100%. Figure 5.7 displays the
results of these experiments.
We found that training the model with only 1% of total sample size, using a 10-fold
cross technique, produced an F-Measure of 0.89. However, when we tested the model
on an unseen dataset we found that the F-measure dropped to 0.533. By increasing the
size of the training dataset from 1% to 100% in various stages, we aimed to simulate
how the model would behave when new data were added to it over time with increased
feature diversity. It was observed that the F-measure did indeed increase with increases
in the dataset size during the training phase as well as in the testing phase, showing the
model to be adaptable when presented with more diverse machine behaviour. It was seen
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Figure 5.7: Comparing classifier accuracy in terms of F-measure when data set is changed
there was a significant jump in the F-measure (from 0.54 to 0.80) when the sample size
was increased to 10%. However, little change in the F-measure was observed when the
sample size from 25% to 100%, suggesting that 25% of data representing machine activity
was enough to build a model that would give an F-measure over 0.83 and a 15% False
Positive Rate. After this point more data does not appear to improve prediction accuracy.
5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we aimed to build on Chapter 4 by moving beyond detection of mali-
cious URLs to predict that the URL was likely to be malicious within seconds of opening
the interaction - before the drive-by download attack could complete the execution of its
payload. This is the first time a method has been tested to predict a malicious outcome
before it takes place - existing literature always classified URLs using all the data gener-
ated throughout an interaction period - so provided a post-hoc result, or without actually
observing the malicious activity; making a decision based on previously seen behaviour.
We also aimed to improve classifier performance by including OSN and URL features to
support the increase of diversity in the machine activity feature set.
Tweets were captured containing URLs around two global sporting events. Our system
produced a second-by-second time series of system-level activity (e.g. CPU use, RAM
use, network traffic etc.) during the visitation of a Web page. The predictive model was
130
trained using four different types of machine learning algorithm on log files generated
from one event (Euro 2016). The model was then validated using tweets captured during
another event (Olympics 2016). The rationale was to determine if similar machine activ-
ity and tweet attributes were exhibited in two completely different events (i.e. does the
model generalise beyond a single event). A ten-fold cross-validation was performed to
train the model, and an F-measure of 0.99 was achieved by using the log files generated at
1 second into the interaction with a Web server. One of the interesting observations dur-
ing the training phase was that by using tweet attributes we can increase the accuracy by
12.98% during training and around 24% during testing phase when compared to machine
activity alone, demonstrating that the machine activities carrying out drive-by download
attacks were relatively stable, while the URL behaviour changed.
When tested using an unseen dataset (Olympics 2016) we achieved an F-measure of 0.833
from log files generated at 2 seconds - that is 1 second after launching the URL. The high-
est F-measure achieved on the unseen event was 0.862 at 5 seconds from the time the URL
was launched. Our model may therefore not be limited to a single case but could be ap-
plied to multiple events on Twitter maintaining reasonably low error rates when predicting
malicious URLs just 1 second into the interaction. The model allows us to reduce the de-
tection time of a malicious URL from minutes - the time taken to run the URL in a secure
sandbox environment - to 5 seconds, with F-measure of 0.86 on an unseen dataset. Fur-
thermore, it allows us to stop the execution process with 0.833 F-measure just 1 second
after clicking the URL, preventing the full execution of the malicious payload, rather than
detecting the malicious action retrospectively and having to repair the system.
Even though the proposed model is capable of processing a minimum of 15,000 URLs and
a maximum of 150,000 URLs per day per deployment, this number could be increased
further by deploying the predictive model in parallel. However, even with multiple de-
ployments of the predictive model, the processing of URLs per day might not be enough
to handle the volatile load of tweets generated during the popular event and 1 in 10 URLs
points to a malicious Web server [47]. Thus, there is a need to understand the infection
behaviour and the factors that contribute towards the propagation of post containing mali-
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cious URLs. This would help devise a strategy to curtail the infection even when the users
that were spreading are removed from the network. Which leads us to the next research
question, do social and content-based factors that exist as part of a tweet containing a
malicious URL aid its propagation?
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Chapter 6
Fear me not, retweet me
Why are certain Tweets retweeted more than others? Virality is partly driven by
psychological arousal. Is the act of retweeting affected by the tweet content and the
emotions it evokes? Having identified sporting events as being used by cyber criminals
to infect a user’s system, we investigated propagation of malware through the action of a
retweet. In this chapter we uncover the social and content-based factors that exist as
part of a tweet containing a malicious URL that aid its propagation
6.1 Introduction
Twitter’s popularity continues to tempt cybercriminals to carry out a myraid of cyber at-
tacks of various kinds. Cyber attacks, such as distributed denial of service [121], cross-site
scripting [86], Trojan attacks [153] and drive-by downloads [102], continue to be major
threats on Twitter. Once a user’s system is infected, sensitive information is exposed to
unauthorised users whose machines can be used to carry out further attacks. Even though
various detection [100, 210, 137, 135, 31, 125, 65, 103, 108, 114, 11, 116, 149, 22] have
been proposed to identify malware, there is still a chance that a large number of users
will be infected before the malware is detected and removed from the network. This is
because current detection models are not capable of processing a large number of tweets
in real time, as the frequency of tweets varies from an average of 6,000 [145] to a high
of 143,199 tweets per second [205]. The evasion of existing detection methods is also
evidenced by a recent report that suggests drive-by downloads account for 48% of attacks
by exploiting Web-based vulnerabilities [175]. Thus, in addition to detection/prediction
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models to counter malware on OSN, there is a need to understand its propagation be-
haviour and factors that influence its propagation.
In the existing research, propagation models for malware are based either on scanning
techniques or the topology of a network, where the focus of the research has been on the
communication medium [41, 70], social network topology [70] and the relationship [194]
exhibited among users. The underlying assumption while building propagation models
has been that the malware is self-propagating. However, the content sharing capability
of an OSN adds another medium through which malware could be distributed, where an
OSN presents a highly interconnected network that could propagate malicious links on
the scale of thousands in a matter of minutes. Malware in the form of malicious links,
that were hidden in a posts could easily be propagated by means of sharing these posts
among users in OSN. This leads to questions such as: (i) why are certain post shared
more than others?; (ii) is virality driven by physiological arousal?; and (iii) do emotion
and sentiment represented in a post aid in its propagation?
In this chapter we identify both social and content based factors, such as emotion and
sentiment, and evaluate their influence on the propagation of posts containing malicious
URLs. Emotion and sentiment were particularly chosen because it has been well estab-
lished that people transfer positive and negative moods to one another in a form of emo-
tional contagion [89]. Through experiments, researchers have shown that emotions rep-
resenting long-lasting moods such as happiness and unhappiness can be diffused through
online social networks [89, 71]. Also, one person’s emotional state can be used to predict
the emotional states of connected friends. Kramer et al. [120] show how the posting be-
haviour of a user varied according to the emotional content received.
In order to uncover different factors that cybercriminals use to entice users to retweet
content containing a malicious URL, a corpus of circa 3.5 million tweets were collected
around seven different sporting events in 3 years; a sub-sample was created and passed
to a high interaction honeypot (see Chapter 3 for details) to identify those tweets that
contained malicious URLs. Capture HPC identified 105,642 tweets containing malicious
URLs and 186,244 tweets containing benign URLs. These data were entered into statis-
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tical models to estimate the size and survival of ’malicious’ information flows. To build
statistical models that help explain the correlation between emotion and propagation we
derived two dependent variables, size and survival. Size was defined by the number of
retweets a tweet receives in the study window, and survival represents the time between
the first and the last retweet in the same window. Independent variables derived from
tweets included social characteristics (those of users) and content factors (those of senti-
ment and emotion). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that links emotions
and sentiment to the propagation of tweets containing malicious URLs on Twitter.
6.2 Background
As technology has evolved over time, so has malware. The increasing complexity of
users’ communication on the Internet has given cybercriminals several methods by which
to propagate malware. The current work on malware propagation is broadly divided into
two categories: propagation on traditional networks and that on online social networks.
Research on traditional networks focuses either on studying malware propagation based
on the transmission medium [164, 132] or based on the topology of the network [76].
Furthermore, malware propagation on traditional networks has frequently applied epi-
demiology theory [235, 229, 154, 132] to understand how the damage spreads.
However, with the growing popularity of online social networks among cybercriminals,
traditional networks were augmented by a new medium to propagate malware, shifting the
research focus from understanding malware propagation on traditional networks to online
social networks. The degree of complexity has also increased with the introduction of
online social networks, since they were overlaid on top of traditional networks. Further-
more, these platforms introduced new communication methods and social relationships
among active users on online social networks. Unfortunately, this social relationship or
connection between users gave cybercriminals another medium through which they could
propagate malware. The malware propagation models that were subsequently built in-
cluded mobile devices [70], Bluetooth [41], email [220], user-friends relationships [70],
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and online social network platforms [194] such as Facebook [67] and Twitter [177]. These
propagation models analysed user behaviour [225, 215] and investigated the user relation-
ships [40] to shed light on the infection rate and reach of malware [177, 216]. These are
covered in more detail in Chapter 2.
Technology and malware are constantly evolving. Models investigating malware propaga-
tion have to incorporate new features to tackle the new techniques used by cybercriminals
for malware propagation. Content based features such as sentiment have been more often
used in models to detect spam [212, 95] than to understand their propagation. Features
such as emotions are used to understand the virality of posts on online social networks
[17, 211]. Particularly, content containing negative emotions have a higher chance to be
shared on OSN than positive emotions [17]. This tactic of using negative emotions to
convey a message to a larger audience have been seen in advertisements as well. For
example, a series of short films called ”The Hire” that evoked negative emotions by in-
cluding a story line that involved a car chase were created by BMW in order to gain
millions of views [16]. This provoked the question of whether cyber criminals were em-
ploying similar tactics by creating contagious posts containing negative emotions on OSN
to propagate malware. We cannot of course presume to know the the mindset or deliber-
ate actions employed by attackers but we can provide evidence to measure the success of
emotions in increasing size and survival of malicious URLs on OSNs
Even though content-based features are being considered in research, they are limited to
understanding the flow of information related to news or to detecting spam. The analysis
conducted to understand content sharing on OSN use basic emotions as defined by Ekman
[63] that identifies more negative emotion than positive in its six basic emotions (Anger,
Fear, Disgust, Sadness, Surprise and Joy). This presents an imbalanced set of positive and
negative emotions for analysis. A research gap exist that links emotions and sentiment to
malware propagation on online social networks, where the set of emotions used for anal-
ysis are balanced in term of positive and negative emotions such as defined by Plutchik
[157] (Anger, Fear, Disgust, Sadness, Anticipation, Surprise, Trust and Joy).
To the best of our knowledge this is the first study that correlates emotions expressed in a
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tweet containing malicious URL with its propagation.
6.2.1 Contribution
The contributions of this chapter develop evidence to answer two research questions that
were identified in Chapter 2:
RQ7 Do social features aid the propagation of posts containing malicious URLs?
RQ8 Do features derived from content, such as emotion or sentiment, help in the propa-
gation of malware?
In this chapter we address the research gap and investigate the factors that contribute
to the retweeting of malicious URLs during popular sporting events. It contributes to the
broader literature on malware propagation by:
• Determining if tweets that contain negative emotions are statistically associated
with the size and survival of the information flow, and at the same time, determining
what discrete negative emotions emerge as most significant;
• Determining if the tweets that contain positive emotions are statistically associated
with the size and survival of information flow;
• Determining if social factors, such as the number of followers a user has, are statis-
tically positively associated with the size and survival of the information flow;
6.3 Data Collection and Predictive Measures
6.3.1 Data Collection
Over 3 years, data from seven different sporting events was collected using the Twitter’s
streaming API and is summarised in Table 6.1 (the detail regarding data collection is
discussed in Chapter 3). The seven sporting events that were used are;
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Table 6.1: Description of Tweets collected during sporting event
Sporting Event Year Location Hashtag Used Number ofTweets Captured
Malicious
Tweets
Identified
Number
of Unique
Tweets
Federation
Internationale de
Football Association
(FIFA) World Cup
2014 Brazil #FIFA2014 95,000 46,481 2,039
Circket World Cup 2015 Australia & New Zealand #CWC15 7,961 4,238 891
Rugby World Cup 2015 United Kingdom #RWC2015 127,393 3,836 627
SuperBowl 2015 2015 USA
#SB50,
#SuperBowlSunday
#superbowlXLIX
122,542 2,293 1,230
European Football
Championship 2016 France #Euro2016 3,154,605 21,559 975
Olympics 2016 Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) #Rio2016 6,111 3,359 525
SuperBowl 2016 USA
#SuperBowlSunday
#NFL 57,572 23,876 582
1. Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup of 2014 : was
the 20th FIFA World Cup for men’s national football team. It took place in Brazil
from 12 June to 13 July 2014 and 32 teams from different countries participated
in the event. During this period 642 million tweets were posted on Twitter related
to the event and Brazil vs Germany semi-final was the most tweeted about event
generating 35.6 million Tweets [185].
2. The American Football Superbowl 2015: was an American football game played
between the American Football Conference (AFC) champion New England Patri-
ots and the National Football Conference (NFC) champion Seattle Seahawks, to
determine the champion of the National Football League (NFL) for the 2014 sea-
son. A total of 28.4 million tweets were recorded during the event and it was the
most talked about event on Facebook, with 1.36 million people commenting every
minute during the event [78].
3. The Cricket World Cup 2015 : was the 11th men’s Cricket World Cup, jointly hosted
by Australia and New Zealand from 14 February to 29 March 2015. A total of 14
teams from different countries participated in the event and 3.5 million tweets were
recorded during the period event occured [113]. During which the India vs Pakistan
match was the most talked about match that generated 1.7 million tweets. [189]
4. Rugby World Cup 2015 was the eighth Rugby World Cup, hosted by England from
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18 September to 31 October. A total of 20 teams from different nations participated
in the event. The final between New Zealand vs Australia recorded 560,000 tweets
with a highest frequency of 2,900 tweets per second [188].
5. The American Football Superbowl 2016 : was an American football game played
between the AFC champion Denver Broncos and the NFC champion Carolina Pan-
thers, to determine the champion of the NFL for the 2015 season. A total of 27
million tweets were reported during the event by Twitter and an engagement of 60
million users related to the event was reported by Facebook [82].
6. The European Football Championships 2016 : was the 15th International men’s
football championship of Europe organised by The Union of European Football
Associations (UEFA). It was held in France from 10 June to 10 July 2016 and a
total of 24 teams participated in it. Where England vs Iceland was reported to be
the most tweeted about programme, generating 2.1 million tweets during the match
[168].
7. The Olympics 2016 : was an international multi-sport event that was held from 5
to 21 August 2016 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. A total of 207 nations participated in
the event and it was the most talked about event of 2016, even surpassing the U.S
Presidential election [118].
6.3.2 Dependent Measure
Two dependent variables were generated to measure the effect of emotion represented in
text on malware propagation, namely, size and survival. Size is defined as the number
of times a tweet is retweeted. This is a measure of virality and therefore we assume that
the more a tweet is retweeted, the greater the risk to other network users if the tweet is
malicious. Survival is defined as the length of time over which a tweet continues to re-
ceive retweets. Again, if the tweet is malicious, the longer it continues to be retweeted,
the longer the risk to network users remains.
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Table 6.2: Description of Malicious Sample Data N=1,137
Variable Range Mean Std. Dev
Dependent
Size 5-22,614 86.53 817.19
Survival 0-2,850,416 218,556.40 483,290.60
Independent
Social Factors
Hashtag 0-13 1.90 1.66
Mentions 0-6 1.22 0.93
Friends 0-784,471 3652.78 28614.25
Followers 0-928,4012 168519.50 618537.10
Age of Account 562-1,321 918.25 287.17
Emotion
Anger 0-3 0.21 0.48
Anticipation 0-7 1.01 1.18
Disgust 0-5 0.27 0.60
Fear 0-5 0.39 0.67
Joy 0-7 0.71 0.95
Sadness 0-3 0.28 0.57
Surprise 0-10 0.44 0.76
Trust 0-5 0.50 0.75
Sentiment
Negative 0-3 0.19 0.46
Positive 0-4 0.37 0.67
In order to identify the number of retweets a tweet received, all the retweets were filtered
Figure 6.1: Number of Tweet’s captured with malicious URLs for each sporting event
by looking at tweets that had RT as the prefix, as one of Twitter’s features is to prefix each
retweet with RT. All the unique tweets in the dataset were identified and we counted the
number of times each unique tweet had been retweeted. The count for each retweet gave
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Table 6.3: Description of Benign Sample Data N=1,862
Variable Range Mean Std. Dev
Dependent
Size 5-48,875 90.86 1,160.23
Survival 0-2,896,989 291,628.00 616,751.50
Independent
Social Factors
Hashtag 0-12 2.02 1.81
Mentions 0-7 1.00 0.97
Friends 0-481194 2,973.49 16,787.49
Followers 0-12,700,000 143,917.60 761,002.80
Account Age 933-1635 1,200.09 306.50
Emotion
Anger 0-3 0.07 0.28
Anticipation 0-6 0.21 0.51
Disgust 0-2 0.05 0.23
Fear 0-3 0.09 0.32
Joy 0-5 0.17 0.46
Sadness 0-2 0.08 0.29
Surprise 0-3 0.09 0.32
Trust 0-5 0.22 0.51
Sentiment
Negative 0-3 0.14 0.39
Positive 0-5 0.34 0.64
us the size of each tweet’s information flow. The sample showed a positive skew (see Fig-
ure 6.1) where unique tweets retweeted fewer than five times were found on the left-hand
side of the distribution. Since the main aim of the study was to understand the propagation
factors, tweets with fewer than five retweets were removed from the sample, following re-
search that indicates this to be a reasonable cut-off point for non-trivial information flows
[9, 26]. The resulting dataset contained N=1,137 unique malicious tweets and N=1,862
unique benign tweets that had been retweeted at least five times. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 give
details of both dependent variables, where the range of Size for malicious tweets was 5
- 22,614 retweets with a mean of 87.53 retweets and the Size for benign tweets was 5 -
48,875 with a mean of 90.86 retweets. For survival, we found that malicious tweets had a
range of 0 - 2,850,416 seconds with a mean of 218,556.40 seconds, and benign tweets had
a range of 0 - 2,896,989 seconds with a mean of 291,628 seconds. The minimum of zero
represents rounding down to the nearest second where retweets happened within millisec-
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onds. Furthermore, an average mean of 0.48 for emotions was recorded in the malicious
sample, a figure that is significantly higher from average mean of emotions (0.12) in a
benign sample. This descriptive statistic suggests that malicious tweets that were iden-
tified across all the seven events contained more keywords that represent emotions than
in those identified as benign. The presence of more keywords associated with emotions
in tweets across all the seven events may suggests that those words that were associated
with emotions were intentionally added to increase the probability that the tweet would be
shared. We cannot be certain of this but this is a tactic that is commonly used in creating
an advertisement to gain a large number of views [16].
6.3.3 Independent Features
Social Features
Based on previous research ([102, 32, 38, 192, 14, 83, 50]), where social features were
used to detect malware in OSNs, the number of friends, number of followers and age
of the Twitter account that posted the initial tweet were extracted from the meta-data of
the captured tweet. The number of hashtags and user mentions that were included in
the tweets, were also calculated. See Tables 6.2 and 6.3 for details regarding the social
features extracted from the tweets that were captured.
Content Features
In addition to the social factors, the aim was to study the emotions and sentiments reflected
in the captured tweets. The rationale behind extracting emotions and sentiment was to
identify the association between different emotions and (i) the frequency of retweets
(size), and (ii) the duration of continuous retweeting (survival). The emotional aspect
of content circulating in OSNs shows its impact based on whether it is being shared or
not [90]. Emotions can even be the common link between two people who find common
143
Figure 6.2: Plutchik’s wheel of emotions. Similar emotions are placed next to each other.
Contrasting emotions are placed diametrically opposite to each other. Radius indicates
intensity [157].
ground between them. It has also been known for two culturally different people, who had
absolutely no contact in the past, to display the same facial expression to reflect a partic-
ular emotion [64], so it is possible that in an online social network people follow similar
patterns of retweeting when reading text exhibiting specific emotions. Furthermore, the
effect of emotions has been studied by biologists and psychologists to establish a link be-
tween one’s survival and the emotion expressed [54]. Numerous methods of classifying
human emotion have been proposed. Some have categorised emotions into two categories
- instinctive (emotions that we can sense and perceive) and cognitive (emotions that result
from thinking or reasoning) [230]. However, some have argued against this categorisation
of emotions by claiming that emotions do not precede cognition [230].
Plutchik proposed a resolution of this debate by suggesting that the problem lies in the
way the categories are defined. Basic and instinctive emotions can be correlated and so
can complex and cognitive ones [157]. This leads to definition of basic and complex
emotions. However, in the present research we focus on the basic emotions. A number
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of theories have been proposed to define the basic emotions perceived by humans, among
which the models proposed by Ekman [64] and Plutchik [157] has been found to be more
popular than others. Ekman [63] identifies six basic emotions (Anger, Fear, Disgust, Sad-
ness, Surprise and Joy), whereas Plutchik [157] identifies eight (Anger, Fear, Disgust,
Sadness, Anticipation, Surprise, Trust and Joy) that are more balanced in term of posi-
tive and negative emotions and also contain the 6 basic emotions identified by Ekman.
Figure 6.2 shows the eight primary or basic emotions identified by Plutchik, along with
other identified emotions depicted in a circular diagram that was later named the wheel
of emotion. The eight basic emotions are positioned in such a way that each is diago-
nally opposite a contrasted emotion; for example, joy-sadness, anger-fear, trust-disgust
and anticipation-surprise (see Figure 6.2). Plutchik also categorised a few emotions as
primary dyads, shown in Figure 6.2 in the white spaces between the primary emotions.
He argued that these emotions are a result of two primary emotions; for instance Love is
a result of Joy and Trust. The radius lines in the circle at the centre of the figure represent
the intensity of the emotion: the closer one gets to the radius lines the higher the intensity.
Interestingly, he states that the emotions in general are not found in isolation and do not
have clear boundaries. Hence, in deriving the emotions in a tweet, we identified all the
emotions expressed by it. For example a tweet might contain both anger and sadness.
In earlier studies an imbalanced set of basic emotions taken from Ekman[64] model were
used to identify the relationship between emotions expressed in a post and the content
shared. For example Kramer et al.[120] showed through a series of experiment that emo-
tions can be transferred to others via content shared, leading people to experience the
same emotions without their awareness. However, no study has been conducted that links
emotions to propagation of tweets containing malicious URL using basic emotions from
Ekman [64] or any other model. In order to address the gap in the research, Plutchick’s
eight primary emotions [157] were chosen for the experiment, demonstrating a balanced
mix of positive and negative emotions. We do not claim that Plutchik’s eight emotions
are better than other categorisations; however, we adopted them because they are well-
founded in psychological empirical research, and unlike some other choices, for example,
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that of Ekman, they are composed of a balanced set of positive and negative emotions.
The eight basic emotions as defined by Plutchik are used as independent features and are
derived from the tweets. In addition to the eight emotions, positive and negative senti-
ments were included.
Architecture of the Sentiment And Emotion Extraction Tool
A Java-based script (see Figure 6.4 for the flowchart) was developed to extract the emo-
tion and sentiment of each tweet. The script identifies the emotion and sentiment based on
keywords, following the principle that it is possible to infer emotional properties associ-
ated with words [60]. To start with, each captured tweet was pre-processed by removing
any stop words and non-ascii characters except those representing emoji or emoticon -
symbols representing emotions. Next emoticons were identified and the emotions asso-
ciated with them were noted. Once an emoticon was identified and the emotions were
noted, the emoticon was stripped out of the tweet and passed on to the next stage. We
used multiple dictionaries containing words associated with each of the eight emotions.
The three dictionaries that we used are listed below.
1. WordNet Affect Lexicon was manually created and is composed of words that
evoke emotions. These words were collected from various sources such as dic-
tionaries [217], newspapers and literary texts [191]. The words were then used to
mark all their synonyms with the same emotion in the WordNet dictionary. The
emotions in Wordnet Affect are organised in a hierarchical structure with the root
having positive, negative, ambiguous and neutral emotions. Each category is then
sub-divided and the related emotions are mapped to the root. For example posi-
tive emotions are divided into thirteen different types of positive emotion (joy, love,
affection, liking, enthusiasm, gratitude, self-pride, levity, calmness, fearlessness,
positive-expectation, positive-fear and positive-hope). These are then again divided
into sub categories. Due to limitations of space, in Figure 6.3 only the complete
Figure 6.3: Hierarchical structure of Wordnet Affect [35]
147
mapping of the emotions Joy and Surprise in Wordnet are shown, where each level
is represented by the same colour. Similar mappings for other emotions exist but
are not shown due to space restriction.
2. NRC-Emolex is another word-emotion based dictionary that was created by the
National Research Council of Canada [148]. The words from the Macquarie The-
saurus [57] were filtered by their frequency of use in the Google n-gram corpus [21].
Words that were part of Ekman’s subset in the WordnetAffect were also included.
These terms and phrases were then annotated using the crowd-sourcing platform
Mechanical Turk. For each question that was asked to identify the emotion asso-
ciated with the word, a test question was asked to eliminate the users who did not
understand the term or word. The test question asked the user to name a word with
similar meaning from a list of four options, where one in the list was a synonym and
others were distractions. Only those results where the participants got the answers
right were included. Along with the emotions, sentiments for each word were also
identified using the same approach as that used to identify associated emotions.
3. Hashtag Emotion Corpus - a hashtag based dictionary was created where the asso-
ciation between a hashtag and an emotion was recorded [147].
In addition to these dictionaries, we used the emoticons contained in a tweet to identify
appropriate additional emotions. Figure 6.4 provides an overview of the core program
in the form of a flowchart. The program first reads a tweet from the dataset and then
pre-processes it by removing stop words and punctuation. It then checks whether any
emoticons are present and identifies those that it finds with the associated emotions. In
the next step the tweet was split into multiple tokens; for each token (word) the associ-
ated emotion was identified using the three dictionaries. As the WordNet affect lexicon
represents emotions in a hierarchical structure (see Figure 6.3), a backward mapping of
granular emotions was performed on Plutchik’s eight emotions. In addition to the eight
primary emotions that were identified for a tweet, sentiments (positive or negative) were
also identified as each word of the tweet was being iterated.
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Figure 6.4: Flow Chart of the Emotion and Sentiment Extraction
6.4 Model Selection
6.4.1 Model selection for Dependent variable
The dependent variable size, which represented the number of retweets, is a positive non-
zero number (due to the imposed cutoff of 5). Thus we considered a number of statistical
models suitable for count data to help explain the rate of an event, which in the given case
was the number of times the tweet had been retweeted during the observation period. Due
to the data being positively skewed (see Figure 6.1) we would typically use a Poisson
model, where the model predicts the number of occurrences of an event. However, on
inspecting the data it was observed that the dependent variable Size mean and variance
were 86.53 and 667,804 respectively for the malicious sample, and 90.86 and 1,160.23
respectively for the benign sample, both indicating over-dispersion. Therefore a negative
binomial model was selected. Given the lack of zeros in the dependent variable we used
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the zero-truncated variant of the negative binomial model (ZTNB).
Pr(yi|yi > 0) = (Γ(yi + α
−1)/yi!Γ(α−1))(α−1/(α−1 + µi))α
−1
(µi/(α
−1 + µi))yi
1− (1 + αµi)α−1
(6.1)
E(yi|yi > 0) = µi
Pr(yi > 0)
=
µi
1− (1 + αµi)α−1 (6.2)
V ar(yi|yi > 0) = E(yi|yi > 0)
Pr(yi > 0)α
[1− Pr(yi = 0)α+1E(yi|yi > 0)] (6.3)
L =
N∏
i=1
Pr(yi|yi > 0) (6.4)
=
N∏
i=1
(Γ(yi + α
−1)/yi!Γ(α−1))(α−1/(α−1 + µi))α
−1
(µi/(α
−1 + µi))yi
1− (1 + αµi)α−1 (6.5)
log(µi) = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + · · ·+ βkXki (6.6)
The zero-truncated models calculate the probability of response variable (size- number
of retweets a tweet got) based on positive count data using Bayes’s Theorem [87, 133,
92]. Above shows the probability mass function (see equation 6.1), mean (see equa-
tion 6.2), variance (see equation 6.3), likelihood function (see equation 6.4) and re-
sponse surface (see equation 6.6) of a zero- truncated negative binomial model. Where
Pr(yi|yi > 0) is the probability mass function of the zero truncated negative binomial
distribution, E(yi|yi > 0) is the expectation of zero-truncated negative binomial distribu-
tion, V ar(yi|yi > 0) is the variance of zero-truncated negative binomial distribution, α
is the over-dispersion parameter, L is the likelihood function, µi is the estimated retweet
count for the ith observation, yi is the observed retweet count for the ith observation, k
is the parameter coefficient of the kth predictor variable (k = 0 for intercept), Xki is the
value of the kth predictor variable ( Hashtag, Mentions, Friends, Followers, Account Age,
Anger, Anticipation, Disgust, Fear, Joy, Sadness, Surprise, Trust, Negative, and Positive)
for the ith observation.
150
6.4.2 Survival Model - Cox Proportional Hazard Regression
Having identified the model to understand the factors associated with the retweet volume,
the next step was to identify the factors that were associated with the Survival of a tweet
containing a malicious URL. Survival analysis involves the modelling of time to event
data; in this context, failure of a tweet to be retweeted in a time-limited window was
considered an ”event”. Survival analysis was conducted to establish the factors that could
be associated with the duration of time until people stopped retweeting a malicious or
benign URL. This allowed those factors to be understand that increased or decreased the
hazards of survival.
For instance, the interest was in identifying if emotions (e.g. anger or fear) had any effect
on the hazard rate for information flow survival. Put another way, does the lifetime of a
tweet (lifetime defined as the time from the first tweet to the last retweet) increase when
anger is expressed in the text content? In order to identify the explanatory factors Cox’s
proportional hazards model [7] was chosen. Cox’s model produces a survival function
that predicts the probability that a retweet is made in the present time-frame for the given
values of the predictor variables. Given the predictor variables X at a given time t, the
survival function can be defined as λ(t|X) where
λ(t|X) = λ0(t)exp(β1X1 + β2X2 + .....βnXn) (6.7)
Based on this, the partial likelihood for X can be calculated using:
L(β) =
∑
i:Ci=1
θi∑
j:Yj≥Yi θi
(6.8)
where, for a given tweet i, Ci is an indicator of the time corresponding to the tweet and
θi = exp(β1X1 + β2X2 + .....βnXn)
151
6.4.3 Kaplan–Meier Estimation
In order to show the impact of the survival rate when an emotion or sentiment is detected,
we used the Kaplan-Meier estimation model to plot the survival function. The generated
plot consisted of a declining horizontal step. The estimator could be represented by
Sˆ(t) = Πti<t
ni − di
ni
(6.9)
where ni is the number of tweets that were retweeted and di is the number of tweets that
failed to be retweeted at time ti.
6.5 Results
The dataset used for the analysis was collected during seven popular sporting events mak-
ing the analysis not specific to one event but generalising it beyond a single event. The
seven sporting event that were used are namely (i) Fe´de´ration Internationale de Foot-
ball Association (FIFA) World Cup of 2014, (ii)Superbowl 2015, (iii) The Cricket World
Cup 2015, (iv) Rugby World Cup 2015, (v) Superbowl 2016, (vi)The European Football
Championships 2016 and (vii) The Olympics 2016. This made the dataset geographi-
cally diverse with each event catering to a different audience. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 give
a summary of the results for the zero-truncated negative binomial models built for our
dependent variable Size using the malicious and the benign datasets. Tables 6.6 and 6.7
summarise the results of the Cox proportional hazard regression models for the dependent
variable Survival.
The independent or predictor variables were divided into three categories: social, emo-
tion and sentiment factors. Several statistically significant associations were observed be-
tween the predictor and the dependent variables. For count data models in place of coeffi-
cients the incident rate ratio (IRR) is shown for each predictor. The IRR is derived by the
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exponentiation of the zero truncated negative binomial regression coefficients, allowing
for the interpretation of retweet incidence rates (as opposed to logs of expected retweet
counts). We can therefore use the IRR to report the strength of causal associations be-
tween certain factors and the information flow size, enabling us to identify quantitatively
which factors are more important than others. In terms of the results, the magnitude of the
effect of the variables of interest (emotions, sentiment and social content) on the retweets
was expressed as a percentage change in the incident rate of a retweet when all the other
factors in the model were held constant. An IRR of more than one indicated that the
percentage change in the incidence of a retweet had increased, whereas an IRR of less
than one indicated the reverse. For example, in Table 6.4, IRR for Surprise is 1.7851390,
which is greater than one. So the percentage change in the IRR is calculated as:
%increase = (IRR− 1) ∗ 100 = (1.7851390− 1) ∗ 100 = 78.51390% (6.10)
Which is interpreted as, by holding all other factors constant tweets that contained more
words associated with the emotion Surprise were more likely to be retweeted by 78.51390%.
Similarly, in Table 6.4 percentage change in the incident rate for Hashtag (IRR=0.893171),
where IRR is less than one, is calculated in the following way
%decrease = (1− IRR) ∗ 100 = (1− 0.8931710) ∗ 100 = 10.6829% (6.11)
Which is interpreted as, by holding all other factors constant tweets that contain higher
number of hashtags were less likely to be retweeted by 10.6829%
6.5.1 Dependent Variable- Size
Social Factors
Benign Dataset
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Table 6.4: Size model Results for Tweets containing Benign URL
Predictors IRR Std. Err Z Sig.
Social Factors
Hashtag 0.8931710 0.0205727 -4.900 0.000
Mentions 0.6581943 0.0333803 -8.250 0.000
Friends 0.9999995 0.0000045 -0.120 0.907
Followers 1.0000010 0.0000001 9.370 0.000
Age of User Account 0.9993696 0.0001616 -3.900 0.000
Emotion
Anger 0.9553148 0.2145193 -0.200 0.839
Anticipation 0.7157636 0.1030828 -2.320 0.020
Disgust 0.8145451 0.2109367 -0.790 0.428
Fear 0.8445490 0.1555862 -0.920 0.359
Joy 0.8073432 0.1528402 -1.130 0.258
Sadness 1.0266900 0.2111274 0.130 0.898
Surprise 1.7851390 0.3412885 3.030 0.002
Trust 0.8126954 0.0880218 -1.910 0.056
Sentiment
Negative 0.5349507 0.0989301 -3.380 0.001
Positive 1.0844390 0.1233625 0.710 0.476
Four social factors were statistically significantly associated with the dependent vari-
able size. The number of hashtags and mentions in a tweet both emerged as negatively
associated with size. For hashtag the IRR was 0.8932, Z was -4.9 and p<0.00 (see Table
6.4). The results show that for every increase in hashtags within a tweet, the tweet is ap-
proximately 11% less likely to be retweeted. Similar results were observed for mentions
and the age of the user account. For mentions, the IRR was 0.6582, Z = −8.25, p<0.00,
and for the age of the user account the IRR was 0.9994, Z = −3.9 and p<0.00. Thus, for
each increase in user mentions, the tweets were 34% less likely to be retweeted. Every
increase in the age of an account made it 0.0006% less likely that tweets posted by the
account would be retweeted. The older the account, the less likely its benign tweets are to
be retweeted. The number of followers a user had was also statistically significant: with
an IRR of 1.0000010, Z equalled 9.37 and p<0.00, thus showing that for every increase
in follower numbers, the likelihood of retweet increased. This follows expectations and
is due to increased social capital; therefore the tweet is exposed to more people.
Malicious Dataset
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Two variables from the set of independent variables in social factors were statistically sig-
Table 6.5: Size model Results for Tweets containing Malicious URL
Predictors IRR Std. Err Z Sig.
Social Factors
Hashtag 1.2493 0.0783 3.5500 0.0000
Mentions 0.9678 0.0892 -0.3500 0.7230
Friends 1.0000 0.0000 -0.8600 0.3880
Followers 1.0000 0.0000 2.7300 0.0060
Age of User Account 0.9999 0.0003 -0.4500 0.6540
Emotion
Anger 0.6585 0.1471 -1.8700 0.0610
Anticipation 1.2971 0.1122 3.0100 0.0030
Disgust 0.9395 0.1492 -0.3900 0.6950
Fear 2.4397 0.3817 5.7000 0.0000
Joy 0.9353 0.0840 -0.7400 0.4560
Sadness 1.3274 0.1731 2.1700 0.0300
Surprise 0.6941 0.0471 -5.3800 0.0000
Trust 0.6883 0.0699 -3.6800 0.0000
Sentiment
Negative 1.0526 0.2703 0.2000 0.8420
Positive 0.9531 0.1278 -0.3600 0.7200
nificantly associated with the dependent variable size. For hashtags, the IRR was 1.2493,
Z 3.55 and p<0.00 (see Table 6.5). This association showed that for every increase in
hashtags in a tweet, the chances of a retweet increased by around 25%. We also observed
that the number of followers that the tweeter had was also statistically significant and it
was observed an IRR of 1.00, Z equal to 2.73 and p<0.00. It was also observed that,
even though IRR for followers was statistically significant, it did not affect the retweeting
behaviour (IRR=1).
Emotion and Sentiment
Benign Dataset
Two positive emotions out of the eight primary emotions used as the independent variable
were found to be statistically significant. Results showed an IRR of 0.7157636, Z -2.320
and p<0.02 for anticipation. For every increase in words relating to anticipation, the tweet
was 28% less likely to be retweeted. However, for every increase in the emotion surprise,
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tweets were 78% more likely to be retweeted (IRR=1.7851390,Z=3.030 and p<0.02) than
tweets not containing surprise (see Table 6.4). Among the independent variables in the
sentiment set, negative sentiment (IRR=0.5349507, Z=-3.38 and p<0.001) was statisti-
cally significant, showing that for benign tweets posted during a sporting event, every
increase in words containing negative sentiment is associated with a 47% reduction in the
likelihood of being retweeted.
Malicious Dataset
Five out of the eight emotions were found to be statistically significant, whereas no sig-
nificant association was found for sentiment. From the set of negative emotions, fear and
sadness were positively associated with size, with fear having an IRR of 2.4397, Z of
5.7 and p<0.00, and sadness having an IRR of 1.3284, Z of 2.17 and p<0.03 (see Table
6.5). In malicious tweets, for every increase in the words relating to fear, the likelihood
of retweet increased by 143%. For sadness, each increase was associated with a 33% in-
crease in the likelihood of being retweeted. Anticipation evokes the feeling of excitement,
whereas surprise is the reaction to what is unexpected and these were both found to be
statistically significant. For anticipation, the IRR was 1.2971, Z 3.01 and p¡0.03 and for
surprise the IRR was 0.6941, Z -5.38 and p<0.00 (see Table 6.5).
This means that malicious tweets which expressed anticipation were 30% more likely to
be retweeted for each additional word containing this emotion, and those that expressed
surprise were 31% less likely to be retweeted. Anticipation was positively associated
with the number of retweets, whereas surprise was negatively associated, compared to
the results from the benign dataset sample. From the set of positive emotions, trust was
observed to be statistically significant. It was observed to have a negative association with
information flow, having an IRR of 0.6883, Z of -3.68 and p<0.00.
We interpret this as meaning that for every increase in a text representative of trust, ma-
licious URLs were 31% less likely to be propagated. The Bayesian information criterion
for the full model was observed to be 10,660.43 and the log-likelihood to be -5270.41,
suggesting a good fit to the data.
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6.5.2 Dependent Variable -Survival
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 show the results obtained from the Cox proportional hazards model
for both malicious and benign tweets. Considering the diversity of each sporting event
regarding the length of playing time (from 90 minutes for a football game to around
480 minutes for a cricket match), we aimed to understand which tweets had information
that survived longer than 24 hours after the end of the sporting event. Therefore, a Cox
proportional hazard model was created for a 24-hour time window. The results from using
the model indicated several statistically significant associations between the dependent
variable (survival) and the predictive factors. When the model was used to explain the
proportional hazards, a positive β indicated an increase in the hazard of survival, meaning
that it reduced the chances of survival for the information flow and a negative β indicated
the reverse.
Table 6.6: Survival Model Results for Tweets containing Benign URL
24 hours Window
Predictors Coef Std. Err z Sig
Social Factors
Hashtag 0.0505660 0.0167934 3.010 0.003
Mentions -0.1661053 0.0357883 -4.640 0.000
Friends 0.0000012 0.0000018 0.660 0.509
Age of User Account 0.0012092 0.0001006 12.020 0.000
Followers -0.0000002 0.0000001 -3.480 0.000
Emotion
Anger 0.1982328 0.1531408 1.290 0.196
Anticipation -0.0820958 0.0956012 -0.860 0.390
Disgust 0.1259461 0.1607216 0.780 0.433
Fear -0.0869308 0.1282319 -0.680 0.498
Joy 0.3235211 0.1259961 2.570 0.010
Sadness 0.2598578 0.1410289 1.840 0.065
Surprise -0.2424558 0.1399941 -1.730 0.083
Trust 0.0393096 0.0743090 0.530 0.597
Sentiment
Negative -0.1533467 0.1219457 -1.260 0.209
Positive -0.2803509 0.0833525 -3.360 0.001
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Social Factors
Benign Dataset
Holding all the factors constant, we found hashtags (β = 0.05056, z = 3.01 ) and the
age of the account in question (β = 0.0012092, z = 12.02) to be statistically signif-
icant and positively associated with hazards of survival. The results showed that be-
nign tweets that contained a higher number of hashtags or were posted by accounts that
were recently created had less chance of survival i.e. they would be retweeted for a
shorter period than those with less hashtags or with older accounts. We also found that
user mentions (β = −0.166, z = −4.64 ) and the number of followers that a user had
(β = −0.0000002, z = −3.48 ) were statistically significant and negatively associated
with hazards to survival. Moreover, we found positive sentiment to be statistically signif-
icant and associated with decreased hazards to survival. Figure 6.5 illustrates that, using
Figure 6.5: Survival rate for positive sentiment in benign tweet sample
Kaplan-Meir survival estimates, benign tweets with higher numbers of positive words
have an increased chance of survival over longer periods.
Malicious dataset
Holding all the factors constant, we found user mentions (β = 0.13513360, z = 3.17)
158
Table 6.7: Survival Model Results for Tweets containing Malicious URL
24 hours Window
Predictors Coef Std. Err z Sig
Social Factors
Hashtag -0.02988310 0.02786000 -1.070 0.283
Mentions 0.13513360 0.04256820 3.170 0.002
Friends -0.00001060 0.00000539 -1.970 0.049
Age of User Account -0.00008420 0.00014620 -0.580 0.565
Followers 0.00000017 0.00000006 2.760 0.006
Emotion
Anger 0.35190140 0.09892910 3.560 0.000
Anticipation -0.02911340 0.04077730 -0.710 0.475
Disgust -0.00215150 0.07319090 -0.030 0.977
Fear -0.19202340 0.06798030 -2.820 0.005
Joy 0.01330880 0.04505960 0.300 0.768
Sadness 0.04871910 0.07660280 0.640 0.525
Suprise 0.00820430 0.05620190 0.150 0.884
Trust -0.04157660 0.06243850 -0.670 0.505
Sentiment
Negative 0.02373590 0.11119810 0.210 0.831
Positive 0.10034690 0.07497770 1.340 0.181
and the number of followers a user had (β = 0.00000017, z = 2.76 ) to be statistically
significant in predicting hazards to survival. Both of them were found to be positively
associated with the hazards to survival. Results showed that the more a cybercriminal
uses user mentions in a tweet (e.g. in trying to target users) or has an extensive social
network (often a sign of bots who buy followers), the more it reduced the chance of
survival. A negative association was observed by the number of friends that a user had
(β = −0.00001060, z = −1.970), showing that the more friends a user has, the higher
the chances of survival of a tweet.
Emotion and Sentiment
Benign dataset
The independent variables representing emotion and sentiment in a tweet were derived
from the contents of the tweet, based on the words expressing them. Survival models
were built using these independent variables. The results showed that only the positive
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emotion of joy and positive sentiment were statistically significant in predicting haz-
ard of the survival of the information flow. We observed a positive association for joy
(β = 0.3235211, z = 2.570), indicating that the chances of survival were reduced if the
tweet reflected joy. However, tweets that reflected a positive sentiment showed a negative
association β = −0.2803509, z = −3.360). Results showed that the more positive tweets
had the greater chance of survival.
Malicious dataset
Sentiment alone was not found to be statistically significant. However, we found two
emotions to be statistically significant in predicting hazard for the survival of the in-
formation flow. The results showed that anger (β = 0.352, z = 3.56) was positively
significantly associated, indicating that the chances of survival were reduced if the tweet
reflected anger. However, tweets that reflected fear (β = −0.192, z = −2.82) showed a
negative association, indicating that the chance of survival of a malicious tweet increases
if a cybercriminal posts an intimidating tweet. Figure 6.6 illustrates the Kaplan-Meir
Figure 6.6: Survival rate for fear in malicious dataset
survival estimates for those tweets that reflect the emotion fear. The levels of fear (0-3)
represented the number of words related to this emotion in the tweet. The results showed
that the more often words associated with fear appeared in a malicious tweet, the higher
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were the chances of its survival. Fear spreads for a longer time than any other emotion in
malicious tweets.
6.6 Discussion
We collected Twitter data around seven sporting events using event-specific hashtags.
Sporting events had been chosen specifically because they attracted a large number of
users which gave cybercriminals an opportunity to spread drive-by download attacks by
obfuscating malicious URLs in tweets. A subsample of 270,00 tweets was randomly cre-
ated from the collected data sample of around 3.5 million tweets, that were pre-processed
to remove the retweeted tweets before the unique URL was extracted from them. The
resultant sample of around 31,171 unique URLs was later passed on to Capture HPC, a
high interaction honeypot, that was set up to distinguish malicious tweets from benign.
Once a URL was passed to the Capture HPC server, it interacted with the Web server
for a limited period and, based on changes made to the client machine, it classified the
URL into malicious (drive-by download attack occurring from the endpoint of a URL)
or benign. The changes made to the client machine clarified that Capture HPC identified
around 6,122 malicious and 25,049 benign URLs. Across all the seven events we identi-
fied all the tweets that contained these malicious and benign URLs, including retweets, to
understand the propagation of a drive-by download attack on Twitter. The research aimed
to identify social and content factors, such as the emotion and sentiment in the tweet, that
was associated with the propagation of malicious URLs. With the nature of the sample
data in mind, we chose the zero-truncated negative binomial method to model size and
the Cox proportional hazard model to calculate the survival as the dependent variables -
and social and content features as the independent variables.
In line with previous research on the virality of news [211, 17] and spam detection [95] in
online social networks, several significant associations for emotions and sentiment were
revealed between the information size and survival. Among the social features, hashtags
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stood out, being created by users to give context to their post and link them to related
topics to reach a targeted audience, increase traffic to their post, and in turn increase in-
teractions and the probability that their tweet will be retweeted. A recent report on the
engagement of users on online social platforms revealed that though hashtags provide
context and are thus important elements in a post, they reduce user engagement if their
number increases beyond a certain point [163]. Interestingly, our results for tweets that
contained benign URLs were in line with the report [163]. The results showed that tweets
classified as benign do not engage users’ interest and are 11% less likely to be retweeted
if they contain more hashtags. This contradicted our finding for those tweets that were
classified as malicious. Our results showed that malicious tweets were 24% more likely
to be retweeted if they contained more hashtags. One explanation for this could be that
hashtags which trigger emotional responses are added to tweets to gain popularity or to
engage users, as has been shown in earlier work where a relationship was identified be-
tween emotion and content sharing [17].
For benign tweets the number of followers of the posting user was positively associated
with the chances of them being retweeted (see Table 6.6). However, though followers
were statistically significant in the propagation of malicious tweets, the effect size was
very small suggesting cybercriminals do not depend heavily on their followers to propa-
gate malware and may seek other techniques for this purpose, including the use of con-
tent features (sentiment or emotion), embedding hashtags that highlight the tweet, or us-
ing techniques such as paying for retweets [61, 42] from black market services such as
Like4Like [62] or YouLikeThis[159] .
Information that is novel attracts people [101] and things that are attractive are worth
sharing on online social platforms [17]. Information that is found novel is also consid-
ered valuable and surprising. Based on this principle, Berger et al showed that content
on online social networks that evokes high arousal emotions such as ’awe’ have a higher
probability of being propagated by the action of sharing [17]. Since the emotion ’awe’
can be derived from the root emotion surprise [191] (see Figure 6.2), we found that tweets
which were classified as benign and contained keywords associated with surprise were
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78% more likely to be retweeted. Even though a higher number of tweets (33% malicious
compared to 8% benign) contained one or more keywords associated with the emotion
surprise in a malicious dataset, it was not statistically significant for the size of the infor-
mation flow. This suggests that it was not one of the driving factors behind a high retweet
count. Rather, it was negative emotions such as fear and sadness that were found to be
statistically significant for the size of the information flow. The results showed fear to
have the highest incident rate ratio (2.4), meaning that each tweet that reflected fear was
114% more likely to be retweeted. A comparison of sample size revealed that 30% of the
tweets from the malicious data sample contained one or more keywords associated with
fear compared to 8% from the benign data sample, suggesting that a higher number of
words associated with the emotion fear were used in constructing tweets with a malicious
link. Even though negative emotion was present in the benign dataset it was not found
statistically significant for the size of the information flow in the dataset categorised as
benign.
To investigate further the choice of keywords used that helped a tweet to gain popularity
or be retweeted, a world cloud (see Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8) was created from the tweets
that were categorised as malicious and and tweets that were categorised as benign . On
Figure 6.7: Word Cloud of Malicious Tweet
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Figure 6.8: Word Cloud of Benign Tweet
closer inspection words such as ”kill”, ”fight”, ”shot”, ”controversy” etc. were frequently
observed in tweets that contained malicious URLs. Whereas words such ”Team”, ”love”,
”happy”,”good”, ”enjoy”,”fun” were found in benign tweets. This suggests that carefully
selected words were being used in the formation of these tweets, where a keyword could
trigger emotional arousal using negative emotions such as fear, anger, or sadness that
could encourage the propagation of malicious tweets. [17, 211]. We further investigated
Figure 6.9: Emotions captured in those Tweets categorised as malicious (N=1137) and
benign (N=1862)
the number of words used in tweets that created emotional arousal and found that tweets
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that were classified as malicious contained more words associated with emotions than did
the tweets classified as benign (see Figure 6.9).
Even though the collective intensity (total number of words associated with emotions) of
positive emotions such as anticipation, surprise, trust and joy were higher than those of
the negative emotions, it was the negative emotion such as fear that were associated with
size and the survival of information flow for tweets classified as malicious. This associa-
tion implies that the associative factors were higher for emotion rather than on followers
for the propagation of tweets containing malicious links. A similar association was found
between content of false news and emotions, where a study showed it was negative emo-
tions that assisted more than positive in propagating fake news [211].
In addition to the ZTNB model built to predict the number of retweets (size) we built
a Cox proportional hazard model for both benign and malicious tweets to measure the
lifetime of the information flow. A number of social factors were found statistically sig-
nificant, where the number of hashtags used in a tweet showed similar traits in the size
of the information flow. That is, as the number of hashtags in a tweet increased, the con-
tinued engagement of users reduced. This is supported by a report on user engagement,
that suggested an inverse relationship between number of hashtags in a post and user en-
gagement with that post [163]. However, this trait was seen only in tweets classified as
benign and no statistical significance was seen between the survival of a tweet categorised
as malicious and the number of hashtags used. Whereas, user mentions were statistically
significant in both datasets and had an opposite relationship. In the malicious tweets it
was positively associated, suggesting that with an increase in user mentions the chances
of survival decreased. This is possibly because cybercriminals may misuse the user men-
tion option by mentioning popular users to attract attention to their tweet.
However, the survival of a tweet classified as benign is linked to user mentions and the
number of followers, suggesting that users who were mentioned shared a trust relationship
with the person mentioning them, thus attracting the retweet as demonstrated in related
work where authors showed cybercriminals have exploited the trust relationship [73] be-
tween users by using accounts that appear trustworthy or by mentioning users in a tweet
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to aid their propagation. The results for malicious datasets showed a negative association
with friends (the more the friends, the higher the chances of survival) and a positive asso-
ciation with followers (fewer followers implying a higher chance of survival), suggesting
that malicious tweets from accounts that have a low ratio of followers to friends have a
higher chance of survival. This could be one of the tactics employed by cybercriminals to
prevent detection, since the follower to friend ratio is identified as one of the key features
for flagging an account as malicious [192, 227, 183]. Experimental results show that a
tweet categorised as malicious will survive longer if posted by an account that has a many
friends and uses fewer user mentions. However, these features were not statistically sig-
nificant for tweets classified as benign.
In terms of emotions that were associated with the survival of a tweet, the results were
similar to those on the size of the information flow. For a benign dataset, positive sen-
timent, which is the emotional effect of the tweet on its reader, was found statistically
significant for its survival. This was similar to the size of information flow for benign
tweets, where tweets containing emotions with positive associations were likely to be
retweeted. Similarly, it was the negative emotions that influenced the survival of a tweet
classified as malicious, where, like the size of the information flow, fear stood out from
the other negative emotions. Tweets that contained keywords associated with fear were
more likely to survive the twenty-four hour window after the sporting event and more
likely to be retweeted.
6.7 Conclusion
This study has analysed malware propagation across seven different sporting events cov-
ering a diverse group of users. Our results show that there is a statistically significant
association between the social and emotional factors derived from a tweet captured dur-
ing a sporting event. In this chapter, it was observed that malware propagation was not
strongly associated with the number of followers that a user had. The stronger association
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was towards content driven features, such as emotions and the choice of words associated
with emotions that were used to compose a tweet or create hashtags. Even though the ma-
licious dataset had lower numbers, the cumulative intensity of emotions (see Figure 6.9)
was much higher than in the tweets containing benign tweets. The results showed that
tweets that contain malicious links are associated with negative emotions, particularly the
emotion fear, for their retweet likelihood (virality) and survival. Whereas, in tweets that
are classified as benign, it was the positive sentiment and high arousal emotions such as
surprise that were associated with the size and survival of the information flow.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Thesis Summary
With 80% of Internet users now active in OSNs, we have seen a 56% rise in Web based
attacks reported by Symantec [196]. Year by year the increase in cyber attacks continue
to pose serious threats to information security [106], resulting in a loss of millions [158].
Cyber criminals who earlier had been known to favour popular platforms such as emails
for their nefarious activities [55], have shifted their focus towards OSNs, which was evi-
dent by the growing number of web based attacks being reported on them [137, 121, 86,
153, 102, 184]. The motivation of this thesis was to contribute to the growing literature
on fighting these web-based attacks, focusing particularly on drive-by download attacks,
that accounted for 48% of web-based attacks [175].
In order to counter these attacks, researchers have proposed malware detection models
based on OSN accounts characteristics [12, 183, 227, 126, 144, 43, 192, 30, 187, 19],
malware code/behaviour [100, 210, 137, 135, 31, 125, 65, 103, 108, 114, 11, 116, 149,
22] and by deploying honeypots [5, 160]. In spite of numerous detection models devel-
oped to counter such attacks, cybercriminals continue to develop new ways to overcome
Twitter’s policy and beat the detection models proposed to counter them. Obfuscating
techniques such as anti-symbolic execution obfuscation [10], anti-fuzzing [84], encryp-
tion [150], polymorphism [150] were used to evade detection from models developed on
malware code/behaviour. Whereas, cybercriminals evaded models developed on OSN ac-
counts characteristics by modifying their attacking behaviour [227].
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The focus of research prior to this thesis had been on detecting malware on OSNs, how-
ever, considering 335 million active users on Twitter [118], an average rate of 6,000 tweets
per second [145] and the highest retweet of 4.1 million recorded for a single tweet [130],
drive-by downloads attacks have the potential to expose the malware to millions of users
before a malware detection model could detect it. In such a volatile environment we pro-
posed the need to adopt a proactive strategy to defend against malware attacks.
In order to keep pace with cybercriminals and overcome challenges faced by models de-
veloped by analysing malware code/behaviour or OSN characteristics, first of all, evi-
dence of popular events being used as a delivery medium was gathered in chapter 3. Data
from Twitter were collected from seven popular and diverse events over a period of 3
years. From the collected tweets, a sub-sample was randomly created, and the extracted
URLs were passed into the Capture HPC [27], a high interaction honeypot set up to iden-
tify malicious URLs. A malicious URL is defined as one which points to a malicious
server or website from which a drive-by download is carried out. Results from the experi-
ment showed that 12.76% of total URLs processed by using data from all the seven events
were classified as malicious, meaning a drive-by download attack occurred while visiting
these websites. Using the list of malicious and benign URLs, in chapter 4, a novel de-
tection model was proposed that classifies a URL into malicious/benign based on system
activities, thus shifting the focus from analysing malware code to observing changes to a
user’s system by the malware. The proposed model was successful in classifying URLs
into malicious and benign with an F-measure of 0.81 during training and 0.71 while test-
ing on an unseen dataset.
In order to extend the detection model so that it could anticipate a drive-by download
attack, a novel prediction model was proposed in chapter 5, to predict drive-by download
attacks on Twitter. The proposed model was based on OSN characteristics and machine
activities leading to a drive-by download attack. Thus, moving beyond the post-execution
classification of such URLs as malicious, to predict that a URL will be malicious with
0.99 F-measure (using 10-fold cross-validation) and 0.833 (using an unseen test set) at 1
second into the interaction with the URL. This finding provides a basis from which to kill
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the connection to the server before an attack has completed and proactively blocking and
preventing an attack, rather than reacting and repairing at a later date.
Considering the aim of the cybercriminal is to increase damage through maximum ex-
posure, Chapter 6 focuses on uncovering social and content-based factors that aid in the
propagation of drive-by download attacks by the action of retweeting. We answered ques-
tions including (i) why are certain post shared more than others?; (ii) is virality driven by
physiological arousal?; and (iii) do emotion and sentiment represented in a post aid in its
propagation? Emotion and sentiment were particularly chosen because it has been well
established that people transfer positive and negative moods to one another in a form of
emotional contagion [89] and the posting behaviour of a user varied according to the emo-
tional content received [120]. The findings of Chapter 6 provide the first study that links
emotions and sentiment to the propagation of tweets containing malicious URLs on Twit-
ter. The experimental results showed that there was a statistically significant association
between the social and emotional factors derived from a tweet captured during a sporting
event and tweets that contain malicious links are associated with negative emotions, par-
ticularly the emotion fear, for their retweet likelihood (virality) and survival.
7.1.1 Contributions
The research conducted and explained in this thesis contributes towards the evolving field
of detecting and managing drive-by download attacks on Twitter and can be summarised
in two contributions. Existing research that has been conducted to fight against cyber at-
tacks and to stop them from spreading on OSNs has been studied from three perspectives:
(i) analysis of social features of the accounts posting malicious URLs, (ii) constructing
models based on static code analysis, and, (iii) constructing models built using dynamic
code analysis. Chapter 2, focused on analysing existing models developed to detect mal-
ware on OSN and highlighted the limitations. It further studied models/techniques that
have been proposed to curb the infection on OSN. The discussion on existing literature
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and on identifying research gaps led to open research questions. The research questions
that were identified in Chapter 2, helped shape the structure of the thesis, where the pri-
mary focus has been in proposing a model to predict a drive-by download attack that can
identify malicious URLs on Twitter and to identify factors that help propagation of posts
that contain malicious URLs.
In order to carry out a successful drive-by download attack, cybercriminals need to ex-
pose the malware to a large number of users on OSNs. However to best of our knowledge,
no research finding presented any measure of association between popular events and the
scale of malicious URLs posted to Twitter. In Chapter 3 evidence that popular events
on Twitter were being used to deliver drive-by download attacks was gathered.The evi-
dence was gathered by collecting tweets containing URLs using event-specific hashtags
and passing them through a high interaction client side honeypot, Capture HPC. The hon-
eypot classified a URL as malicious or benign on the basis of client machine changes in
terms of file, process and registry. Using seven diverse sporting events, 3,571,184 tweets
were collected over a period of three years. From these, a random sample of 48,991
unique tweets were passed on to Capture HPC, out of which 6,879 (individual tweets)
and around 105,642 (tweets including retweets) were identified to be malicious through
an automated analysis of each URL.
In order to detect and counter malware on OSNs numerous models have been proposed.
However, cyber criminals continue to develop new ways to overcome Twitter’s policy
and beat the detection models proposed to counter them. The models were primarily built
using OSN accounts characteristics and by observing malware code/behaviour. Yet cy-
bercriminals tend to modify their behaviour on OSNs, hence evade detection from models
build on OSN characteristics, while models based on malware code/behaviour succumb
to techniques such as anti-symbolic execution obfuscation [10], anti-fuzzing [84], en-
cryption [150], polymorphism [150] used to obfuscate malware code/behaviour. Thus,
there was a requirement to develop detection models by shifting the focus from existing
malware code/behaviour features to keep pace with cybercriminals. We proposed one
such approach would be to focus on the effect of malware on user systems, by observing
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machine activities leading to an attack. After all, malware will reveal itself eventually
to harm a system even if it is using different evading techniques such as polymorphism,
encryption, triggers, etc. to hide the malicious code. In Chapter 4 we proposed a novel
malware detection model that classifies a URL into malicious/benign based on machine
activities, thus shifting the focus from malware code/behaviour to system behaviour dur-
ing malware execution for the first time. The proposed detection model presented as a
result of our experiment, observes machine activities during visitation of a webpage in-
stead of statically/dynamically analysing malware code. It was trained and tested by using
data collected over popular sporting events from Twitter. The model gave an F-measure
0.81 for MLP during training the model and an F-Measure of 0.71 during testing the
model on unseen dataset. However, the malware detection model could only handle 500
URLs per day and classified a URL as malicious based on activities after an attack had
taken place. In order to increase the number of URLs to be processed without increasing
the number of resources a predictive model was proposed in Chapter 5. Thus, giving our
first contribution:
C1 To propose a predictive model capable of identifying a malicious URL within
seconds, based on machine activities and social features, thus providing new capability
to kill the connection and curtail the sequence of malicious actions rather than
depending on detection and repair at significant cost and inconvenience.
The prediction model was developed using data around two global sporting events.
The model was trained using a second-by-second time series of system-level activity (e.g.
CPU use, RAM use, network traffic etc.) during the visitation of a Web page and that of
social features derived from the meta-data of the tweet. During training, a ten-fold cross-
validation was performed to train the model, and an F-measure of 0.99 was achieved by
using the log files generated at 1 second into the interaction with a Web server. When
tested using an unseen dataset (Olympics 2016) we achieved an F-measure of 0.833 from
log files generated at 2 seconds - that is 1 second after launching the URL. The highest F-
measure achieved on the unseen event was 0.862 at 5 seconds from the time the URL was
launched. Furthermore, it allows us to stop the execution process with 0.833 F-measure
just 1 second after clicking the URL, preventing the full execution of the malicious pay-
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load, rather than detecting the malicious action retrospectively and having to repair the
system.
Even though the predictive model was capable of processing a maximum of 150,000
URLs per day per deployment, the rate at which the tweets are posted could spike during
a popular event on Twitter. The processing power of the model could be increased by
simultaneously deploying multiple images of the predictive model. However, even with
multiple deployments of the predictive model, the processing of URLs per day might not
be enough to handle the volatile load of tweets generated during the popular event. Thus,
there is a need to understand the infection behaviour and the factors that contribute to-
wards the propagation of posts containing malicious URLs.
In Chapter 6, the social and content-based factors within a tweet containing a malicious
URL that aid its propagation were uncovered. In order to identify these factors, we de-
veloped evidence to answer questions including: why are certain post shared more than
others?; is virality driven by physiological arousal?; and do emotion and sentiment re-
flecting in a post aid in its propagation? Answers to these questions could help in the
future to devise a strategy to curtail the infection even when the users that were spreading
are removed from the network. The factors that aid in the propagation of post containing
malicious URL produces our final contribution.
C2 To understand propagation behaviour by uncovering the social and content
features, particularly emotions that influence the propagation of tweets containing
malicious URLs.
In order to identify the factors that aid in malware propagation, data across seven
different sporting events covering a diverse group of users was collected. Experimental
results show that there is a statistically significant association between the social and
emotional factors derived from a tweet captured during a sporting event. It was observed
that malware propagation had a stronger association towards content driven features, such
as emotions and the choice of words associated with emotions that were used to compose
a tweet or create hashtags. The results showed that tweets that contain malicious links are
associated with negative emotions, particularly 30% of the tweets were associated with
the emotion fear. Whereas, in tweets that are classified as benign, it was the positive
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sentiment and high arousal emotions such as surprise that were associated with the size
and survival of the information flow.
7.2 Future Work
The contributions made through this thesis can also be used as basis for future work
both in terms of improving the performance of the predictive model to identify tweets
containing malicious URLs and to further investigate malware propagation.
7.2.1 Real world application
The future direction of the proposed predictive model lies in the development of real
world application that is capable of identifying malicious URLs being posted during pop-
ular events on Twitter in real time. However, one of the main challenges while dealing
with Twitter data is handling large number of tweets in real time. Also, considering the
volatility of the tweets being posted during popular events the model should be either
capable of adding resources or creating multiple instances of itself to cope with the load.
One of the ways to overcome the dynamic scalability issue is to deploy the model on a
cloud environment using an overlay framework, such as, CometCloud [58] that allows
creating dynamically multiple instances of the predictive algorithm. CometCloud is open
source and is specifically focused on supporting integration of distributed computer plat-
forms, enabling it to create multiple instances of the predictive model to quickly classify
a URL. It achieves this through the use of the Comet coordination ”spaces” — an abstrac-
tion based on the availability of a distributed shared memory that all users and providers
can access and observe, enabling information sharing by publishing requests/offers to in-
formation to this shared memory.
CometCloud deployment consists of a Master and number of Workers. The Master is
responsible for managing the interaction between workers and tasks that have been sub-
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Figure 7.1: Deploying of Malware Prediction Model on Cloud
mitted to the system by one or more users. A worker can directly execute a task, or act
as a gateway to a third party system. Execution spaces can be created in the context of
a single site for provision, such as local resources or to support a cloudburst (i.e. when
additional capacity is needed to respond to a sudden increase in tweet posting rate) to
public clouds or external high performance computing systems. Moreover, they can be
used to create a private sub-federation across several sites. This case can be useful when
several sites have some common interest (e.g. to defend against cyber attacks) and they
decide to jointly target certain types of tasks as a specialised community.
Figure 7.1 shows the proposed architecture of deploying the malware prediction model
on cloud using the CometCloud framework. The master is responsible for receiving the
request containing the details about the tweet captured and then to aggregating the results
received from workers. The malware prediction algorithm will be deployed as worker
and will be responsible for visiting the web page, creating a log file and classifying the
URL into malicious or benign. Once the tweet is captured from the Twitter streaming
API, it is forwarded to the master, the master then publishes the task, which in turn can
be picked up by any free worker or by another master in a different cloud connected via
175
CometCloud framework. Once the classification is complete, the result are displayed to
the user on a graphical user interface, possibly a dashboard displaying statistics of URLs
identified, accounts posting those URL, events used etc., giving the security practitioner
a complete picture of the attacks defended against.
7.2.2 Curbing propagation of Malware
Chapter 5 focuses on the development of a predictive model to identify malicious URLs
on Twitter and Chapter 6 identifies those factors that aid in propagation of tweets con-
taining malicious URLs. A tweet that is captured and identified as containing malicious
link may not be the original tweet, but could be part of a retweet chain. Removing the
tweet may not necessarily stop the malware propagation as users that have retweeted the
tweet have already exposed it to their followers. However, a strategy to selectively re-
moving those users that have a high degree of centrality from the retweet chain could be
employed to curb the malware propagation. Research in identifying these key users or
minimum number of users that can stop the propagation until the infection is removed
from the network could be another future direction of this work.
7.2.3 Generalising model for other OSN platforms
The research was conducted using Twitter as a case study, where data were collected from
seven different diverse popular sporting events. However, the model and techniques can
potentially be adapted to other platforms, as the predictive model relied greatly on the
machine activities leading to a drive-by download attack. The capturing of machine ac-
tivities was independent of the OSNs, but the social feature vector may be different from
platform to platform. However, these features could easily be added when the social fea-
tures are merged with the machine activities. Making the algorithm adaptable to different
OSNs.
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7.3 Conclusion
The contribution of this research has been towards countering drive-by downloads at-
tacks on Twitter by developing a predictive model to identify URLs pointing to malicious
servers and to identify factors aiding its propagation. It contributes to existing literature
on detecting malware on OSNs, by shifting the focus towards the effects of malware on
user machines away from the malware signature and dynamic behaviour, which can be
obfuscated. This was achieved by developing a novel model to detect drive-by down-
loads on Twitter. The model was built by observing changes to the user’s system in terms
of machine activities observed while visiting a web page. The model was successful in
classifying an URL into malicious or benign with an F-measure of 0.81 during training
and an F-Measure of 0.71 while testing the model on an unseen dataset. This was then
extended to develop a novel prediction model by using machine activity data and tweet’s
metadata, thus moving beyond post-execution classification of such URLs as malicious, to
predicting a URL will be malicious with 0.99 F-measure (using 10-fold cross-validation)
and 0.833 (using an unseen test set) at 1 second into the interaction with the URL. This
provides a new basis from which to kill the connection to the server before an attack has
completed and proactively blocking and preventing an attack, rather than reacting and re-
pairing at a later date.
The extent of damage caused due to a cyber attack on Twitter depends on the number
of people that were exposed to it. Earlier studies have established that emotion and sen-
timents could be transferred to one another through OSNs [89] and they can affect the
posting behaviour of users [120]. Thus, in order to investigate the relationship between
emotion, sentiment and tweets containing malicious links, our first study that links emo-
tions and sentiment to the propagation of tweets containing malicious URLs on Twitter
was conducted. The experimental results showed that there was a statistically significant
association between the social and emotional factors derived from a tweet captured dur-
ing a sporting event. Furthermore, tweets that contain malicious links were associated
with negative emotions, particularly with the emotion fear (30% of total tweets contained
177
words associated with fear), for their retweet likelihood (virality) and survival.
The work conducted in the thesis aimed to address the problem of drive-by download
on Twitter, that accounted for 48% of web-based attacks, by predicting whether a URL
will be pointing to a malicious web server or not within one second of interaction with
the URL, and by identifying the association of negative emotion with retweetability of a
malicious tweet. The outcome of the thesis provides hitherto unavailable means through
which malicious URLs could be proactively identified and factors affecting its propaga-
tion could be used to devise a strategy to curtail its propagation.
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Appendix
The rules for file, process and registry that were defined to identify drive-by downloads
attacks and were used to configure Capture HPC are defined below.
File exclusion list rules 
 
#[+,-] [File Access] [Process Name] [File Path] 
 
################################################### 
### Clean Windows 7 SP 1 System  ### 
################################################### 
+ Read .* .* 
+ Create .* .* 
+ Open .* .* 
#issue in the way process path information is communicated to capture client 
+ Write UNKNOWN .* 
+ Delete UNKNOWN .* 
#capture 
+ Write .* C:\\program files\\capture\\logs\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\program Files\\capture\\captureclient\.exe C:\\program files\\capture\\.+\.zip 
+ Delete C:\\program Files\\capture\\captureclient\.exe C:\\program files\\capture\\logs 
+ Delete C:\\program Files\\capture\\captureclient\.exe C:\\program files\\capture\\logs\\.* 
+ Write C:\\program Files\\capture\\captureclient\.exe C:\\program 
files\\capture\\capture\.log 
+ Write C:\\program Files\\capture\\7za\.exe C:\\program files\\capture\\capture\.log 
+ Write C:\\program Files\\capture\\7za\.exe C:\\program files\\capture\\.+\.zip 
+ Delete C:\\program Files\\capture\\7za\.exe C:\\program files\\capture\\.+\.zip 
+ Write C:\\program Files\\capture\\7za\.exe C:\\progra~1\\capture\\capture\.log 
+ Write C:\\program Files\\capture\\7za\.exe C:\\progra~1\\capture\\.+\.zip 
+ Delete C:\\program Files\\capture\\7za\.exe C:\\progra~1\\capture\\.+\.zip 
#Prefetch 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\Prefetch\\.+ 
+ Write System C:\\WINDOWS\\Prefetch\\.+ 
#NTFS Metadata 
+ Write .* c:\\\$mft 
+ Write .* c:\\\$mftmirr 
+ Write .* c:\\\$logfile 
+ Write .* c:\\\$volume 
+ Write .* c:\\\$directory 
+ Write .* c:\\\$AttrDef 
+ Write .* c:\\\$boot 
+ Write .* c:\\\$bitmap 
+ Write .* c:\\\$badclus 
+ Write .* c:\\\$quota 
+ Write .* c:\\\$upcase 
+ Write .* c:\\\$ReplaceAttribute2 
+ Write .* c:\\\$converttononresident 
#Performance 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap\.exe
 C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\Performance\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\Perf.* 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\Prefetch\\.+ 
+ Write System C:\\WINDOWS\\Prefetch\\.+ 
#System Log Files 
+ Write System C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\.+\.LOG 
+ Write System C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\.+\.LOG 
+ Write System C:\\WINDOWS\\Debug\\UserMode\\userenv\.log 
+ Write System C:\\WINDOWS\\SoftwareDistribution\\ReportingEvents\.log 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\winlogon\.exe
 C:\\WINDOWS\\Debug\\UserMode\\userenv\.log 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\.+\.log 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\.+\.LOG 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\SAM 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\system 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\SECURITY 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse\.exe
 C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\Logs\\wmiprov\.log 
#Windows update 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt\.exe
 C:\\WINDOWS\\SoftwareDistribution\\DataStore\\Logs\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\WindowsUpdate\.log 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt\.exe
 C:\\WINDOWS\\SoftwareDistribution\\DataStore\\DataStore\.edb 
 
+ Delete C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt\.exe
 C:\\WINDOWS\\SoftwareDistribution\\DataStore\\Logs\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\WindowsUpdate\.log 
+ Delete C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt\.exe
 C:\\WINDOWS\\SoftwareDistribution\\DataStore\\DataStore\.edb 
#System Events 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\services\.exe
 C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\AppEvent\.Evt 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\services\.exe
 C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\SysEvent\.Evt 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\services\.exe
 C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\config\\SecEvent\.Evt 
#Mapping 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\.+ 
#Cataloging 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\CatRoot2\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\CatRoot\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\winevt\\Logs\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Windows\\ServiceProfiles\\LocalService\\AppData\\Local\\lastalive0\.+ 
#System restore 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\WINDOWS\\SoftwareDistribution\\WuRedir\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe C:\\System Volume Information\\_restore.* 
#snapshots and crypt url  
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Windows\\System32\\wdi\\.+\\.+\\snapshot.etl 
+ Delete C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Users\\.+\\AppData\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\Content\\.* 
+ Delete C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Users\\.+\\AppData\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\Content\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\Content\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\Content\\.* 
+ Delete C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\MetaData\\.* 
+ Delete C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\MetaData\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\Content\\8059E9A0D314877E4
0FE93D8CCFB3C69_298C7C05A76CF4F87B7E48888C7B12A9 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\Content\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\Content\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\MetaData\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\MetaData\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Windows\\System32\\wdi\\ShutdownPerformanceDiagnostics_SystemData\.bin 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Windows\\System32\\wdi\\BootPerformanceDiagnostics_SystemData\.bin 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\wdi\\.+\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\wdi\\.+\\.* 
#user data 
 
+ Write System C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Local Settings\\Application 
Data\\Microsoft\\Windows\\UsrClass\.dat 
################################################### 
### Win 7 specific files (part of OS) ### 
################################################### 
#Google chrome updating task scheduler 
+ Write System C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\GoogleUpdateTaskMachineCore\\.job 
#+ Write System C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\.+ 
#+ Write System C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\GoogleUpdateTaskMachineCore\\.job 
#+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\.+ 
#+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\.+\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\SYSTEM 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\config\\SYSTEM.LOG1 
# Some sort of windows 7 logging feature 
 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Windows\\System32\\winevt\\Logs\\Microsoft-Windows-HomeGroup Provider 
Service%4Operational\.evtx 
#Win 7 search indexer these are index files created by search indexer 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer\.exe
 C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Search\\Data\\Applications\\Windows\\GatherLogs\\SystemIndex\\.+\
\.* 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer\.exe
 C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Search\\Data\\Applications\\Windows\\GatherLogs\\SystemIndex\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer\.exe
 C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Search\\Data\\Applications\\Windows\\GatherLogs\\SystemIndex\\Sy
stemIndex.4\.gthr 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer\.exe
 C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Search\\Data\\Applications\\Windows\\GatherLogs\\SystemIndex\\Sy
stemIndex.4\.Crwl 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer\.exe
 C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Search\\Data\\Applications\\Windows\\MSS\.log 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer\.exe
 C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Search\\Data\Applications\\Windows\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer\.exe
 C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Search\\Data\Applications\\Windows\\MSS\.chk 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer\.exe
 C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Search\\Data\Applications\\Windows\\tmp\.edb 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer\.exe
 C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Search\\Data\Applications\\Windows\\Windows\.edb 
#WSB = Opened by microsoft works quite possibly log files 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer\.exe
 C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Search\\Data\\Applications\\Windows\\Projects\\SystemIndex\\Index
er\\CiFiles\\.+wsb 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer\.exe
 C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Search\\Data\\Applications\\Windows\\Projects\\SystemIndex\\Index
er\\CiFiles\\.+wid 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer\.exe
 C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Search\\Data\\Applications\\Windows\\Projects\\SystemIndex\\Index
er\\CiFiles\\.* 
#Networking for windows 7 id files 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Windows\\ServiceProfiles\\LocalService\\AppData\\Roaming\\PeerNetworking\\idstore\.sst\.ne
w 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Windows\\ServiceProfiles\\LocalService\\AppData\\Roaming\\PeerNetworking\\idstore\.+ 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Windows\\ServiceProfiles\\LocalService\\AppData\\Local\\.+ 
#Readyboot 
+ Delete C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe C:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\ReadyBoot\\.+ 
#wfpdiag- network trace files 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\wfp\\wfpdiag\.etl 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Crypto\\RSA\\MachineKeys\\4943bf62402c78e35e6a41d057394ac7_0
e17101e-bd8f-4859-ad29-a2b0529004a5 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\services\.exe
 C:\\Windows\\System32\\LogFiles\\Scm\\28e6b4d9-ed90-4c80-b08b-814efb653eff 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Windows\\ServiceProfiles\\LocalService\\AppData\\Roaming\\PeerNetworking\\661081597c497
31a0cbf909a3a1a816bcd7d3e00.HomeGroupClassifier\\473194124b68995eabe9d1640fa2be41\\grouping\\t
mp\.edb 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe
 C:\\Windows\\ServiceProfiles\\LocalService\\AppData\\Roaming\\PeerNetworking\\661081597c497
31a0cbf909a3a1a816bcd7d3e00.HomeGroupClassifier\\473194124b68995eabe9d1640fa2be41\\grouping\\t
mp\.edb 
################################################### 
### Internet Explorer 6.0 SP2(browser activities)### 
################################################### 
#somehow VMwareService & System accesses the same files when IE is browsing. 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\VMware Tools\\VMwareService\.exe .* 
+ Write System .* 
# IE Temporary Files/Internet Cache.  
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Local 
Settings\\Temporary Internet Files\\Content\.IE5\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Local 
Settings\\Temp\\.+tmp 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\WINDOWS\\Temp\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Local 
Settings\\Temporary Internet Files\\Content\.IE5\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Local 
Settings\\Temp\\.+tmp 
# History 
 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Local 
Settings\\History\\History.IE5\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Local 
Settings\\History\\History.IE5\\.+ 
# IE Cookies 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\.+\\Cookies\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\.+\\Cookies\\index.dat 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\.+\\Cookies\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\.+\\Cookies\\index.dat 
# User data 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\.+\\Application Data\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\.+\\UserData\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\.+\\Application Data\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\.+\\UserData\\.+ 
# Plug ins (like Flash player) 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\.+\\Application Data\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\.+\\Application Data\\.+ 
# DRM related stuff 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\.+\\DRM\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\.+\\DRM\\.+ 
# msg activeX 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\.+\\NTUSER.DAT.LOG 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe C:\\Documents and 
Settings\\.+\\NTUSER.DAT.LOG 
################################################### 
### Internet Explorer 8.0  updated for win7 ### 
################################################### 
#System level log files/cache files (some regarding certificates of websites) Generally written after the visit of 
any malicious website. 
#User Data for win 7's updated file system 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\.+\\AppData\\LocalLow\\Microsoft\\CryptnetUrlCache\\.+\\.* 
#IE Temporary Files 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\.+\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\.+tmp 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\.+tmp 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\.+tmp 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\.+\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\.+tmp 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Temporary Internet Files\\Content.IE5\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Temporary Internet Files\\Content.IE5\\.+ 
######################################## is this really safe? some temp files can be ok; others cannot 
=[  ################################################################# 
+ write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Temporary Internet Files\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Temporary Internet Files\\.+ 
# IE Internet Cache. 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\.+\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Temporary Internet Files\\Content.IE5\\+.txt 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\.+\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Recovery\\.+dat 
#IE Cookies 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies\\.+txt 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\.+\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies\\.+txt 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\.+\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\.+\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Cookies\\.+ 
#IE History ###Volatile 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\History\History.IE5\\.+ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\History\History.IE5\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\History\History.IE5\\.+\\.* 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\History\History.IE5\\.+\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\History\History.IE5\\.+\\index\.dat 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\History\\History.IE5\\MSHist0120140224201
40225\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\History\\History.IE5\\MSHist0120140224201
40225\\index\.dat 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\History\\History.IE5\\.+\\index\.dat 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\History\\History.IE5\\.+\\index\.dat 
#frame icon cache 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\frameiconcache.dat  
#GoogleUpdateFiles 
#+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\.* 
#Morelogfiles 
+ Write C:\\Windows\\System32\\services\.exe C:\\Windows\\System32\\LogFiles\\.* 
+ Write System C:\\Windows\\Tasks\\.* 
#IE WEB STORAGE (DOMSTORE) downloads and saves cookies etc - no sign of malicious activity previously put 
there.  
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\DOMStore\\.+ 
#flash macromedia C:\Users\mp\AppData\Roaming\Macromedia\Flash 
Player\macromedia.com\support\flashplayer\sys\#s.ytimg.com\settings.sxx# 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\macromedia.com\\support\\flashplayer\\sys\#s.ytimg.com\\settings.sxx 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\macromedia.com\\support\\flashplayer\\sys\#s.ytimg.com\\settings.sxx 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\macromedia.com\\support\\flashplayer\\sys\\settings.sxx 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\macromedia.com\\support\\flashplayer\\sys\\settings.sxx 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\macromedia.com\\support\\flashplayer\\sys\\settings.sol 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\macromedia.com\\support\\flashplayer\\sys\\settings.sol 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\macromedia.com\\support\\flashplayer\\sys\#s.ytimg.com\\settings.sol 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\macromedia.com\\support\\flashplayer\\sys\#s.ytimg.com\\settings.sol 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\macromedia.com\\support\\flashplayer\\sys\#s.ytimg.com\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\macromedia.com\\support\\flashplayer\\sys\\.* 
 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\macromedia.com\\support\\flashplayer\\sys\#s.ytimg.com\\.* 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\macromedia.com\\support\\flashplayer\\sys\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\#SharedObjects\\GV7ZM8GP\\s.ytimg.com\\restore.sxx 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\#SharedObjects\\GV7ZM8GP\\s.ytimg.com\\restore.sxx 
#+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash Player\\.+\\GV7ZM8GP\\s.ytimg.com\\.* 
#+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash Player\\.+\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash Player\\.+\\.+\\s.ytimg.com\\videostats.sxx 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\.+\\.+\\s.ytimg.com\\soundData.sxx 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash Player\\.+\\.+\\s.ytimg.com\\restore.sxx" 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash Player\\.+\\.+\\s.ytimg.com\\videostats.sxx 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\.+\\.+\\s.ytimg.com\\soundData.sxx 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash Player\\.+\\.+\\s.ytimg.com\\restore.sxx" 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash Player\\.+\\.+\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\.+\\4WCZFSR2\\s.ytimg.com\\restore.sxx 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Macromedia\\Flash 
Player\\.+\\4WCZFSR2\\s.ytimg.com\\restore.sxx 
################################################### 
### firefox v26  updated for win7  ### 
################################################### 
#Relatively safe file no sign of maliciousness 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\startupCache\\start
upCache.4.little 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\startupCache\\start
upCache.4.little 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\.+\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\startupCache\\startu
pCache.4.little 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\.+\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\startupCache\\startu
pCache.4.little 
#startup cache 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\startupCache 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\startupCache 
#first time run of firefox creates and stores a profile there 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\compatibility.ini 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\compatibility.ini 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\.+\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\compatibility.ini 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\.+\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\compatibility.ini 
#More firefox profiles 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\webapps\webap
ps-1.json 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\webapps\webap
ps-1.json 
#Always created at first launch of firefox 
 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\marionette.log 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\marionette.log 
#Firefox temp files  
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Temporary Internet Files\\desktop.ini 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Temporary Internet Files\\desktop.ini 
#desktopini C:\Users\mp\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\desktop.ini 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Temporary Internet 
Files\\Content.IE5\desktop.ini 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Temporary Internet 
Files\\Content.IE5\desktop.ini 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Temporary Internet Files\\desktop.ini 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Temporary Internet Files\\desktop.ini 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Temporary Internet 
Files\\Content.IE5\\desktop.ini 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Temporary Internet 
Files\\Content.IE5\\desktop.ini 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\mozilla-temp-files\\mozilla-temp-12941 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\mozilla-temp-files\\.+ 
#Firefox cache 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\Cache\\_CACHE_MA
P_ 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\Cache\\_CACHE_MA
P_ 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\Cache\\.* 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\Cache\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\Cache\\.+\F1\.* 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\Cache\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\Cache\\.+\F1\.* 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\Cache\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\Cache\\.+ 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\_CACHE_CLEAN_ 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\.* 
#places.sqlite stores the annotations, bookmarks, favorite icons, input history, keywords, and browsing 
history. 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\places.sqlite-wal 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\places.sqlite-wal 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\places.sqlite 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\places.sqlite 
#cookies.sqliteHolds all of your cookies, including login information, session data, and preferences. 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\cookies.sqlite-
wal 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\cookies.sqlite-
wal 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\cookies.sqlite 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\cookies.sqlite 
#places.sqlite stores the annotations, bookmarks, favorite icons, input history, keywords, and browsing 
history. 
 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\permissions.sqlit
e-journal 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\permissions.sqlit
e-journal 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\.* 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\permissions.sqlit
e 
#safebrowsing malware/pshish etc files (built in firefox security feature) 
#safebrowsing malware 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\safebrowsing\\.* 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\safebrowsing\\test-
malware-simple.cache 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\safebrowsing\\test-
malware-simple.pset 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\safebrowsing\\test-
malware-simple.pset\ 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\safebrowsing\\test-
malware-simple.sbstore 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\safebrowsing\\test-
malware-simple.sbstore 
#safebrowsing phish 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\safebrowsing\\.* 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\safebrowsing\\test-
phish-simple.pset 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\safebrowsing\\test-
phish-simple.sbstore 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\safebrowsing\\test-
phish-simple.sbstore 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\safebrowsing\\test-
phish-simple.cache 
#Safebrowsing to delete folder 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\safebrowsing-
to_delete\\.* 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\safebrowsing-
to_delete 
#+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\safebrowsing-
to_delete\\test-phish-simple.sbstore 
#thumbails  
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Local\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\thumbnails\\.+ 
#Certificates 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\cert8.db 
#Session data (saves session data including open win and tabs) 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\sessionstore.js.t
mp 
#Firefox Preferances 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\prefs-1.js 
#URL Classifier 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\urlclassifierkey3.
txt 
#webappstore 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\webappsstore.sq
lite-wal 
 
+ Delete C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\webappsstore.sq
lite-wal 
+ Write C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 C:\\Users\\mp\\AppData\\Roaming\\Mozilla\\Firefox\\Profiles\\rg570dm1.default\\.* 
################################################### 
### Minus List - General Malicious Activity ### 
################################################### 
# Alert about executables or scripts that are written to disk 
- Write .* .+\.bat 
- Write .* .+\.cmd 
- Write .* .+\.exe 
#- Write .* .+\.inf 
#- Write .* .+\.lnk 
#- Write .* .+\.msi 
#- Write .* .+\.msp 
#- Write .* .+\.pif 
#- Write .* .+\.reg 
#- Write .* .+\.sct 
#- Write .* .+\.shs 
#- Write .* .+\.scr 
#- Write .* .+\.wsc 
#- Write .* .+\.wsf 
#- Write .* .+\.wsh 
#commented out for IE because \.com cache files and \.vb script files are very common 
#- Write .* .+\.vb 
#- Write .* .+\.com 
# Alert about modifications to startup locations 
- Write .* C:\\Documents and Settings\\.+\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup.+ 
- Write .* C:\\WINDOWS\\win.ini 
- Write .* C:\\WINDOWS\\Tasks\\.+ 
 
  
Process exclusion list 
#[+,-] [Process Created] [Parent Process] [Process Path] 
################################################### 
### Clean Windows 7 SP 1 System done  ### 
################################################### 
#issue in the way process path information is communicated to capture client 
+ UNKNOWN .* UNKNOWN 
#capture client itself 
+ CaptureClient.exe .* C:\\Program Files\\Capture\\CaptureClient\.exe 
+ CaptureClient.bat .* C:\\Program Files\\Capture\\CaptureClient\.bat 
+ 7za.exe .* C:\\Program Files\\Capture\\7za\.exe 
# 
#Windows update (it runs even if disabled) 
+ wuauclt.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt\.exe 
# 
+ savedump.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\savedump\.exe 
#Standard screensaver 
+ logon.scr .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\logon\.scr 
# 
#defragmenter 
+ dfrgntfs.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\dfrgntfs\.exe 
+ defrag.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\defrag\.exe 
# 
#7za 
+ 7za.exe .* C:\\program Files\\capture\\7za\.exe 
#Line 25 
#mapping 
+ wmiadap.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap\.exe 
+ wmiprvse.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse\.exe 
# 
#vmware tools 
+ VMwareUser.exe .* C:\\Program Files\\VMware\\VMware Tools\\VMwareUser\.exe 
# 
#Windows 7 processes - beneign process for windows running services 
+ svchost.exe .* C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost\.exe 
#DLLHOST manages dll based apps- care there is incertainty around 30% say it can be infectedcomment out if 
desired 
+ dllhost.exe .* C:\\Windows\\System32\\dllhost\.exe 
+ taskhost.exe .* C:\\Windows\\System32\\taskhost\.exe 
# 
#Services is commented out: it's a windows process but it's been shown to be prone to attacks 
#+ services.exe .* C:\Windows\System32\services\.exe 
# 
#Windows 7 task scheduler - according to reviews ol seems harmless C:\Program 
Files\Google\Update\GoogleUpdate.exe 
+ taskeng.exe .* C:\\Windows\\System32\\taskeng\.exe 
# 
#Windows 7 Search processes built in 
+ SearchProtocolHost.exe .* C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchProtocolHost\.exe 
+ SearchFilterHost.exe .* C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchFilterHost\.exe 
+ SearchIndexer.exe .* C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer\.exe 
# Line 49 
#User termi process 
+ winlogon.exe .* C:\\Windows\\System32\\winlogon\.exe 
+ userinit.exe .* C:\\Windows\\System32\\userinit\.exe 
#csrss important win process 
+ csrss.exe .* C:\\Windows\\System32\\csrss\.exe 
#Conhost fixes some console bugs from win vista 
+ conhost.exe .* C:\\Windows\\System32\\conhost\.exe 
+    .* C:\\Windows\\System32\\mobsync\.exe 
################################################### 
### Microsoft Internet Explorer 8.0  ### 
################################################### 
+ iexplore.exe .* C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore.exe 
+ IEXPLORE.EXE .* C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\IEXPLORE.EXE 
#agent server is an activeX control that starts upon displaying multimedia content 
+ agentsvr.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\msagent\\agentsvr.exe 
#messenger activeX 
+ msmsgs.exe .* C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs.exe 
+ rundll32.exe .* C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\rundll32.exe 
#imapi 
+ imapi.exe .* c:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\imapi\.exe 
 
################################################### 
### Firefox v27    ### 
################################################### 
+ firefox.exe .* C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox.exe 
################################################### 
### Google update    ### 
################################################### 
#Google Update processes 
+ GoogleUpdate.exe .* C:\\Program Files\\Google\\Update\\GoogleUpdate\.exe 
+ UNKNOWN .* C:\\Program Files\\Google\\Update\\GoogleUpdate\.exe 
+ GoogleUpdate.exe .* C:\\Windows\\System32\\taskeng\.exe 
 
 
 
  
Registry Exclusion list 
#[+,-] [Registry Event] [Process Name] [Registry Path] 
################################################### 
### Microsoft Windows XPSP2 Updated for win 7sp1### 
################################################### 
+ OpenKey .* .* 
+ CreateKey .* .* 
+ CloseKey .* .* 
+ EnumerateKey .* .* 
+ EnumerateValueKey .* .* 
+ QueryValueKey .* .* 
+ QueryKey .* .* 
#issue in the way process path information is communicated to capture client 
+ SetValueKey UNKNOWN .* 
+ DeleteValueKey UNKNOWN .* 
+ SetValueKey .* HKU\\.+\\SessionInformation\\ProgramCount 
+ SetValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam.* 
+ SetValueKey .*
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Installer\\UserData\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey .* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\RNG\\Seed.* 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Capture\\CaptureClient.exe
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\nm\\Parameters\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe HKCU\\SessionInformation\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe
 HKU\\.+\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache\\Paths\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe
 HKU\\.+\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam\\BagMRU\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\winlogon.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Group Policy\\State\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe \\REGISTRY\\USER\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKU\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\EAPOL\\Parameters\\General\\InterfaceList 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\AuthRoot\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\PCHealth\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\services.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe HKLM\\SECURITY\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Protected 
Storage System Provider\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\WBEM\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap.exe
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\WmiApRpl\\Performance\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Perflib\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\WBEM\\WDM\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey .* HKU\\.+\\SessionInformation\\ProgramCount 
+ DeleteValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam.* 
+ DeleteValueKey .*
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Installer\\UserData\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey .* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\RNG\\Seed.* 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Capture\\CaptureClient.exe
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\nm\\Parameters\\.+ 
 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe HKCU\\SessionInformation\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe
 HKU\\.+\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\explorer.exe
 HKU\\.+\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam\\BagMRU\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\winlogon.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Group Policy\\State\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe \\REGISTRY\\USER\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKU\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\AuthRoot\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\PCHealth\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\Root\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\services.exe HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe HKLM\\SECURITY\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Protected 
Storage System Provider\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\WBEM\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap.exe
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\WmiApRpl\\Performance\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiadap.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Perflib\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wbem\\wmiprvse.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\WBEM\\WDM\\.+ 
#defrag 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\dfrgntfs.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Dfrg.* 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\dfrgntfs.exe HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Dfrg.* 
#windows update 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt.exe
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\Eventlog\\Application\\ESENT\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wuauclt.exe
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\Eventlog\\Application\\ESENT\\.+ 
################################################### 
### Microsoft Windows 7 SP1 Updates  ### 
################################################### 
#Win7 System specific reg changes 
#Explorer 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\HomeGroup\\UIStatusCache\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe HKCR\\Local Settings\\MuiCache\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Windows\\explorer.exe
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\services\\NlaSvc\\Parameters\\Internet\\ManualProxies 
#Search Indexer 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Search\\Gather\\Windows\\SystemIndex\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchIndexer.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Search\\.* 
#lsass- Note seems "volatile" keep an eye on this please~ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe
 HKU\\.DEFAULT\\Software\\Classes\\Local Settings\\MuiCache\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe
 HKU\\.DEFAULT\\Software\\Classes\\Local Settings\\MuiCache\\.+\\.+\\LanguageList.* 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe
 HKU\\.DEFAULT\\Software\\Classes\\Local Settings\\MuiCache\\.+\\.+\\.* 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe
 HKU\\.DEFAULT\\Software\\Classes\\Local Settings\\MuiCache\\.* 
 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe
 HKU\\.DEFAULT\\Software\\Classes\\Local Settings\\MuiCache\\.+\\.+\\LanguageList 
#taskend 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\taskeng.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Schedule\\Handshake\\.+ 
#SVCHOST 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\WBEM\\Transports\\Decoupled\\Client\\.+\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\WBEM\\Transports\\Decoupled\\Client\\.* 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet 
Explorer\\LowRegistry\\Audio\\PolicyConfig\\PropertyStore\\.+\\.* 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet 
Explorer\\LowRegistry\\Audio\\PolicyConfig\\PropertyStore\\ee00d86b_0\\.* 
#SearchProtocolHost 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\SearchProtocolHost.exe
 HKU\\.DEFAULT\\Software\\Classes\Local Settings\\.* 
#SVCHOST- contains a number of individual services that perform a range of functions such as win defender 
services - can have multiple instances of this 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\WBEM\CIMOM\\ConfigValueEssNeedsLoading 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\WBEM\\CIMOM\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\WBEM\\CIMOM\\.* 
+ SetValueKey System HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\Nsi\\.* 
+ SetValueKey System HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\Nsi\\.+  
#System setting and deleting value keys- practically unknown but seems to be actively being picked up 
+ SetValueKey System
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\Capabi
lities 
+ DeleteValueKey System
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\UINu
mber 
+ SetValueKey System
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\.* 
+ SetValueKey System
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\.+
  
+ DeleteValueKey System
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\.* 
+ DeleteValueKey System
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey .* HKLM\\SYSTEM\\.+\\Control\\DeviceClasses\\.+\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey .* HKLM\\SYSTEM\\.+\\Control\\DeviceClasses\\.+\\.+ 
#System logs?  
+ SetValueKey .* HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\Circular 
Kernel Context Logger\\Status 
+ DeleteValueKey .* HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\Circular 
Kernel Context Logger\\Status 
#SpoolSV- Windows printing and fax services -usually docs sent to this service before reaching the printer.  
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\Print\\Printers\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\Print\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Print\\Printers\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Ports\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe HKU\\S-1-5-
19\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Devices\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe HKU\\S-1-5-
19\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\PrinterPorts\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe
 HKU\\.+\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Devices\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe
 HKU\\.+\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\PrinterPorts\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe HKU\\S-1-5-
19\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Devices\\Fax 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe HKU\\S-1-5-
19\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\PrinterPorts\\Fax 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe
 HKU\\.+\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Devices\\Fax 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe
 HKU\\.+\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\PrinterPorts\\Fax 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe
 HKU\\.DEFAULT\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Devices\\.+ 
 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe
 HKU\\.DEFAULT\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\PrinterPorts\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe
 HKU\\.DEFAULT\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Devices\\Fax 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe
 HKU\\.DEFAULT\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\PrinterPorts\\Fax 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows 
NT\\CurrentVersion\\Devices\\Microsoft XPS Document Writer 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows 
NT\\CurrentVersion\\PrinterPorts\\Microsoft XPS Document Writer 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows 
NT\\CurrentVersion\\Devices\\Fax 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\spoolsv.exe HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows 
NT\\CurrentVersion\\PrinterPorts\\Fax 
#####explorer 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\explorer\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Action Center\\Checks\\.+\\CheckSetting 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\explorer\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Action Center\\Checks\\.+\\CheckSetting 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\explorer\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Action Center\\Checks\\.+\\CheckSetting 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\explorer\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Action Center\\Checks\\.+\\CheckSetting 
############################################################## 
##########Very volatile can change need a fix perm ########### 
############################################################## 
+ SetValueKey .*
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\Capa
bilities 
+ DeleteValueKey .*
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\UINu
mber 
+ DeleteValueKey .*
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\LogC
onf\BasicConfigVector 
+ SetValueKey .*
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\Hard
wareID 
+ SetValueKey .*
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\Comp
atibleIDs 
+ SetValueKey .*
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\Conta
inerID 
+ SetValueKey .*
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\Devic
e Parameters\\NodeID 
+ SetValueKey .*
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\Devic
e Parameters\\Identity 
+ DeleteValueKey .*
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\LogC
onf\\BootConfig 
+ SetValueKey .*
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\Capa
bilities 
+ DeleteValueKey .*
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\UINu
mber 
+ SetValueKey .* HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\services\\umbus\\Enum\\1 
+ SetValueKey .* HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\services\\umbus\\Enum\\Count 
+ SetValueKey .* HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\services\\umbus\\Enum\\NextInstance 
+ SetValueKey .*
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\Capa
bilities 
+ DeleteValueKey .*
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Enum\\UMB\\UMB\\1&841921d&0&PrinterBusEnumerator\\UINu
mber 
################################################### 
### Internet Explorer 6.0 SP2   ### 
################################################### 
+ OpenKey .* .* 
+ CreateKey .* .* 
+ CloseKey .* .* 
+ EnumerateKey .* .* 
+ EnumerateValueKey .* .* 
 
+ QueryValueKey .* .* 
+ QueryKey .* .* 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\EUDC\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\Window_Placement 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\Fullscreen 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\NotificationDownloadComplete 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe   
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Toolbar\\Locked 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\International\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Security\\P3Global\\Enabled 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\CmdMapping\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\PageSetup\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\MenuOrder\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\MountPoints2\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\UserAssist\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\CabinetState\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet 
Settings\\ZoneMap\\UNCAsIntranet 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Toolbar\\WebBrowser\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet 
Settings\\ZoneMap\\IntranetName 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\AutoDetect 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\ProxyBypass 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet 
Settings\\ZoneMap\\UNCAsIntranet 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\MigrateProxy 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ProxyEnable 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ProxyServer 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Connections\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\5.0\\Cache\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Ext\\Stats\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam\\BagMRU.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam\\Bags.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Ext\\Stats\\.+\\iexplore\\(Count|Time|Typ
e) 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ParseAutoexec 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\5.0\\Cache.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Passport\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Direct3D.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DirectDraw.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\RNG\\Seed 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\AudioCompressionManager\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\5.0\\Cache. 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Hardware 
Profiles\\0001\\Software\\Microsoft\\windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ProxyEnable 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\EventLog\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCU\\EUDC\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\Window_Placement 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\Fullscreen 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\NotificationDownloadComplete 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\TypedURLs 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Toolbar\\Locked 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\International\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Security\\P3Global\\Enabled 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Extensions\\CmdMapping\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\PageSetup\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\MenuOrder\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\MountPoints2\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\UserAssist\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\CabinetState\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet 
Settings\\ZoneMap\\UNCAsIntranet 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet 
Settings\\ZoneMap\\IntranetName 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\AutoDetect 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ZoneMap\\ProxyBypass 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet 
Settings\\ZoneMap\\UNCAsIntranet 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\MigrateProxy 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ProxyEnable 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ProxyServer 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Connections\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\5.0\\Cache\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Ext\\Stats\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam\\BagMRU.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\ShellNoRoam\\Bags.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Ext\\Stats\\.+\\iexplore\\(Count|Time|Typ
e) 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\ParseAutoexec 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\5.0\\Cache.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Passport\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Direct3D.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\DirectDraw.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Cryptography\\RNG\\Seed 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\AudioCompressionManager\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\SystemCertificates\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\Cache.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\5.0\\Cache.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Hardware 
Profiles\\0001\\Software\\Microsoft\\windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ProxyEnable 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\EventLog\\.+ 
+ DeleteKey .* .* 
#Plugins 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Scrunch\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\MediaPlayer\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Media\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Multimedia\\ActiveMovie\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\ActiveMovie\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\MPEG2Demultiplexer\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Multimedia\\msacm.imaadpcm\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\msagent\\agentsvr\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\AudioCompressionManager\\DriverCache\\msacm.msadpcm\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\msagent\\agentsvr\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Agent\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe
 HKCU\\AppEvents\\Schemes\\Apps\\MSMSGS.* 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe
 HKCU\\AppEvents\\EventLabels\\MSMsgs.+ 
 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\MSMSGS 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\EventSystem\\.+\\Subscriptions\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Scrunch\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\MediaPlayer\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Media\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Multimedia\\ActiveMovie\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\ActiveMovie\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\MPEG2Demultiplexer\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Multimedia\\msacm.imaadpcm\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\msagent\\agentsvr\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\AudioCompressionManager\\DriverCache\\msacm.msadpcm\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\msagent\\agentsvr\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Microsoft Agent\\. 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe
 HKCU\\AppEvents\\EventLabels\\MSMsgs.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe
 HKCU\\AppEvents\\Schemes\\Apps\\MSMSGS.* 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\MSMSGS 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Messenger\\msmsgs\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\EventSystem\\.+\\Subscriptions\\.+ 
################################################### 
### Internet Explorer 8.0 SP1   ### 
################################################### 
#May need more investigation - Current research shows a bit of uncertainty regarding what these actually do 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Rpc\\UuidSequenceNumber 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\CompatibilityFlags 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Recovery\\AdminActive\\.+ 
 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.ex
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet 
Settings\\ZoneMap\\ProxyBypass 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet 
Settings\\ZoneMap\\IntranetName 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\services\\NlaSvc\\Parameters\\Internet\\ManualProxies 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\WindowsSearch\\Version 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Direct3D\\MostRecentApplication\\Name 
#Language list 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCR\\Local 
Settings\\MuiCache\\A\\52C64B7E\\LanguageList 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCR\\Local 
Settings\\MuiCache\\.+\\.+\\LanguageList 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe HKCR\\Local 
Settings\\MuiCache\\.* 
#DOMSTORAGE 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\DOMStorage\\Total 
 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\DOMStorage\\.+ 
#Windows search 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\Main\\WindowsSearch\\UpgradeTime 
#Linksbar (recently searched/typed addresses in iE) 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\LinksBar\\ItemCache\\.+ 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Internet Explorer\\LinksBar\\ItemCache\\.+ 
#flashplayer 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Macromedia\\FlashPlayer\\FlashPlayerVersion 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Macromedia\\FlashPlayer\\FlashPlayerVersion 
#Mob Sync (windows process to keep compornments updated 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\mobsync\.exe HKCR\\Local 
Settings\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\SyncMgr\\HandlerInstances\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\mobsync\.exe HKCR\\Local 
Settings\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\SyncMgr\\HandlerInstances\\.+\\.+ 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\mobsync\.exe HKCR\\Local 
Settings\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\SyncMgr\\HandlerInstances\\.+\\SyncTime 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\mobsync\.exe HKCR\\Local 
Settings\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\SyncMgr\\StartAtLogin 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\mobsync\.exe HKCR\\Local 
Settings\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\SyncMgr\\HandlerInstances\\.+\\Enabled 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Windows\\System32\\mobsync\.exe HKCR\\Local 
Settings\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\SyncMgr\\HandlerInstances\\.+\\connected 
################################################### 
### Firefox v26     ### 
################################################### 
#Firefox browser 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ProxyEnable 
+ SetValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet 
Settings\\Connections\\SavedLegacySettings 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ProxyServer 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\ProxyOverride 
+ DeleteValueKey C:\\Program Files\\Mozilla Firefox\\firefox\.exe
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings\\AutoConfigURL 
###################################################### UNKNOWN"? 
+ SetValueKey .* HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows 
NT\\CurrentVersion\\Schedule\\Handshake\\.+ 
################################################### 
### Minus List - General Malicious Activity ### 
################################################### 
#Any modification to start/bootup sequence 
- SetValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run.* 
- SetValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run.* 
- SetValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows 
NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Run.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows 
NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Run.* 
- SetValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows 
NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Load.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows 
NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\Load.* 
- SetValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows 
NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows 
NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Userinit.* 
- SetValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows 
NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows 
NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Shell.* 
- SetValueKey .*
 HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run.* 
 
- DeleteValueKey .*
 HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run.* 
- SetValueKey .*
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run.* 
- DeleteValueKey .*
 HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run.* 
- SetValueKey .* HLKM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session 
Manager\\BootExecute.* 
- DeleteValueKey .* HLKM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session 
Manager\\BootExecute.* 
- SetValueKey .*
 HLKM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\ShellServiceObjectDelayLoad\\.* 
- DeleteValueKey .*
 
